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I. INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
A. Contrasting Destinies of Industrial Art and Industrial Literature 
Because industrial design partakes of both art and industry, it sits 
astride the Berne and Paris Conventions, I which otherwise purport to subdi-
vide the world's intellectual property system into mutually exclusive spheres 
dominated by the copyright and patent paradigms. 2 Empirically, ornamen-
tal designs of useful articles (or "appearance designs" as they are called 
today) seldom behave like the subject matters that either of these paradigms 
typically governs. Viewed as industrial property, appearance designs seek 
protection under design patent laws3 or sui generis design laws that tradi-
tionally operate on modified patent principles.4 In practice, relatively few 
1. "A design. . . is an ensemble of lines, surfaces, volumes, and profiles connected with 
each other in subtle or unique ways so as to give a characteristic external appearance to 
an article .... " 2 S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PRarECTIoN 829 (1975). For international regulation of 
this subject matter as either artistic or industrial property, see Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, last revised at Paris, July 24, 
1971, art. 2(1) ("The expression 'literary and artistic works' shall include ... works 
of applied art. "), id. art. 2(7) ("Works of Applied Art and Industrial Designs and 
Models") [hereinafter Berne Convention], reprinted in 3 WIPO & UNESCO, COpy-
RIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, Berne Conv., item H (1987); Paris Conven-
tion for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, last revised at Stockholm, 
July 14, 1967, art. 5 quinquies, 21 US.T. 1583, T.I.A.S. No. 6923,328 UN.T.S. 305 
[hereinafter Paris Convention] ("Industrial designs shall be protected in all the coun-
tries of the Union."); see also Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, arts. I, 
IV, 6 US.T. 2731, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, last revised at Paris, July 24, 
1971,25 US.T. 1341, T.I.A.S. No. 7868 [hereinafter U C.C]. See generally S. RICKET-
SON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PRarECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 
1886-1986 267-82 (1987); A. BOGSCH, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT UNDER THE UNIVERSAL 
CONVENTION 50-51 (1968); 2 S. LADAS, supra, at 827-44. 
2. Compare Berne Convention, supra note I, art. 1 (constituting "a Union for the protec-
tion of the rights of authors in their literary and artistic works") with Paris Convention, 
supra note 1, art. 1 (1) (constituting "a Union for the protection of industrial property") 
and id. art. I (2) (defining object of protection as "patents, utility models, industrial 
designs, trademarks. . . and the repression of unfair competition"). 
3. The prototypical example is the Act of August 29, 1842 [U.S.A.], ch. 263, § 2, 5 Stat. 
543 (1842) (codified as amended at 35 US.C. §§ 171-73,289 (1988». See generally I 
D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1.04[1] (1988). For examples of other design laws largely 
shaped by the full patent paradigm, see the Registered Designs Act, 1949 (Design Stat-
ute) [United Kingdom], 12, 13 & 14 Oeo. 6, ch. 88, reprinted in UNESCO & BIRPI, 
DESIGN LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD, United Kingdom, item I, (A. Bogsch ed. 
1969-71) [hereinafter DESIGN t-Aws] (1949 text), amended by Copyright, Designs, and 
Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, §§ 265-273; Industrial and Commercial Property (Protec-
tion) Act (Ireland], 1927 (Part III, Designs); Industrial Designs Act [Canada), R.S.C. 
ch. 1-8 (1970). See generally R. MERKIN, RICHARDS Bun..ER ON COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS 
AND PATENTS: THE NEW LAw 308-26 (1989); I. MORRIS & B. QuEST, DESIGN-THE 
MODERN LAW AND PRACTICE 10-59 (1987); C. FELLNER, THE FUTURE OF LEGAL PRo-
TECTION FOR INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 11-20 (1985). The Japanese design law also follows 
the patent model. See infra note 82. 
4. See, e.g., Uniform Benelux Designs Law, annexed to the Benelux Designs Convention, 
signed at Brussels on Oct. 25, 1966, effective Jan. I, 1975, reprinted in 13 INDUS. PRop. 
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designs meet the formal and substantive prerequisites these laws normally 
impose.s Viewed as works of applied art, appearance designs seeking 
copyright protection become embodied in mass-produced useful articles of 
every kind.6 With the notable exception of France, courts and legislators in 
most industrialized countries limit copyright protection of three-dimension-
al appearance designs 7 in order to defend the capacity of their industrial 
property systems to mediate between innovation and competition on the 
general products market. 8 Trapped between the patent and copyright para-
177-83 (1974); Law on Designs and Models (Design Law) [France), July 14, 1909,last 
amended by decree of Apr. 24, 1980, reprinted in DEsiGN LAWS, supra note 3, France, 
item I (English version 1909 text); Act Concerning Copyright in Designs of January 
II, 1876 (Design Act (Geschmacksmuster» [Fed. Rep. of Germany), as last amended 
Dec. 18, 1986, effective Dec. 18, 1986, and July I, 1988, reprinted in GERMAN INDUS· 
TRIAL PROPERTY, COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAws 82-89 (F.K. Beier, G. Schricker, and 
W. Fikentscher 2d ed. 1989) [hereinafter GERMAN LAws]; Decree No. 1411 on Models 
and Designs of Aug. 25, 1940 [Italy), as amended May 23, 1977, June 27, 1979 
(Decree No. 338), and Feb. 14, 1987 (Decree No. 60) [hereinafter Italian design law), 
reprinted in DESIGN LAws, supra note 3 ,Italy, item I (1940 English version), reprinted in 
ARMONIZZAZIONE DELLA NORMATIVA IN MATERIA Dt BREVETrI PER MODELL! E DtSEGNI 
INDUSTRIALI CON LE DtSPOSIZIONI DELL'AcCORDO DELLJ\JA DEL 6 NOVEMBRE 1925, E 
SUCCESSIVI REVISIONI, RATIFlCATE CON LEGGE 24 OrrosRE 1980, N. 744 [legge 14 
Febbraio 1987, n.6O) (L.c. Ubertazzi ed.), II LE NUOVE LEGal ClVICI COMMENTATE 
589-90 (1988) (Italian text) [hereinafter ARMONIZZAZIONE DELLA NORMATlVA]; Nordic 
Design Laws, reprinted in 10 INDUS. PROP. 223-40 (1971) (English version) (effective in 
1970 in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and in 1971 in Finland). For citations to, and 
summary descriptions of other foreign (,Iesign laws, see A.M. GREENE, DESIGNS AND 
UTILITY MODELS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD (1989). 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 319-31,813-17,845-58,889-95. 
6. See, e.g., B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF CoPYRIGHT 55 (1967) (warning of "the 
dangers of injecting copyright into complex, going market mechanisms"); see also 
Comment, CopyrighJ Protection for Mass-Produced, Commercial Products: A Review of 
the Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. CHI. L. REV, 807 (1971) [hereinafter 
Comment, CopyrighJ Protection). 
7. France allows all ornamental and some functional designs of useful articles to claim 
concurrent protection in copyright law whether or not eligible for protection under its 
sui generis.design law. See, e.g., Gaubiac, La tMorie de ['unite de ['art, III R.l.D.A. 2 
(1982) (describing and criticizing French regime of total cumulation under the "unity 
of art" doctrine); Desbois, Le systemefrancais: La theorie de ['unite de ['art, reprinted 
in LES PERSPECTIVES D'UN DROIT COMMUNAlrTAIRE EN MATIERE DE DESSINS ET 
MODELES INDUSTRIELS 74 (Centre Universitaire d'Enseignement et de Recherche de 
Propri~te Industrielle (CUERPl) ed. 1977) [hereinafter LES PERSPECTIVES]; see also 
infra text accompanying notes 813-47. 
8. See infra notes 44-46,832-47 and accompanying text. For recent comparative surveys, 
see, e.g., Perot-Morel, Les enseignements du droit compare europeen etles perspectives 
communautaires [hereinafter Perot-Morel, Les enseignements), in LES DESSINS ET 
MODELES EN QuESTION: LE DROIT ET LA PRATIQUE 147-230 (A. Fran~on & M.A. 
Perot-Morel eds. 1986) [hereinafter LES DEsslNS ET MODELES EN QuESTION]; Benussi, 
Protection of Industrial Designs in Italian and Comparative European Law, 25 INDUS. 
PROP. 61 (1986); Duchemin, General Report-The Protection of Designs and Models 
[hereinafter Duchemin, General Report) in ALAI, LA PROTECTION DES DESSINS ET 
MODELES 47-79 (1985) [hereinafter ALAI 1984) (proceedings of the Symposium held 
at Paris, Apr. 5-6, 1984); Cohen Jehoram, Protection of Industrial Design Between 
Copyright and Design Laws: A Comparative Study [hereinafter Cohen Jehoram, Com-
parative'Study], in ALAI, CONGRESS OF THE AEGEAN SEA 77-104 (1984) [hereinafter 
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digms, yet ill-served by both,9 industrial design constitutes a legal hybrid lO 
whose cyclical path through history still destabilizes the world's intellectual 
property system II despite some two hundred years of regulatory action. 12 
Although the United States has never enacted a sui generis design pro-
tection law like those adopted abroad l3 and did not recognize works of 
applied art until 1954,14 its intellectual property system registers the same 
disruptive tendencies attributable to the design phenomenon that other 
industrialized countries have long experienced. IS Historically opposed to 
copyright protection of industrial art under the French "unity of art" doc-
trine, I this country's intellectual property authorities struggled to exclude 
commercial designs from the Copyright Act of 1909 while petitioning Con-
gress to enact an innovative design protection law built on modified copy-
right principles. 17 Between 1955 and 1976, the United States thus seemed 
ALAI 1983] (proceedings of the Congress held in Greece on Apr. 13-20, 1983). For 
most recent source, see also DiSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PROTEZIONE EUROPEA (1989) 
(proceedings of the Internalional Conference held at Treviso, Italy, on Oct. 12-13, 
1988). For earlier comparative studies that remain authoritative, see generally DESIGN 
PRoTECrION (H. Cohen Jehoram ed. 1976); F. PERRET, L'AurONOMIE Du REGIME DE 
PROTECrION DES DEsSINS ET MODELES (1974); M.A. ~ROT-MoREL, LES PRINCIPES DE 
PROTECrION DEs DEsSINS ET MODELES DANS LES PAYS Du MARCHE COMMUN (1968) 
[hereinafter M.A. ~ROT-MoREL, LES PRINCIPES]; Duchemin, La protection des arts 
appliques dans la perspective d'un depot communautaire en matiere de dessins et 
modeles industriels, 97 R.l.D.A. 4 (1978) [hereinafter Duchemin, La protection]. 
9. For the anomalous application of both the Berne and Paris Conventions, supra note I, 
to the same matter with different legal results contingent upon artificial distinctions 
between "applied art" and "industrial design," see generally, Perot-Morel, Les con-
traintes conventionelles, IN LES DEsSINS ET MODELES EN QuESTION, supra note 8, at 
117-46. 
10. M.A. ~ROT-MoREL, LES PRINCIPES, supra note 8, at 16. 
11. See infra text accompanying notes 781-865. 
12. The first legislation on designs was reportedly a British Act of 1787 "for the encourage-
ment of the arts of designing and printing linens, cottons, calicoes and muslins." 2 S. 
LADAS, supra note 1, at 829. Although this act appears to follow the principles of artis-
tic property law, the French design law of 1806, which made designs a branch of indus-
trial property law, was the model followed by the rest of the world. 
13. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
14. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); infra text accompanying notes 333-34. 
15. Compare infra text accompanying notes 782-810 (pendular swings in domestic law) 
with infra text accompanying notes 811-65 (over- and underprotection in foreign law). 
16. See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 836 (noting British and American opposition to 
French "unity of art" doctrine at Hague Conference of 1925); Fisher, The Operations oj 
the Copyright Office (address before the meeting of the ABA Section of Patent, Trade-
mark and Copyright Law, Aug. 30, 1960) [hereinafter Fisher AddressJ, reprinted in 
PRocEEDINGS OF THE ABA-SECrION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT LAw 202, 
207-08 (1960) (stressing dangers of applying copyright law to commercial designs). 
For the "unity of art" doctrine, see supra note 7; infra note 43 and accompanying text. 
17. See generally Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law: 
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1143, 
1174-82, 1186-1213, 1223-49 (1983) [hereinafter Reichman, Designs Before 1976); 
Reichman, Design Protection After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of 
the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'y U.S.A. 267, 298-324, 350-66 
(1984) [hereinafter Reichman, Designs After 1976J. 
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committed to a noncumulationist solution that would have combined the cri-
terion of "separability" familiar from Italian copyright law with an Ameri-
can regime of special design protection that aimed to be a model to the 
world. '8 
When, in 1976, Congress passed the General Revision of Copyright 
Law after some two decades of lacerating deliberations, the accumulated 
tensions surrounding the treatment of borderline utilitarian works issued in 
two contradictory sets of provisions. At one extreme, Congress apgc;ared to 
reject a "unity of art" heresy brewing in the federal district courts' by cod-
ifying the criterion of separability as the sole basis for distinguishing copy-
rightable works of applied art from noncopyrightable industrial designs. 2o 
The new definitions of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" and of 
"useful articles" set out in section 101 effectively denied copyright r.rotec-
tion to most three-dimensional, modern designs of useful articles. I The 
proposed sui generis design bill, however, still .pending in early 1976 as 
Title II of the General Revision Bill, was deleted at the last minute by the 
vote of a closely divided House Subcommittee, and that bill was never 
restored to the Final Act signed into law on October 19, 1976. 22 
18. See Fabiani, La protezione delfarte applicata e dell'industrial design in ltalia e neg/i 
USA, 57lL DIRITTODI AUTORE 414 (1986) [hereinafter Fabiani, lA Protezione del/'arte 
applicata); Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1181-1200,1213-23 (cit-
ing authorities); see also infra notes 74, 341-42. 920-34 and accompanying text. 
19. See, e.g .• Esquire. Inc. v. Ringer. 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976) (holding design of 
outdoor parking lamp to be a copyrightable work of applied art). rev 'd. 591 F.2d 796 
(D.C. Cir. 1978). cert. denied. 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Eltra Corp. v. Ringer. 194 U.S.P.Q. 
(BNA) 198 (E.D. Va. 1976) (finding that typeface design was copyrightable). affd on 
other grounds. 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978). 
20. See 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988) (definition of "pictorial. graphic. and sculptural works" 
plus definition of "useful article"). 
21. 17 U.S.c. § 10 I (1988). The new definitions read as follows: 
"Pictorial. graphic. and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three-
dimensional works of fine. graphic. and applied art, photographs. prints and 
art reproductions. maps. globes. charts. technical drawings. diagrams. and 
models. Such works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as 
their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the 
design of a useful article. as defined in this section. shall be considered a picto-
rial. graphic. or sculptural work only if and only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified sep-
arately from, and are capable of existing independently oj, the utilitarian 
aspects of lhe article. 
A "useful article" is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is 
not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. 
An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a "useful 
article." 
1d. (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476. 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801 (stressing effort to clar-
ify "the distinction between works of applied art protectable under the bill and indus-
trial designs not subject to copyright protection") (emphasis added); infra text accom-
panying notes 343-475. 
22. See Reichman. Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1261-64. 
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At the other extreme, Congress proceeded to codify language, pending 
since 1964 in the very same section of the Copyright Act, which in effect 
instituted a "unity of literature" approach to computer programs. 23 In so 
doing, Congress declined to treat computer programs as "useful articles," 
and it did not carryover to industrial literature any of the doctrinal limita-
tions it had just imposed on applied art, including the highly exclusionary 
criterion of separability.24 When Congress further enacted the Software 
Protection Act of 1980,25 it confirmed t~e liberal dispositions concerning 
the copyrightability of industrial literature as codified in 1976,26 without 
any clarification of the restrictive and altogether contradictory dispositions 
concerning industrial art that were adopted-without a special design 
law-in the General Revision of 1976.27 
B. Noncumulation Without a Design Law 
The provisions codified in 1976 shunted most three-dimensional 
designs of useful articles to the Design Patent Act of 1842.28 But few com-
23. See Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications 0/ 
Copyright Protection/or Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 641. 
690-96, 693 n.288 (1989) [hereinafter Reichman. Programs as Know-How) ("Aberra-
tions of the 'Unity of Literature' Approach"). The definition of "literary works" in 17 
US.C § 101 was devised to include computer programs, while the definition of "useful 
articles" excluded computer programs because they are presumably works that "convey 
information." See supra note 21. There is no test of separability for industrial litera-
ture built into the definition of literary works, nor can computer programs be "designs 
of useful articles" since they "convey information." Also of capital importance for 
computer programs viewed as "literary works" was the elimination of the visibility rule 
previously applied to all copyrightable subject matter. 17 US.C. § 102(a) (1988). 
Finally, § 113(b) of the 1976 Act applies to industrial designs but not to computer pro-
grams. This provision (sorely needed these days in foreign law) prevents any two-di-
mensional depiction of a useful article, such as an engineering drawing or blueprint, 
from protecting the article so portrayed when given a three-dimensional embodiment. 
See 17 U.S.C § 113(b) (1988) (codifying prior law); Reichman. Designs Be/ore 1976. 
supra note 17. at 1201-13 (explaining the evolution and purpose of this provision); infra 
notes 356-59 and accompanying text. However, no comparable provision was added or 
extended to verbal blueprints that portray or depict machine parts beyond an express 
exclusion for ideas. methods of operation. concepts, principles. procedures, processes, 
systems or discoveries in 17 US.C § 102(b) (1988). See generally Carey. Copyright 
Registration and Computer Programs. II BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 362 (1964). 
24. Compare authorities cited supra note 21 with authorities cited supra note 23. 
25. Software Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517. § lO(b), 94 Stat. 3015. 3028 
(1980) (codified as amended at 17 US.C. §§ 101. 117 (1988». Besides enacting the 
current version of § 117, which deals with user rights to make copies for archival pur-
poses or for purposes of certain adaptations, the 1980 legislation added the following 
definition of computer programs to the list of definitions in § 101: "A 'computer pro-
gram' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a com-
puter in order to bring about a certain result." Id. § 101. See generally Samuelson. 
CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in 
Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663, 727-49 (1984) (discussing utilitarian 
character of machine-readable computer programs). 
26. See supra note 23. 
27. Compare provisions quoted supra note 21 with provisions quoted supra note 23. 
28. See supra notes 3, 20-22; infra notes 68, 370-74 and accompanying text. Two-dimen-
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mercial designers could satisfy the high standards of patentability under the 
best of circumstances,29 while judicial hostility to this institution had ren-
dered even issued design patents so vulnerable to invalidation in the past 
that some authorities deemed them hardly worth the cost and effort to 
obtain. 30 As regards unfair competition, moreover, the United States 
Supreme Court, in the Sears-Compco decisions of 1964,31 had ruled that 
neither state nor' federal laws appealing to the misappropriation rationale 
could protect" unplltented, noncopyrightable industrial designs against slav-
ish imitation as sucb .. 32 .. 
The Copyrig'ht Act of.J 97f, thus appeared to consign the bulk of the com-
mercially most valuable appearance designs to the public domain, notwith-
standing this country's obligation' to protect industrial designs under article 5 
quinquies of the Paris Convention. 33 This result satisfied those who opposed 
sui generis legislation on the grounds that the case for exempting industrial 
designs from free competition had not been established. 34 It contrasts with 
the view prevailing abroad, which assigns design protection an important role 
in world trade;35 and it ignored the past tendencies offoreign courts to expand 
sional designs remained subject to copyright protection under longstanding judicial 
and administrative practice. See, e.g., I M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COpy-
RIGHT § 2.08[H)[2] (1988) [hereinafter M. & D. NIMMER] (citing cases); as did certain 
three-dimensional product designs in traditional or representational shapes. See I P. 
GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT-PRINCIPLES, LAW AND PRACTICE 151-58 (1989); infra notes 
352-68 and accompanying text. Moreover, noncumulation between the Copyright Act 
of 1976 and the Design Patent Act of 1842 is not absolute in the sense that a copyright 
registration will not impede the grant of a design patent if the other prerequisites are 
met. See, e.g., In re Yardley, 493 F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974). Given a one year novelty 
grace period in regard to commercial exploitation under the Design Patent Act, 35 
US.C. §§ 102, 171 (1988), it is technically possible for a design that satisfied both the 
separability test of copyright law and the nonobviousness test of patent law to remain 
protected by the former until the grant of protection under the latter. See, e.g., I O. 
CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[5], at 1-234. As a practical matter, this wiJI rarely 
occur. Moreover, once a design patent issues, the Copyright Office wiJI not register a 
copyright claim to the same design. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 202.IO(a)-(b) (1989); 
Korzybski v. Underwood & Underwood, Inc., 36 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1929). But see 
Clarke v. G. A. Kayser & Sons, Inc., 205 US.P.Q. (BNA) 610 (W.O. Pa. 1979). 
29. See infra notes 69,89-97, 110-44 and accompanying text. 
30. See infra notes 97-105 and accompanying text. 
31. Compco Corp. v. Oay-Britel:ighting, Inc., 376 US. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
v. Stiffel Co., 376 US. 225 (1964); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, 
Inc., 489 US. 141 (1989). 
32. See, e.g., 17 US.C. § 301(a)-(b) (1988) (codifying Sears-Compco in part); Brown, 
Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1359 (1987); infra text 
accompanying notes 527-29 . 
. 33. See Paris Convention, art. 5 quinquies, quoted in supra note I. 
34. "The Department of Justice strongly opposed the creation of this new form of intellec-
tual property on the grounds that no need for it had been demonstrated." 122 CONGo 
REC. 31,979 (1976) (Statement of Chairman Robert W. Kastenmeier). Both the Copy-
right Office and the Commerce Department had, however, strongly favored the design 
protection bills deleted from the General Revision of Copyright bills in 1976. See gen-
erally Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 358-61. 
35. See, e.g., COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, GREEN PAPER ON COPYRIGHT 
AND THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGy-COPYRIGHT ISSUES REQUIRING IMMEDIATE 
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copyright and unfair competition laws in order to compensate for a lack of sui 
generis design protection. 36 If, in short, Congress intended to maint~in 
healthy competition in the design industries, it had neglected to indicate just 
how the United States could accomplish this result without an op:rative 
design law when the other industrialized countries had failed. 37 
1. Early Judicial Responses: 1976-1982 
That the federal appellate courts in this country were no more disposed 
to tolerate systematic design piracy than their foreign counterparts became 
increasingly evident in the period between 1978, when the new copyright 
law took effect,38 and 1982, when a specialized appellate tribunal began to 
hear patent appeals. 39 In this period, for example, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit attempted to expand the protection of appearance 
designs as copyrightable works of applied art by magnifying the ambigui-
ties inherent in the separability criterion codified in 1976.40 Some federal 
appellate courts, including the Second Circuit, also began to treat product 
and container configurations as unregistered trademarks protectable within 
the federal unfair competition law developing around section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act.41 
As these early trends gathered momentum, comparative analysis 
revealed striking affinities between the different responses to the design 
problem emerging in domestic law and the conflicting approaches to the 
same problem that have long prevented the Berne Union countries from 
AcnON 2, 16 (Com. (88) 172 final, June 7, 1988) (hereinafter EC GREEN PAPER). The 
Commission stresses the economic role of "goods to which considerable value has been 
added through the application of technology, skill and creativity;" it notes that the 
"superior performance and non-material attributes of such goods, such as their design 
or image, constitute their main competitive advantages;" and it warns that economic 
expansion will be lessened by tolerating losses to these industries due to unauthorized 
copying. Id. at 2. See also Posner, The Legal Protection of Industrial Designs-Some 
Community Aspects, in D1sEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PRarEziONE EUROPEA, supra note 8, at 
333,335. 
36. See infra note 37; infra notes 521-24 and accompanying text. The Copyright Office 
feared the pressures that victims of design piracy were exerting on the copyright and 
unfair competition laws in this country and abroad. See Fisher Address, supra note 16. 
37. Consider in this light the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands, which were the only 
countries in the European Community to operate 'without a design law in the period 
1950 to 1975. See Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 283-97. In Bel-
gium, the copyright law expanded to accommodate virtually all commercial designs; 
in the Netherlands, unfair competition law expanded to accommodate many commer-
cial designs. Both countries enacted a special design law, effective in 1975. See supra 
note 4. 
38. See 17 U.S.C. Trans. & Supp. Section 102 (1988). 
39. For a discussion of the establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 
1982, see infra notes 141, 145 and accompanying text. 
40. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); infra 
text accompanying notes 374-95. 
41. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Truck Equip. 
Servs. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 563 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 
(1976); infra notes 530-53 and accompanying text. 
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reaching a consensus concerning applied art and industrial designs.42 
Three orthodox positions are still recognized in foreign and international 
law. At one extreme, partisans of the "unity of art" doctrine codified in 
France advocate full and cumulative copyright protection for all industrial 
art, regardless of any protection otherwise available from sui generis design 
laws operating under the aegis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of 
Industrial Property.43 At the opposite extreme, partisans of noncumulation-
as codified in Italy oppose copyright protection of industrial desl§ns and 
look to sui generis design laws governed by the Paris Convention. Parti-
sans of a third position, which the High Court of Germany has implemented 
since the turn of the century, prefer a regime of partial cumulation to either 
of these extremes. This school allows full copyright protection to a few 
exceptional designs of useful articles under a case-by-case test of artistic 
achievement while relegating most commercial designs to a sui generis 
regime. 4s Although individual member states sometimes change their 
affiliations, the Berne Union countries as a whole remain divided into irrec-
oncilable camps along these Iines.46 
42. For the laCK of consensus among the Berne Union countries as reflected in the Berne 
Convention, supra note I, art. 2(7), see generally S. RICKETSON, supra note I, at 
267-69,280-82. The Berne Convention, supra note 1, as revised at Brussels in 1948, 
obligated member countries to recognize some works of applied art, but it left the mem-
ber countries free to determine the line of demarcation between copyrightable works of 
applied art and noncopyrightable industrial-designs that remained subject to domestic 
design laws and, later, to article 5 quinquies of the Paris Convention, supra note I. See, 
e.g., S. RICKETSON, supra note 1, at 276-79 (discussing articles 2( I), 2(5) of the 1948 
text of the Berne Convention); see also Geller, International Copyright: An Introduction 
§ 4 [I][c][i), in I INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw AND PRACI"ICE (P. Geller ed. 1990) 
[hereinafter INTERNATIONAL CoPYRIGHT LAw). These provisions, with their discordant 
application of reciprocity, were carried over to article 2(7) of the present Berne text. 
However, the duration of protection for works of applied art was extended to a mini-
mum of twenty-five years in article 7(4), and the notion of reciprocity as regards works 
"protected in the country of origin solely as designs and models" was refined to ensure 
that, in countries where no design law existed, copyright protection must be afforded. 
See Berne Convention, supra note I, arts. 2(1), 2(7), 7(4); S. RICKETSON, supra note I, 
at 279-80. 
43. See supra note 7 (citing Gaubiac and Desbois); Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra 
note 17, at 1153-59 (discussing unity of art doctrine in France). 
44. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1182-86 (dissociation theory in 
Italy); id. at 1213-23 (criterion of separability in Italian law); infra text accompanying 
notes 374-80. 
45. See, e.g., Reimer, The Rell1tions Between Copyright Protection and the Protection of 
Designs and Models in Gemuln Law, 98 R.I.D.A. 38 (1978); infra notes 393, 401-03 
and accompanying text (citing other authorities). 
46. The situation today is thus no clearer than it was in 1948. See Perot-Morel, us 
enseignements, supra note 8; Cohen Jehoram, Comparative Study, supra note 8; 
Duchemin, General Report, supra note 8, at 58-62; see also S_ RICKETSON, supra note 
I, at 281-82 (summarizing "three broad national approaches to the protection of works 
of applied art in Berne Union countries"); EC GREEN PAPER, supra note 35, at 16 
(deferring legislative initiatives concerning designs and models until "the time is ripe" 
and stressing that "(a]t present ... it would be unrealistic to think that such legislative 
proposals could be launched with a reasonable chance of success"). The positions of 
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy remain essentially unchanged. The 
Nordic countries and Switzerland reportedly follow a regime of partial cumulation 
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After 1976, United States courts and administrators increasingly suc-
cumbed to the same divisive tendencies that had long plagued the Berne 
Union. For example, the United States Courts of Appeals for the Eleventh 
and District of Columbia Circuits appeared to align themselves with the 
neo-Italian regime of noncumulation that the Copyright Office had formally 
endorsed since 1958.47 In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit pursued a regime of partial cumulation closely resem-
bling that of the Federal Republic of Germany.48 Those federal appellate 
courts that began to apply section 43(a) of the Lanham Act49 displayed the 
same protectionist bias that had induced Netherlands courts to shelter 
industrial designs in unfair com~etition law until the Uniform Benelux 
Designs Act took effect in 1975. 0 Meanwhile, individual judges on all 
more or less along the lines of the Federal Republic. Spain also appears to follow a 
regime of partial cumulation like that of the Federal Republic, as does Austria. See 
Lastres, Refiexiones sobre Ia figura del modelo industrial en el derecho Espanol, in 
DtSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PRorEZIONE EUROPEA, supra note 8, at 119, 123-24; Walter, 
The Legal Protection of Industrial Design in Austria, in DtSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E 
PRarEZIONE EUROPEA, supra note 8, at 101-05. The Benelux countries formally 
adhered to a similar regime in 1975, but courts have continued to expand cumulative 
protection of industrial designs in copyright law, especially in the Netherlands. See 
Cohen Jehoram, Netherlands § 2[4][c], in INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw, supra note 
42; Braun, Les systemes de cumul partiel de protection par les lois specifiques et par Ie 
droit d'auteur, in LA PRon:.cTloN DEs CREATIONS D'EsTHETIQUE INDUSTRIELLE DANS 
LE CADRE DE LA C.E.E.-OBJECTIF 1992, at 97-106 (C.UE.R.P.I. & A.D.E.R.P.1. eds. 
1988) [hereinafter OsJECTIF 1992] (proceedings of the international conference held at 
Chateau de Sassenage, France, June 17, 1988). 
The United Kingdom allowed cumulative protection in copyright law after 1968 
(while admitting some purely functional designs to full copyright protection in the 
same period). But the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, §§ 213-64, 
may have eliminated cumulative protection for all commercially exploited industrial 
designs in conjunction with the enactment of an unregistered design right. See gener-
ally Fellner, The New United Kingdom Industrial Design Law, 19 U BALT. L. REV. 369 
(1989) [hereinafter Fellner, New U.K. Law]. For the implications of this development, 
see infra text accompanying notes 938-63. 
47. See Norris Indus., Inc. v. lIT, 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 818 
(1983); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerr. denied, 440 US. 
908 (1979); infra text accompanying notes 369-73. 
48. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Dur-
ham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 E2d 905,909-11,914-15 (2d Cir. 1980); see also 
Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1982); L. 
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 480 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 
857 (1976). See generally Reichman, Designs After 1976. supra note 17, at 312-50 
(quantitative and qualitative creativity in the Second Circuit). For more recent cases 
that struggle with and appear to retreat from this nascent regime of partial cumulation, 
see Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Carol 
Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985); infra text accom-
panying notes 374-520. 
49. See supra note 41; infra notes 526-52 and accompanying text. 
50. See supra note 37. For current tendencies to treat slavish imitation as tortious misap-
propriation actionable in unfair competition law, especially with regard to' new technol-
ogies, see, e.g., P.l. KAUFMANN, PASSINGDFF AND MISAPPROPRIATION 83 (1986); Reich-
man, Intellectual Property in International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT 
Connection, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 747, 781-94 (1989) [hereinafter Reichman, 
GAT[ Connection]. 
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these courts openly endorsed the views of the late Professor Melville Nim-
mer, whose influential treatise downplayed the codification of separability in 
1976 and continued to advocate broad copyright protection of industrial 
designs in keeping with the unity of art thesis established in France.51 
2. Current Trends and the Quest for a Universal Solution 
That it took the federal appellate courts only a few years to recapitulate 
on these shores the chequered history of design protection law abroad 
testifies to the universality of the phenomena under investigation. 52 Viewed 
prospectively, moreover, comparative analysis made it plausible to advance 
three predictions concerning the future evolution of design protection law in 
the United States on the basis of past developments abroad. 
The first prediction was that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit, which took office in 1982,53 would dismantle the judge-made barriers 
to design patent protection inherited from the past and thereby enable the 
Design Patent Act to implement its original goals. 54 A second prediction 
was that efforts to fashion a regime of partial cumulation between copyright 
law and the design patent law would falter under pressure from judges and 
commentators who refused to compromise with the principle of non-
discrimination. 55 A third prediction was that the federal courts would 
aggressively expand trademark and unfair competition law in order to pre-
vent slavish imitators from appropriating innovative commercial designs 
that found no haven in positive intellectual property law. 56 
These predictions are borne out by a survey of the empirical data .for 
the period 1983 to 1990. Part II of the present Article accordingly 
describes the evolution of United States design protection law after 1982, 
with a view to demonstrating both the accuracy of these predictions and the 
amplitude of their fulfillment. 57 
Part III considers why comparative analysis could predict legal out-
comes so different from those Congress ostensibly meant to obtain when it 
51. "The Mazer opinion can be read to mean that any useful anicle, at least if it is aestheti-
cally pleasing in appearance, is subject to copyright protection with respecl to its 
form." I M. & D. NIMMER, supra note 28, § 2.08[B](3]; see also Reichman, Designs 
Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1152, 1211 n.347 (noting testimony of Barbara Ringer, 
who identified Professor Nimmer's views with "the concept of unity of an that some 
countries follow" and contrasted them with the opposing views of Professor Deren-
berg); Latman, Fifteen Years After Mazer v. Stein: A Brief Perspective, 16 BULL. Copy· 
RIGHT SOC'y 278 (1969). 
52. See infra text accompanying notes 781-865. 
53. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. 
54. See Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 362-65. 
55. See id. at 381-82. For recent developments in Benelux law consistent with this same 
prediction, see, e.g., Cohen Jehoram, Netherlands. supra note 46; Braun, supra note 46. 
at 104-06. 
56. See Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 335-36, 379, 382. 
57. See infra text accompanying notes 319-31,476-524, 725-80 (summarizing and evaluat-
ing these findings). 
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jettisoned the sui generis design bill in 1976.58 This inquiry will show that 
the behavior of industrial designs under domestic law has followed a cycli-
cal pattern that oscillates between states of chronic underprotection and 
states of chronic overprotection. 59 When this behavior is compared with 
that of industrial designs uneler foreign intellectual property laws, the same 
cyclical pattern emerges as a common characteristic of the design phenome-
non in all relevant legal environments. 60 . 
The study then examines the underlying causes of, and potential cures 
for, this cyclical behavior pattern that has so singularly disrupted the world's 
intp.llectual property system. D~parting from the observation that indus-
trial design is the oldest legal hybrid falling between the patent and copy-
right systems, the study finds that past regulatory action was distorted by an 
ingrained tendency to analyze the design problem in terms of either "art" or 
"inventions," that is to say, in terms of false premises suggested by the dom-
inant legal paradigms. 61 In contrast, recent difficulties in securing ade-
quate legal protection for new technologies, such as semiconductor chip 
designs and computer programs, suggest that it is more fruitful to view 
iridustrial design as a precursor of the many legal hybrids that world intel-
lectual property law would struggle to accommodate in the latter half of the 
twentieth century. 62 
From this angle, the commercialization of applied scientific know-how 
appears to suffer from the same regulatory disabilities as have always afflic-
ted industrial designs, and efforts to protect new technologies increasingly 
manifest the same cyclical pattern of behavior:63 This finding helps to 
explain why the demand for copyright protection of these technologies has 
grown so strident in recent years and why actual delivery of such protection 
frustrates many of the regulatory goals it is supposed to advance. 64 Assimi-
lating the problems that applied scientific know-how currently encounters to 
the difficulties that industrial design has always encountered also explains 
why sui generis design laws built on modified patent principles seldom suc-
ceed. By the same token, adoption of a modified copyright model could 
break the cyclical behavior patterns characteristic of both old and new legal 
hybrids operating in different legal environments. 65 
The study recommends that those seeking to harmonize the design 
laws of the European Community should focus their attentions on a modified 
copyright approach not unlike that which the United States Congress 
58. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
59. See infra text accompanying notes 782-810. 
60. See infra text accompanying notes 811-65. 
61. See infra text accompanying notes 866-79. 
62. See infra text accompanying notes 880-98. 
63. See Reichman. Programs as Know-How. supra note 23. at 648-67; infra text accompany-
ing notes 873-79. 
64. See infra text accompanying notes 901-17. 
65. See infra text accompanying notes 880-972. 
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neglected to enact in 1976.66 Such a model, once implemented by leading 
industrialized countries, could then influence the future course of design 
protection in the United States. It could also facilitate the elaboration of a 
sui generis law capable of dealing with advanced technological know-how 
on its own terms without the excesses of under- and overprotection that 
recur whenever incremental innovation is squeezed into legal paradigms 
devised for the regulation of art and inventions. 67 
II. MORPHOLOGY OF UNITED STATES DESIGN PROTECTION 
LAW IN THE 1980s 
A. A New Court Revives an" Old Design Law 
Although the Design Patent Act of 184268 recognized ornamental 
designs of useful articles as patentable subject matter, it did nothing to sof-
ten the formal and substantive prerequisites of the full patent paradigm in 
the interests of promoting the decorative arts.69 In the early years, the fed-
eral judiciary appeared to accept the statutory policy at face value and 
allowed industrial designs to qualify for protection on fairly relaxed condi-
tions. 7o As the "substantive prerequisites applicable to utility patents grew 
more stringent, however, courts began to question the social value of design 
patents that too readily enabled manufacturers to avoid competition by 
claiming to improve the appearance of articles reproduced in series. These 
doubts soon found expression in strict standards of nonfunctionality and of 
inventive height that exposed even design patents that the Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) had issued after full examination of the prior art to a 
high risk of judicial invalidation in the course of actions for infringement. 71 
66. See infra text accompanying notes 935-37. 
67. See infra text accompanying notes 917-72. 
68. Act of Aug. 29, 1842 [US.A.], ch. 263, § 2,5 Stat. 543 (1842), (codified as amended at 
35 US.c. §§ 171-73,289 (1988». See generally 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[1]; 
Hudson, A Brief History of the Development of Design Patent Protection in the United 
States, 30"J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 380 (1948). In 1982, Congress eliminated the possibility 
of paying lesser fees for shorter periods of protection and made all design patents issue 
for a period of fourteen years. The Patent Fee Act, 35 US.c. § 173 (1988). 
69. Section 171 of the Design Patent Act provides as follows: "Whoever invents any new, 
original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title. The provisions of this 
title relating to patents for inventions shall apply to patents for designs, except as other-
wise provided." 35 US.c. § 171 (1988). The purpose of the Act was to stimulate the 
production of superior designs and not merely to recognize the creators' natural rights. 
See, e.g., Hudson, supra note ~8, at 380-81; Nimetz, Design Protection, 15 CoPYRIGHT 
L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 19, 80 n.l (1967). The decision to follow a patenl approach was 
influenced by the industrial nature of the material support as well as by purely histori-
cal factors. See id. (citing authorities). 
70. See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 122-25 (citing authorities). 
71. See, e.g., id. at 83 (stating that "the hostility of the courts to patents in general and to 
design patents in particular makes a design patent a most uncertain form of protec-
tion"); id. at 113-28 (high standards of nonfunctionality and invention);" see also infra 
notes 97-109 and accompanying text. 
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I. Three Decades of Suspended Animation: 1952-1982 
By 1952, when the patent law underwent its last general revision, most 
observers believed that the design patent provisions had become too dys-
functional to accomplish their original purpose.72 But the revisers chose to 
ignore these provisions on the premise that a sui generis approach to the 
design problem was more consonant with the reform movement gathering 
momentum both here and abroad.73 In this spirit, the American intellec-
tual property authorities developed an innovative, sui generis law providing 
short-term protection for ornamental designs of useful articles under a 
modified copyright approach that departed from the modified patent 
approach heretofore used in foreign law. 74 When Congress ultimately 
rejected these ~roposals in 1976, it left the Design Patent Act exactly as it 
stood in 1952. 5 This law still requires patentable designs to meet the same 
tests of semi-absolute novelty and of nonobviousness that are applied to util-
ity patents 76 and to undergo the same procedural ordeal of an examination 
at the Patent and Trademark Office based on a search of the prior art. 77 
a. Novelty and Nonobviousness Compared 
Ironically, most foreign design laws impose a more lethal standard of 
novelty than that found in the United States Design Patent Act. 78 For exam-
72. See, e.g., Derenberg, Copyright No-Man's Land: Fringe Rights in Literary and Artistic 
Property, 351. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 627,693-706 (1953); Reichman, Designs Before 1976, 
supra note 17, at 1190 n.245 (citing Ringer, Bogsch, and Judge Giles S. Rich). 
73. See generally Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1164-67, 1165 n.115 
(citing authorities); id. at 1176-77,1186-1200. In the 1950s, the United States played 
an active role in the movement to strengthen the international protection of industrial 
designs within the framework of the Hague and Paris Conventions. 
74. See H.R. 8873, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) (Willis Bill) (copy on file at the Center for 
Research Libraries, Chicago, Illinois), refined by S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) 
(O'Mahoney-Wiley-Hart Bill). For the view that these proposals still bear on a univer-
sally valid solution to the design problem, see infra text accompanying notes 935-37. 
75. See supra notes 17-18, 22 and accompanying text. See generally Reichman, Designs 
Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1176-77, 1180-82, 1186-1200. Proponents of the sui 
generis law had intended to keep the design patent law on the books, and not to repeal 
it, in part because this would prevent courts from elevating the threshold of protection 
underthe special design law. Id. at 1191 & n.254. . 
76. See 35 U.S.c. § 102 (1988) (novelty); id. § 103 (nonobviousness); id. § 171, quoted in 
supra note 69; 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2), at 1-184, who states: 
A design, consisting of the configuration or surface ornamentation of an arti-
cle of manufacture, is patentable if it meets the general requirements of nov-
elty, originality, and nonobviousness and is ornamental. A design need not 
meet the requirement of utility and indeed will not be p.atentable if its form is 
dictated solely by considerations of function. 
A quirk of the general novelty requirement, however, is that its absolute 
barrier extends only to publications, whereas prior use of either an invention or 
a design outside the United States does not of itself defeat novelty. 
1d.; see 35 U.S.c. §§ 102(a), 171 (1988). 
77. See, e.g., 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[3]; P. RoSENBERG, PATENT LAw FUNDAMEN-
TALS § 15_03 (1988); Fryer, Industrial Design Protection in the United States of Amer· 
ica-Present Situation and Plans for Revision, 27 INDUS. PROP. 115, 118 (1988). 
78_ 35 U.S.c. §§ 102, 171 (1988)_ . 
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pie, the novelty standard in some foreign laws disglays a mQre absolute char-
acter as regards antecedent designs in prior use,7 although there is a recent 
tendency to limit the field of prior art both in temporal and geographical 
terms. 80 Foreign design law may also insist on more quantitative distance 
between a candidate design and the prior art than the novelty standard cus-
tomarily requires in this country. 81 Apart from Japan and, lately, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany,82 moreover, the novelty standard present in most 
foreign design laws lacks any grace period whatsoever. 83 
The lack of a grace period means that even proprietors who com mer-
79. See. e.g .• Duchemin, General Report, supra note 8, at 63 (finding that foreign design 
laws characteristically require "objective and absolute novelty, implying the absence of 
precedents, with no limitations of time or space"). 
80. For example, the Benelux countries "adopt the concept of objective but relative novelty: 
only models which during the fifty years preceding the deposit were actually familiar in 
the Benelux industrial or commercial circles concerned and which have not been 
deposited are taken into consideration." Id. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
concept of novelty is also objective but relative to antecedents that are "familiar among 
specialized circles within the country or accessible to them without great difficulty." 
Id. at 64. In the United Kingdom, novelty under the Registered Designs Act "is in 
theory absolute, but particular attention is paid to designs registered or published in the 
UK." Fellner. United Kingdom, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 141-42. 
81. Compare infra note 89 and accompanying text with Duchemin, General Report, supra 
note 8 (stressing emphasis on objective novelty in Nordic countries, the Benelux couo-
tries, the Federal Republic of Germany. the United Kingdom, and Canada). Italy, how-
ever, has consistently applied a flexible standard of novelty to ornamental designs. See, 
e.g., Duchemin, General Report. supra note 8. at 64; Reichman, Designs Before 1976, 
supra note 17. at 1214 (stating that the "novelty requirement, although strict with 
regard to prior divulgation, is otherwise satisfied by a relative rather than an absolute 
measure of differentiation from the prior art") (citing Fabiani). France, of course, is 
also an exception, since the concept of novelty under the Law on Design and Models of 
July 14, 1909, approximates that of originality in French copyright law. See. e.g., 
Duchemin, General Report. supra note 8, at 64 (quoting Perot-Morel). For the atypical 
structure and character of the French design law owing to the influence of copyright 
law on all aspects of design protection under a regime of total cumulation, see, e.g., 
Perot-Morel, France, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at J 17-18. 
82. See Law No. 125 of April 13, 1959 (Design Law) [Japan], as revised through 1975, 
reprinted in JAPANESE LAws RELATING TO INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (J.P.O. rev. ed. 1979). 
Although article 3( I) of the Japanese Design Law adopts the principle of absolute nov-
elty, an exception under article 4(2) enables creators "to test the marketability of their 
designs by way of test sale, public display or distribution of samples." T. DOl, THE 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN 100, 103-04 (1980). As regards the Federal 
Republic of Germany. § 7(a) of the Act Concerning Copyright in Designs as amended 
in 1986, supra note 4, introduced a six-month novelty grace period. See, e.g., 
Loschelder, The New German Model and Design Act, 191.1.C. 622, 629-30 (1988); see 
also E. GERSTENBERG, GESCHMACKSMUSTERGESETZ 54-56 (2d ed. 1988); O. VON 
GAMM, GESCHMACKSMUSTERGESETZ (2d ed. 1989); B. ENGLERT, GRUNDZUGE DES 
RECHTSSCHlTfZES INDUSTRIELLEN FoRMGEBUNG 50-78 (1978). 
83. Compare 35 U.S.c. §§ 102(b), 171 (1988) (one year novelty grace period in respect of 
public use and on sale bars) with Duchemin, General Report, supra note 8, at 65 (noting 
that "[w]ith the exception of France [and now the Federal Republic], all the [EC] coun-
tries require that the model not be disclosed before it is deposited"). In France, owing 
in part to the system of total cumulation between design law and copyright law, disclo-
sure before deposit has no effect on the validity of design protection. See Duchemin, 
General Report, supra note 8, at 66; supra note 81. 
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cialize very creative designs without first meeting the costly deposit and 
registration requirements will destroy their own novelty and forfeit protec-
tion. 84 What limits the availability of design protection in foreign law, 
therefore, is not just a cumbersome set of formal prerequisites85 or stiff 
standards of nonfunctionality86 and qualitative originality.87 Often a major 
84. Compare, e.g., Loschelder, supra note 82, at 629 (praising amendments to design law in 
Federal Republic of Germany that now permit test marketing before registration) with 
Wibbens, The Relation Between Copyright and Industrial Property Law Protection oj 
Designs and Models, in ALAI 1983, supra note 8, at 255, 258 (complaining that the 
Uniform Benelux Designs Law of 1975, supra note 4, provides no opportunity to test-
market designs prior to registration without destroying novelty). 
85. The "obligatory formalities of deposit and registration ... [are] considered to be the 
most reliable way of proving ... the date of creation and ... anteriority." Duchemin, 
General Report, supra note 8, at 65. In most of the industrialized countries, "there is 
no prior examination of substance nor any procedure for opposition" beyond "a purely 
formal check" that the applicant has complied with the regulations. Id. at 67. How-
ever, an opposition procedure is pennitted in Italy and in the Nordic countries, and the 
Italian authorities may control whether the deposited design meets the prerequisites of 
eligibility. See, e.g., id.; Fabiani, I Modelli e Disegni Industriali [hereinafter Fabiani,l 
Modelli], in 2 DIRllTO INDUSTRIALE-INVENZIONI E MODELLI INDUSTRIALI 213, 
253-54 (T. Rav!, M. Fabiani, & P. Spada eds. (988) [hereinafter INvENZloNI E 
MODELU INDUSTRIALI]. While these formal requirements are far less demanding than 
those under United States design patent law, see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying 
text, they are nonetheless costly and burdensome, especially for small- and medium-
sized producers. See, e.g., Loschelder, supra note 82, at 637-38; Wibbens, supra note 
84, at 258. In Japan, registered designs appear subject to a full examination like that 
in the United States. See, e.g., T. Dol, supra note 82, at 100-01. The situation in the 
United Kingdom under the Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, resembles 
that in the United States, given that a design in the u.K. "is examined for formal com-
pliance with the regulations for application; to ensure that it fulfills the definition of a 
design; and for novelty. There is no opposition procedure." Fellner, United Kingdom, 
in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 143. For developments in the U.K. after 1988, see 
infra notes 846,943,948-49 and accompanying text. 
86. In the United Kingdom, designs dictated solely by function were excluded from the 
Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, and the House of Lords has stated that 
"those features of a design whose shape or configuration is determined by the job they 
do, and which therefore have received no design effort directed to their appearance as 
opposed to their function, are excluded from registration." Fellner, United Kingdom, in 
ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 142. At the opposite extreme, the Nordic design laws pur-
port to embrace "all new forms regardless of technical effect or functionality." See, 
e.g., Levin, Nordic Countries, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 135-36. "However, it can 
be assumed that [a] purely functional design in most cases is to be regarded as 'banal,' 
i.e., only containing such elements which ought to belong to the general public['s] stock 
of forms." Id. at 136. Moreover, Swedish courts recently have excluded highly func-
tional designs altogether. Id. Italian design law insists on some ornamental or decora-
tive character and excludes purely technical or functional designs. See, e.g., Fabiani, 
Italy, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 131. The same is true in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, but in practice, "it rarely occurs that a form producing an aesthetic effect is 
exclusively technical." Dietz, Allemagne, in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 87 (trans.). 
French design law, instead, makes no reference to a requirement of ornamentality and 
absorbs highly utilitarian designs, but it excludes purely technical and functional 
designs under several tests, notably a "multiplicity of fonns test." See Perot-Morel, 
France, supra note 81, at 118-20. For the introduction of a similar test into recent 
United States law, see infra text accompanying notes 269-302. 
87. The fundamental substantive prerequisite under all foreign design laws is objective 
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handicap is the inability of proprietors to test-market designs in order to 
preselect a few that are worth the cost of registration from the many that are 
not. 88 
The situation under the United States Design Patent Act was just the 
opposite. The federal courts flexibly interpret the novelty requirement so as 
to disqualify only those designs that, viewed as a whole, do not differ from 
pre-existing designs in the eyes of an ordinary observer. 89 More to the 
point, section 102(b) of the Patent Act of 1952 provides a one year novelty 
grace period for utility patents,90 which the provisions applicable to orna-
mental designs incorporate by reference. Designers in this country thus 
obtain some opportunity to test the market before incurring the expense of 
patent prosecution.91 
novelty, which may be absolute or relative in its scope depending on the different 
domestic design laws. See, e.g., Duchemin, General Report. supra note 8, at 63; supra 
notes 79-80 and accompanying text. Besides this requirement of novelty in the sense of 
an absence of references to prior 2rt. most design laws superimpose some qualitative 
standard as well, which is either cast in terms of "originality" or as a subtest of the gen-
eral novelty requirement. See, e.g .• Duchemin, General Report, supra note 8, at 63-64 
(discussing the cases of Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, and the United King-
dom). The meaning of "originality" in the United Kingdom became uncertain after 
1988, but was in the past treated as a qualitative factor. See Fellner, United Kingdom, 
in ALAI 1984, supra note 8, at 142; infra note 948. In the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, the qualitative originality standard excludes the products of a routine designer. 
See. e.g., Dietz, Allemagne. supra note 86, at 88. Italy distinguishes between intrinsic 
and extrinsic novelty; the former requires a creative contribution or some qualitative 
originality but not progress in the art nor an innovation that is the fruit of creative intel-
lectual activity. See. e.g., Fabiani. I Modelli. supra note 85, at 240-43. In countries 
that appear not to require qualitative originality, such as the Nordic countries and the 
Benelux countries, courts may in fact demand more in the way of objective differentia-
tion from the prior art. See. e.g., Duchemin. General Report. supra note 8, at 63-64; 
Levin, Recent Developments in Nordic Design Protection, 19 1.I.c. 606, 608 (1988) 
[hereinafter Levin, Recent Developments) (stating that an "additional prerequisite [in 
Nordic law] ... is a certain 'design level,' which means that, in order to be registered, 
a design must 'differ substantially' from what is previously known"); see also Levin, 
supra note 86, at 137 (stating that the requirement of a certain "design level" is reflec-
ted in judicial insistence on "essential difference" from prior art). 
88. See. e.g., Loschelder, supra note 82, at 629-30; Duchemin, La Protection, supra note 8, 
at 34-36, 88-90; Gregory, Les enjeux economiques, in LES DEsSINS ET MODELES EN 
QuESTION, supra note 8, at 231,248-54. 
89. 35 U.S.c. §§ 102, 171 (1988); see. e.g., Contico Int'!, Inc. v. Rubbermaid Commercial 
Prods., Inc., 665 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1217 
(C.C.P.A. 1981). To fail the novelty test, a claimed design must exactly resemble a ref-
erence from the prior art or constitute a mere modification of it, and courts may not 
decompose or subject the design to piecemeal analysis for this purpose. See. e.g., 
Clark Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778,779 (8th Cir. 1978); Rains v. Cascade Indus., 
Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 242 (3d Cir. 1968); Fryer, supra note 77, at 118. 
90. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), which provides that a person shall be entitled to a patent unless 
"the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this country or a 
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to 
the date of the application for patent in the United States .... " 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(1988). 
91. See id. § 171; see also supra note 69; 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2]. Test mar-
keting must not extend beyond the one year novelty grace period of § 102(b) because 
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If the American design law, as an integral part of the patent law, thus 
benefits from a workable novelty standard, the major disadvantage of this 
same linkage is that it brings into play all the formal and substantive prereq-
uisites applicable to utility patents, including the requirement of nonob-
viousness. 92 That the United States still requires protectable designs to 
undergo a search of the prior art and a qualifying examination,93 in addition 
to the obligations of deposit and registration,94 means that design protection 
here is slower and costlier to obtain than in many other industrialized coun-
tries. 95 These procedural requirements are unsuited to the fast-moving but 
short-lived product cycle characteristic of today's market for mass-produced 
consumer goods. 96 
Nevertheless, it was primarily the nonobviousness requirement that 
limited the availability of statutory design protection in this country from 
the 1920s on.97 Although the United States. patent authorities issued some 
88,000 design patents between 1959 and 1983,98 the patentees whose 
designs met the substantive prerequisites according to the examiners seldom 
benefited from the statutory monopoly when seeking to enforce their rights. 
On the contrary, the federal courts routinely invalidated design patents in 
the course of litigation by applying a stricter nonobviousness standard than 
that of the examiners99 and by superimposing rigid requirements of orna-
the Federal Circuit declines to apply the experimental use exception to design patents 
that are otherwise subject to the public use bar. See In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988). In contrast, the best mode requirement of § 112 does not apply to design 
patents because the "mode" is determined by the drawings. Some verbal description 
may usefully explain the illustrations. See, e.g., Racing Strollers, Inc. v. TRI Indus., 
Inc., 878 E2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
92. See 35 US.C. §§ 102-03, 171 (1988); supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text. 
93. See 35 US.c. §§ II3, 171 (1988); supra note 77. 
94. See supra note 85. 
95. Until recently, some major European countries, notably France and Italy, operated 
without an examination system for utility patents, and even today Italy seems to have 
retained a system of registration and publication of research results rather than a true 
examination system. See, e.g., Ubertazzi, Note inlroductive, in Ubertazzi, ed., 
ARMONIZZAZIONE DELLA NORMATIVA, supra note 4, at 558-59. Most European Com-
munity countries that examined utility patents had abolished such a requirement for 
industrial designs subject to sui generis legislation. See supra note 85; see also 
Duchemin, Les difficultes relatives a l'organisation d'un depot communautaire en 
fTUltieC'e de dessins et modeles industriels [hereinafter Duchemin, us difficultes1, in LES 
PERSPECTIVES, supra note 7, at 173-81, 184-85, 190-203. Exceptions include the 
United Kingdom (registered designs), Ireland, and Japan. See supra note 85. 
96. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 121; Thompson, Industrial Design Protection in the 
U.S., 3 CANADIAN INTELL. PRoP. REV. 155, 170 (1987). 
97. See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 125-28. The nonfunctionality requirement was a 
close second. See id. at 113-21. 
98. See Lindgren, The Sanctity of the Design Patent: Illusion or Reality?, 10 OKLA. CITY 
UL REV. 195, 204-07 (1985). About 16.5% of these were granted to foreign inven-
tors; the percentage of design patents granted to foreign inventors increased to 23% in 
the period 1973 to 1983. Id. Altogether some 272,000 design patents reportedly issued 
between 1842 and 1983. [d. 
99. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 119 (noting that, despite the presumption of validity 
to be accorded examiners' decision, "the courts have had their own 'view' of how to 
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mentality and nonfunctionality that could eliminate any design that hap-
pened to survive these other ordeals. 100 
The traditional hostility of the federal judiciary to this particular 
branch of the domestic intellectual property systemlOI has been statistically 
demonstrated. For example, one survey of some 130 cases litigated between 
1964 and 1983 found that the underlying design patent ·had been invalidated 
on various legal grounds about seventy percent of the time. 102 But this 
figure was probably too optimistic for the 1960s as a whole, and it is 
definitely too pessimistic for the 1980s as a whole. 103 A more significant 
finding is that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, one 
of the nation's premier intellectual property courts, upheld only two design 
patents challenged for obviousness between the 1920s and the 1970s. 104 
Still more revealing was a set of official statistics published for the period 
1968 to 1972, which showed an invalidation rate at the appellate level of one 
hundred percent,105 notwithstanding decisions by the patent examiners 
favorable to the patentees in each and every case. 
As will be seen from data examined later in this Article, the rate of 
appellate invalidation tended to decrease from 1974 to 1983,106 and it has 
dramatically decreased since the establishment of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1982. 107 The fact remains that relatively 
few industrial designs could promise their creators sufficient commercial 
rewards as to justify the expense of obtaining and defending a patent under 
the best of circumstances,108 while the prospects for enforcing issued 
design patents prior to the 1980s were so bleak that, in the words of Judge 
Giles S. Rich, "many felt it was not worth the effort and the protection [was] 
illusory. ,,109 
apply the obviousness standard"); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 125-28 (finding that "very 
few design patents were likely to be sustained in litigation" as of 1965). 
100. Patentable designs must be ornamental in the sense that they "appeal to the eye," and 
the claimed design features must not pertain to matter that is dictated or primarily 
determined by functional considerations. See generally 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, 
§ 104[2](c]-[d] (citing authorities); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 115-21. The extent to 
which visibility in normal use is required remains controversial. 
101. See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 83. Nimetz observed, however, that United States 
courts were hostile to utility patents during the same period. 
102. See Lindgren, supra note 98, at 207,209. 
103. See infra text accompanying notes 143-44, 323-31. 
104. See B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGIIT 158 (3d ed. 1978). For the leading 
role of the Second Circuit in fostering a stricter approach after 1926, see Nimetz, supra 
note 69, at 125-26. 
105. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1190 n.245 (citing authorities). 
According to another study, nearly two-thirds of all patents-including design pat-
ents-adjudicated between 1935 and 1973 were ruled invalid. See Baum, The Federal 
Couns and Patent Validity: An Analysis of the Record, 56 J. PAT. OFf; SOC'Y 758, 763 
(1974). 
106. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (observing that period of 1974 to 1983 
shows trend more favorable to design patent protection). 
107. See infra text accompanying notes 323-31 (discussing period from 1982 to 1990). 
108. See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 82. 
109. Hearings on S. 1884 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights o/the 
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b. Nonobviousness Means What It Says 
In voting against a sui generis design law in 1976, some legislators 
seemed to believe that the federal courts could make the existing Design 
Patent Act more workable. 110 If so, the standard of nonobviousness 
remained the logical place to start. III In regard to utility patents, courts 
administered this standard by asking whether a given achievement would 
have been obvious at the time of invention to "a worker with ordinary skill 
in the art who had full knowledge of the prior art.,,112 In the case of 
designs, courts had likewise conjured up a fictitious "designer with ordinary 
skills in the pertinent art," who could better detect pre-existing influences 
underlying a candidate design than an ordinary purchaser who might suc-
cumb to the charm of a less original visual effect. 113 
Given this test, there were only two logical explanations for the prac-
tice of routinely invalidating issued design patents at the appellate level. 114 
Either the nonobviousness standard as imported from the domain of utility 
patents inherently lay beyond the reach of even the most gifted designers, or 
courts had artificially elevated the standard of nonobviousness applicable to 
designs to avoid undue restraints on trade. 115 If the former was true, then 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th ·Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1961) [hereinafter Design Pro-
tection Hearings 1961]. The eminent Judge Giles S. Rich testified in 1960 that "[p]at-
ents for designs have been difficult to obtain and more difficult to sustain and many 
have felt it was not worth the effort and the protection illusory." [d. Despite these 
drawbacks, the number of applicants seeking to obtain such patents from the PTO aver-
aged between 4,000 to 6,000 per year in the period 1953 to 1975. The number of 
design patents issued by the PTO during the same period ranged from 2,300 to 4,300 
annually. See Lindgren, supra note 98, at 204-07; see also Brown, supra note 32, at 
356-57 (remarking that "[s]omebody must think they are worth having"). In effect, the 
design patent provided a marketable certificate of title that demonstrated proof of 
invention and ownership, and it supported claims for priority rights in foreign law 
under article 4(c) of the Paris Convention, supra note 1. See G. BoOENHAUSEN, GUIDE 
TO THE ApPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION RlR THE PaarEcnON OF INDUSTRIAL 
PRoPERTY 43-44 (1968). An issued design patent also enhanced the possibility of 
negotiating license agreements that served to avoid the costs of litigation, especially in 
industries that respected design patents as a matter of trade custom. At the very least, 
such a patent constituted an initial barrier to entry that a competitor would have to over-
come. See Lindgren, supra note 98, at 207. 
Whether these advantages-despite wholesale judicial invalidation of litigated 
patents-satisfied art. 5 quinquies of the Paris Convention, supra note I, remained an 
open question. As amended at Lisbon in 1958, this article declared that "Industrial 
designs shall be protected in all the countries of the Union." According to 
Bodenhausen, "All that was inserted in the [Paris] Convention was the mere obligation 
for member states to protect industrial designs." G. BODENHAUSEN, supra, at 86 
(emphasis supplied). 
llO. Chairman Kastenmeier expressly mentioned this possibility at hearings held in 1975. 
See Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 362-63. 
Ill. See supra text accompanying notes 97-109. 
112. See 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2], at 1-200, § 5.04[1]. 
113. See id. § 1.04[2] (citing cases). 
114. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 
115. See supra notes 69, 92; Nimetz, supra note 69, at 127 (stating that courts used the· 
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less biased courts could reinterpret the standard so as to implement the orig-
inal policies behind the Design Patent Act of 1842. 116 If the latter explana-
tion proved correct, then courts could undo much of the mischief they had 
caused by a more evenhanded application of the general nonobviousness 
standard as conventionally formulated. 117 
From a comparative perspective, foreign courts that administered sui 
generis design laws built on the patent model had faced similar dilemmas 
without elevating the requirements of novelty and qualitative originality to 
unattainable heights. liS Italian courts, in particular, working with a rigid 
design patent law rather like that of the United States,119 had deliberately 
softened the statutory test of intrinsic novelty-akin to nonob-
viousness-on the theory that the strict standards applicable to both utility 
patents and utility models would not serve to promote the decorative arts. 120 
No evidence has been found to suggest that these or other foreign practices 
influenced judicial application of United States design patent law, in the way 
that Italian law had directly influenced the domestic copyright standard of 
separability promulgated in 1958 and codified in 1976. 121 Nevertheless, 
the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.), in 1966, 
introduced a lower standard of nonobviousness for ornamental designsl22 
that paralleled prior developments in Italian law. 
invention standard "to choose between those designs deserving a monopoly and those 
that should be freely copyable" and stressing economic considerations unfavorable to 
design protection). 
116. For the original policy, see supra note 69. and accompanying text; see also Gorham v. 
White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall) 511 (1871) (still the leading Supreme Court decision on 
design patents, which favorably viewed the statutory policy of stimulating design inno-
vation). 
117. Nothing in the statute "suggests the need for a disproportionately high standard" or 
obliges courts "to exaggerate the degree of nonobviousness required of miniscule 
design innovations that possess significant commercial value." Reichman, Designs 
After 1976, supra note 17, at 362. 
118. See supra notes 79-82, 86-87 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the eligibility 
requirements under most foreign design laws remain too high, even if not so high as 
those in the United States. See infra text accompanying notes 848-58. 
119. See Italian design law, supra note 4; Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 
1213-14 (citing authorities). 
120. See, e.g., BenussI, supra note 8, at 64-65 (stating that the Italian courts' "ftexible crite-
rion of assessment" looks only for "a particular esthetic quality given to an industrial 
product in relation to the usual appearance of products in the same sector," and noting 
a recent tendency to lower the requirement in mote crowded fields where "possibilities 
for. . . variations are necessarily limited"). As a result, challenges for lack of inven-
tive height seldom appear to succeed under Italy's design law, although its novelty 
requirement, which lacks a grace period, destroys proportionately more designs than 
the novelty requirement of American law. See, e.g., Fabiani,l Modelli, supra note 85, 
at 240-43 (stressing minimum level of "new creative contribution" required of designs); 
see also Z.O. ALGARDI, o.SEGNO INDUSTRIALE E ARTE APPUCATA 90-91 (1977). 
121. See infra notes 341-42 and accompanying text. 
122. See In re Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1966); see also Michaelson, Design PatenlS 
and Obviousness-Obviousness to Whom?, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'y 620 (1970); Comment, 
Design Protection-1ime to Replace the Design Patent, 52 MINN. L. REV. 942 (1967). 
. 
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In the case of In re Laverne, 123 the C.C.P'A. -speaking through Judge 
Giles Rich-observed that the usual test of nonobviousness would negate 
all patent protection for ornamental designs if courts construed the distinc-
tion between routine mechanics and true inventors so as to exclude the entire 
output of "competent designers." It was the competent designers who, in 
Judge Rich's estimation, ultimately brought about any progress in the field 
of industrial design. 124 To be sure, Judge Rich did not say that section 103 
of the Patent Act required no more than a competent designer might pro-
duce. 125 Rather, the object was to enable such designers to protect at least 
some of their work. To this end, the C.C.P.A. proposed a new test for obvi-
ousness based on the "ordinary intelligent man," who would assess the vis-
ual impact of a candidate design with less technical refinement than "the 
designer of ordinary skill in the art.,,126 The policy behind this test aimed 
to promote innovative industrial design by aligning the standard of eligibil-
ity with the pristine goal of the Design Patent Act of 1842.127 
If a similar strategy appears to have worked rather well in Italy, where 
courts seldom invalidate patented designs for lack of "intrinsic novelty,"12S 
it failed in the United States. The other appellate courts, with one excep-
tion,129 refused to follow the C.C.P'A. and rejected what they viewed as a 
move "to equate obviousness with novellJ' in the case of design patents" 
without an express legislative mandate. 13 Because of the split in the cir-
cuits after Laverne, the design patent law operated with a lower threshold of 
123. 356 F.2d 1003 (C.c.P.A. 1966). 
124. Id. at 1006. The court noted that the distinction between "patents for inventions" and 
"patents for designs" in 35 U.S.c. § 111 "would seem to indicate a legislative con-
sciousness that 'inventions' and 'designs' are different in kind." Id. at 1005. 
125. [d. at 1006. 
126. "The test is inherently a visual test. . . . No special skill is required to determine what 
things look like, though individuals react differently. It is bound to be an individual 
reaction." Id. 
127. Id.; see supra note 124. By upholding the validity of a patented American variant on 
Saarinen's famous chair, the court arguably increased the availability of design patent 
protection by enlarging the range of patentable variations. By the same token, how-
ever, the court may have weakened the scope of protection for patented designs because 
it did not view the American design as falling within the range of equivalents covered 
by Saarinen's own patent. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 96, at 190, 199 (implying 
that the scope of a design patent will not extend beyond literal copying). 
128. See supra note 120 and accompapying text. 
129. See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 444 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1970) 
(purporting to apply the ordinary observer standard but in so strict a manner as to 
defeat its purpose); see also Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 620 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1980). 
130. Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kiddie & Co., 462 F.2d 1263, 1265 (3d Cir. 1972). See 
generally I D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 104[21, at 1-203 to 1-204 (citing cases); Fryer, 
supra note 77, at 118-19. The congressional decision not to enact a special design law 
in 1976 could therefore also be construed as an express mandate to maintain the status 
quo and as an implicit disavowal of Laverne. Cf Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150 (1989) (stating that the novelty and nonobviousness 
Jequirements express a congressional determination of the desired level of competi-
tion). 
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eligibility in some jurisdictions than in others, a situation that encouraged 
forum shopping. 
In 1981, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals ended the Laverne 
experiment and, in In re Nalbandian, 131 closed the split in the circuits it had 
opened in 1966. 132 Henceforth the c.c.P.A. agreed to measure obviousness 
in terms of a "designer of ordinary capability who designs articles of the 
type presented in the application."133 The court, however, would allow 
applicants to demonstrate their attainment of this standard more objectively 
than in the past134 through the use of expert testimony by designers working 
in the pertinent field. 135 
This return to an orthodox doctrinal formulation did not mean that the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had acquiesced in the practice of 
exaggerating the degree of nonobviousness required of design innovation. 
In a series of opinions posterior to Nalbandian,'36 panels of the C.C.P.A. 
attacked the tendency of sister courts to disassemble patented designs into 
their component parts and then to subject these parts to piecemeal evalua-
tion against the prior art, usually with twenty-twenty hindsight and without 
regard to commercial success. 137 The correct approach, as the c.c.P.A. 
now saw it, required a patented design challenged for obviousness to be 
tested as a visual whole against existing references pertinent to the ensemble 
without piecemeal dissection of its component parts. 138 The court hinted, 
moreover, that secondary considerations, especially copying and commer-
cial success, were respectable indicia of nonobviousness in the design envi-
ronment, 139 a point it had not made in Nalbandian. 140 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals thus ended its days by 
bequeathing a more workable set of binding doctrinal tools to its succes-
sor-the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit l41 -than had previously 
131. 661 F.2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
132. Id. at 1216. 
133. Id. 
134. See id. at'1217; Fryer, supra note 77, at 119. 
135. Fryer, supra note 77, at 119. Professor Fryer, however, notes the tendency of skilled 
designers to disagree when caIled as experts. 
136. See. e.g., In re Carter, 673 F.2d 1378 (C.c.P.A. 1982); In re Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 
(C.C.P.A. 1982). 
137. See supra note 136; Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1223-24, 1223 
n.414, 1224 n.415 (describing these practices and criticizing courts for "acting upon a 
virtually conclusive presumption that combination designs were obvious as a matter of 
law," notwithstanding the presumption of validity that nominally attached to the patent 
itself). 
138. See, e.g., Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 (stating that "there must be a reference to something in 
existence, the design characteristics of which are basically the same as the claimed 
design, in order to support a holding of obviousness"); see also Carter, 673 F.2d 1378; 
In re Spreter, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 866 (C.C.P.A. 1981). 
139. See, e.g., Rosen, 673 F.2d 388. 
140. See Nalbandian, 611 F.2d at 1218. 
141. The Federal Circuit was formed through a merger of the former Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims. The new court has declared that all decisions 
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been available, even though the c.c.P.A. validated very few design patents 
in this period. 142 At the same time, other federal courts had begun to con-
clude that "blind opposition to the design patent was counterproductive.,,143 
Between 1974 and 1982, a number of decisions at both the appellate and 
district court levels upheld and enforced design patents under a more flexible 
reading of the nonobviousness standard than was customary during the pre-
ceding half century. 144 
2. Transitional Holding Patterns: 1982-1986 
By 1982, when the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit began to 
implement the congressional call for a specialized tribunal that would 
develop a uniform and more rational patent system, 145 there were many por-
tents heralding "the end of the antipatent era."I46 Not the least of these 
were the Supreme Court's ground-breaking decisions concerning microbiol-
ogy and computer programs,147 which may indirectly have improved the 
outlook for industrial designs. Any lasting improvement in the climate for 
design patents, however, depended on the willingness of the Federal Circuit 
to undertake a searching reevaluation of the nonobviousness requirement in 
general, with a view to preventing issued utility patents from succumbing to 
facile judicial invalidation. 148 
of the predecessor courts rendered before the close of business September 30, 1982, 
will be considered binding. See, e.g., South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 
1370 (Fed. Cir. 1982). 
142. Compare, e.g., Rosen, 673 F.2d 388 (reversing the rejection of an application for furni-
ture design for obviousness) with Carter, 673 F.2d 1378 and Spreter, 211 US.P.Q. 
(BNA) 866 and Nalbandian, 611 F.2d 1214 (all holding designs invalid for obvious-
ness). 
143. Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 363. 
144. See id. at 334-35, 362-65 (citing cases). Notable in this period were Contico Inn, Inc. 
v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 665 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1981) (trash can dolly); 
Lancaster Colony Corp. v. Aldon Accessories, Inc., 506 F.2d 1197 (2d Cir. 1974) (mod-
em ash tray); see also Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 494 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1974). 
145. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 28 U.S.c. § 1295 (1988). The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created by this Act, came into existence on October I, 
1982. See also Adelman, The New World of Patents Created by the Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, 20 U MICH. lL. REF. 979,982 (1987). 
146. See Adelman, supra note 145, at 981-83,982 n.12. According to Professor Adelman, 
the year 1982 marked the end of the anti patent era in that the authorities eased the pres-
sure from antitrust law, the Supreme Court enlarged the scope of patentable subject 
matter, the Patent and Trademark Office was upgraded, and Congress created the Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. [d. at 981. 
147. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 US. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabaty, 447 U.S. 303 
(1980); see also Dawson Chern. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 US. 176,201-02 (1980) 
(allowing patent law to create monopoly in unpatented product that had no other sub-
stantial commercial use). 
148. See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 83 (relating strong judicial hostility to design pat-
ents in the 1950s and 1960s to more diffuse judicial bias against utility patents during 
the same period). Rendering § 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 more manageable was 
essential to a strong patent system, which in tum was allegedly needed to meet the 
challenge of foreign competition. See, e.g., Adelman, supra note 145, at 982 n.14. 
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The steps taken by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to over-
haul prior jurisprudence and enhance the value of utility patents in recent 
years are largely beyond the scope of this Article. 149 Nevertheless, the 
emphasis this court has placed on the role of secondary considerations in the 
evaluation of nonobviousness generally ISO is of such overriding importance 
for an understanding of current trends in design patent law that some pre-
liminary observations on this topic are in order. 
a. The Emerging Role of Secondary Considerations 
As early as 1966, the United States Supreme Court, In Graham v. John 
Deere CO.,ISI had included secondary considerations among the various 
subtests it allowed lower courts to apply when evaluating utility patents 
challenged for obviousness. The federal appellate courts could therefore 
assess such nontechnical, objective factors IS2 as commercial success, 
fulfillment of a long-felt need in the trade, and copying by an alleged 
infringerlS3 at the same time as they subjectively measured the inventive 
height of a given innovation in terms of the routine skill of an ordinary engi-
neer familiar with the prior art. IS4 
Observers agree that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has fulfilled legisla-
tive expectations that it would improve the climate for utility patents in general. See, 
e.g., Adelman, supra note 145, at 982-88; Dunner, Introduction, in 13 A.I.P.L.A. Q.1. 
185 (1985); see also Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 
64 N.Y.U L. REV. I (1989). However, some believe the court may have overfulfilled 
this assignment. See, e.g., Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Eco-
nomic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAUF. L. REV. 803, 859-76 (1988); Note, A Cri-
tique of the Use of Secondory Considerations in Applying the Section 103 Nonobviousness 
Test for Patentability, 28 B.C.L. REV. 357 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Secondory Consider-
ations]. 
149. See supra note 148 (citing authorities). 
150. See generally Adelman, supra note 145, at 987-1007. 
151. 383 US. I, 17-18 (1966). 
152. The so-called subjective tests of nonobviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as mandated 
by Graham, require courts to ascertain: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) 
the level of ordinary skill in the art; and (3) the differences between the prior art and 
the claimed invention. Id. at 17-18. The Supreme Court also authorized the use of 
nontechnical, objective factors, called secondary considerations or subtests of nonob-
viousness, which focus on "the economic and motivational aspects" rather than "tech-
nological aspects" of the issue. See, e.g., Note, Secondory Considerations, supra Dote 
148, at 357-59; see also Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness":"A Nontechnical Approach 
to Patent Validity, 112 U PA. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Subtests of 
Nonobviousness]. How and when such factors were to be applied after Graham 
remained controversial. 
153. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 148, at 816; Note, Secondory Considerations, supra note 
148, at 358 (citing cases). Other secondary factors include licensing to potential com-
petitors (acquiescence of the trade), progress of the patent application through the PTO, 
nearly simultaneous invention by another researcher in the field, professional approval 
by experts in the field, and the failure of others to make the same invention. 
154. See Merges, supra note 148, at 815 (stating that the Federal Circuit has made Gra-
ham-along with the secondary considerations-"the cornerstones of nonob-
viousness"). 
32 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
In the past, however, courts tended to apply the Graham tests of nonob-
viousness in such a restrictive fashion that appeals to secondary considera-
tions did little to prevent judicial invalidation of a large proportion of the 
utility patents litigated in the period 1966 to 1982. 155 In overriding both the 
examiners' favorable decisions and the presumptions of validity supposed to 
derive from them,156 many judges actually evaluated the teachings dis-
closed in a patent as of the time its validity was challenged rather than as of 
the time the invention was made. 151 Courts in this mood either neglected 
the secondary considerations altogether or applied them in a half-hearted 
manner that normally served to corroborate their own intuitive findings of 
obviousness. 158 
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, deploring any 
devaluation by hindsight, held that the secondary considerations constituted 
one of four basic subtests applicable to all utility fatents challenged for 
obviousness under section 103 of the Patent Act. 15 The federal district 
courts l60 must accordingly evaluate objective factors, including commer-
cial success, in every relevant case,161 and these so-called secondary con-
155. See, e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 US. 273 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. 
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 US. 57 (1969); Merges, supra note 148, at 815-16, 815 
n.39; Adelman, supra note 145, at 991 n.46 (noting 60-70% rate of invalidation in 
period preceding establishment of Federal Circuit). 
156. See, e.g., P. RoSENBERG, supra note 77, § 17.05 (presumption of validity); Adelman, 
supra note 145, at 991-92. 
157. See, e.g., Mintz & Racine, Anticipation and Obviousness in the Federal Circuit, 13 
A.I.P.L.A. Q.J. 195, 212 (1985) (stating that hindsight inherently diminishes the per-
ceived level of inventive height); see also P. RoSENBERG, supra note 77, "at 9-16 (stress-
ing that the test is "not what would have been obvious to a judge after reading the patent 
in suit and hearing the testimony"). For evidence that case law was affected by an anti-
patent bias rooted in early laissez-faire economic theory, see Nimetz, supra note 69, at 
98-102. 
158. See supra note 155. The conventional formula for downgrading secondary considera-
tions was to find them relevant only when the outcome of the nonobviousness test was 
ambiguous on the basis of the primary, subjective considerations of the prior art. See, 
e.g., Walker v. General Motors Corp., 362 F.2d 56,60 (9th Cir. 1966); Note, Secondary 
Considerations, supra note 148, at 358. 
159. See, e.g., Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1099-1100 (Fed. Cir. 
1985); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 895-96 (Fed. Cir.), 
eert. denied, 469 US. 857 (1984); Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 961 
(Fed. Cir. 1983), eert. denied, 469 US. 835 (1984); Stratoftex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 
713 F.2d 1530, 1538-40 (Fed. Cir. 1983). These decisions build on prior decisions of 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals that stressed the importance of secondary 
factors and that had occasionally given them greater weight than the three prior art con-
siderations. The other federal appellate courts did not follow this lead. 
160. The Federal Circuit has jurisdiction over appeals concerning patents from the federal 
district courts and from the Patent and Trademark Board of Appeals. 28 US.C. 
§ 1295(a) (1988). 
161. See, e.g., Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F.2d 1573, 1575-76 
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence of commercial success required finding of 
nonobviousness even though invention would have been obvious on basis of prior art 
considerations alone), eeN. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman 
Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540. 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that objective factors 
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siderations may greatly affect the final outcome of patent litigation. 162 The 
Federal Circuit has also insisted that district courts assess nonobviousness 
as of the time the invention was made, that they avoid all recourse to hind-
sight, and that they respect the presumption of validity that the statute con-
fers upon every patentee. 163 
Any resolute rehabilitation of secondary considerations in the realm of 
utility patents should then logically extend to the judicial evaluation of 
design patents as well. Implementing this logic, however, presented certain 
practical difficulties l64 and posed a real dilemma for the court. On the one 
hand, continued judicial annihilation of design patents would become incon-
sistent with the Federal Circuit's overall approach.165 On the other hand, 
full application of the secondary factors to design patents without some 
countervailing doctrinal limitations could produce a still more protective 
environment than has so far emerged in the realm of utility patents. 166 
are entitled to great weight); StratoJlex. 713 F, 2d at 1538 (stressing burden of proof on 
challenger of invalidity). 
162. See, e.g., Alco Standard Corp. v. Thnnessee Valley Auth., 808 F,2d 1490 (Fed. Cir. 
1986) (holding patent valid essentially on basis of commercial success); Hodosh v. 
Block Drug Co., 786 F, 2d 1136, 1143-44 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (requiring evidence of sec-
ondary considerations to be evaluated independently of what any real person knows 
about prior art); Simmons Fastner Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 739 F,2d 1573, 
1575-76 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence of commercial success alone may 
require reversal of a finding of invalidity), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985); see also 
Mintz & Racine, supra note 157, at 217 (stating that the Federal Circuit has "emphati-
cally endorsed" application of secondary factors in patent infringement litigation and in 
ex parte prosecutions of patent applications); Merges, supra note 148 (criticizing this 
approach). . 
163. See, e.g., P. RoSENBERG, supra note 77, at 9-16; Mintz & Racine, supra note 157, at 
212. 
164. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 119. In regard to utility patents, for example, it is 
assumed that judges can measure the distance between the prior art and a new techni-
cal achievement on the basis of scientific criteria and technical data that are consistent 
for all decision-makers faced with a similar evaluation. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 
383 US. I, 35 (1966). Moreover, Ihere is implicitly a further judgment about the level 
of incentives needed in a given field, in relation to the rules of free competilion that 
otherwise apply. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US. 
141, 150 (1989); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 127. In the case of appearance designs, 
court!; cannot measure the distance between any given aesthetic contribution and its 
predecessors without succumbing to value judgments that are hard to quantify and 
unreliable at best. See, e.g., 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2], at 1-199 to 1-200 
("[N]ot surprisingly, the courts openly admit that any assessment of the obviousness of 
the [design) solution is necessarily subjective."); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 122 (noting 
that no socially accepted concept of artistic progress exists to guide the courts). Use of 
expert testimony appears to formalize these inherent uncertainties without providing a 
firm basis for resolving them. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 119. While value 
judgments about art are impermissible under general principles of copyright law, lest 
veiled forms of censorship prevail, see Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 
US. 239 (1903), the contestability of any judgment about matters of taste renders the 
patent examiners' decisions to grant design patents easier to challenge than is true of 
inventions generally. See Nimetz, supra note 69, at 113. 
165. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text. 
166. Whether the Federal Circuit has become a "plaintiffs" court or not is controversial. 
34 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
Consider, for example, that only the commercially successful appear-
ance designs attract imitators, while the market for mass-produced con-
sumer goods moves at a rapid pace that makes close copying the typical 
mode of infringement. Yet, both "commercial success" and "copying" con-
stitute secondar;,>.; factors entitled to considerable weight in the evaluation of 
utility patents. 1 7 Even if the Federal Circuit were to require design patent 
owners to establish a closer nexus between commercial success and the 
challenged components of protected designs 168 than it has so far required of 
plaintiffs suing to enforce utility patents, 169 routine reliance on commercial 
success and copying would significantly narrow the opportunities. to invali-
date patented designs. 170 
One should therefore expect the rate of invalidation for obviousness to 
decrease sharply if the Federal Circuit decided to evaluate design patents in 
light of the same objective criteria it has applied to utility patents in the 
name of Gralwm. In approaching the case law from 1982 on with this 
hypothesis in mind, however, it seems logical to ask whether the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit was prepared to make such a radical break 
with the past. If it was, one also needs to ask how the court would seek to 
ensure a proper balance between innovation and competition under a revital-
ized design patent law in which commercial success was likely to figure in 
every action for infringement. 
h. Evenhanded Tests of Nonobviousness 
During the period 1982 to 1986,171 the evidence suggests that the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit began cautiously to disentangle the 
For the view that the patent courts as a whole have been neutral or evenhanded, see 
Dunner, supra note 148, at 185-94 (including statistical tables). 
167. See supra note 153 and accompanying text. Few of the myriad designs launched onto 
the market in any given year will attain commercial success. See, e.g., Duchemin, La 
protection, supra note 8, at 34-37. But once a design captures the public's fancy, slav-
ish imitation gives competitors a price advantage and eliminates the originators' lead 
time. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1386-95; Nimetz, supra note 69, at 108-09. 
Moreover, a primary purpose of most appearance designs, as distinct from functional 
designs, is to induce the public to purchase marginally differentiated products whose 
technical yields tend to be standardized. See generally F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 
9-21. 
168. See, e.g., Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1392-93 
(Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding that the commercial response to an invention provides objec-
tive evidence of how it is viewed in the marketplace). While plaintiff bore the burden 
of proving a nexus between commercial success and the patentable features, a prima 
facie showing of this nexus shifted the burden onto the defendants of proving that suc-
cess was due to extraneous factors. [d. 
169. See. e.g., Merges, supra note 148, at 861 (arguing that a test of commercial success 
rewards marketing advantages, such as a superior distribution system or access to cap-
ital, and favors monopoly power); id. at 876 (arguing for less use of secondary factors in 
regard to utility patents); see also Emery, Patent Law: Obviousness. Secondary Consid-
erations. and the Nexus Requirements, 1986 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 117 (1986). 
170. See infra text accompanying notes 323-30. 
171. In point of fact, the period under review in this subsection extends from 1982 to 1985. 
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design patent law from past judicial encumbrances without formulating a 
comprehensive policy concerning the proper role of the Design Patent Act in' 
the absence of legislative reform. For its opening move, the court insisted 
that design patents challenged for obviousness were entitled to a genuine 
presumption of validity that saddled the challenger with the twin burdens of 
going forward and of overcoming the examiner's findings by clear and con-
vincing proof. 172 The Federal Circuit then proceeded to ratify the same 
standard of obviousness that the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals had 
applied to design patents between 1979 and 1982. 173 Both the district 
courts and the examiners would accordingly continue to test the inventive 
height of an ornamental design by reference to the skill of an ordinary 
designer working in the relevant field of endeavor and not by reference to the 
impression it made upon an ordinary observer unskilled in the art. 174 
At the same time, the Federal Circuit endorsed the C.C.P.A.'s last stric-
tures against piecemeal decomposition of candidate designs either at the 
prosecution stage or for purposes of invalidating issued design patents. A 
finding of obviousness would thus continue to depend on references to com-
parable art and not merely to bits and pieces of unrelated design solu-
tions. 175 The court also stressed the need to measure obviousness against 
the level of prior art existing at the time a design was created, and it strictly 
forbade devaluation through hindsight. 176 The Federal Circuit then broke 
new ground by holding that all the subtests currently used to determine the 
nonobviousness of utility patents,l77 including the secondary considera-
tions, should apply to design patents as well. 178 
The court did not relish the consequences of its own logic, however. 
True, it declined to invalidate a number of successful designs on the 
with one decision in the first quarter of 1986 assimilated to the discussion of functional-
ity characteristic of this transitional period. That decision was Unette Corp. v. Unit 
Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See infra notes 217-22 and accompanying 
text. 
172. See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (placing burden on challenger); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 
1423, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
173. See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text. 
174. See, e.g .• Shelcore. Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc .• 745 F.2d 621 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Litton, 
728 F.2d at 1443; In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981), rev'g In re Laverne, 
356 F.2d 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1966); see also supra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. 
The Federal Circuit thus declined to soften the standard of eligibility for design patents 
by judicial interpretation, as the C.C.P'A. had tried to do in the period 1966 to 1980. 
See supra notes 122-35 and accompanying text. 
175. See, e.g., Shelcore, 745 F.2d 621; Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 
F.2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Litton, 728 F.2d at 1443; Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hin-
delang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (LEX IS Genfed library. USApp file) 
(unpublished); see also Ex parte Igarashi, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 463 (PTO Bd. Pat. App. 
& Interferences 1985); In re Carter, 673 F.2d 1378, 1381 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Rosen. 
673 F.2d 388,390 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
176. See, e.g., Shelcore, 745 F.2d at 628; Litton, 728 F.2d at 1441. 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 159-63. 
178. See, e.g., Litton, 728 F.2d at 1440-41; Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 
83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (unpublished). 
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grounds that they represented mere adaptations or modifications of the prior 
art,179 a favorite tactic of federal appellate courts hostile to design protec-
tion in the past. 180 It even recognized that, of all the objective factors inher-
ited from Graham v. John Deere Co., "copying" deserved particular weight 
in the judicial evaluation of patented designs challenged for obviousness. 181 
But the Federal Circuit distrusted the results to which uncritical reliance on 
commercial success might lead in the design milieu, acknowledging that 
such success could depend as much on brand loyalties, advertising, and 
functional efficiency as on the superiority of the designer's creative art. 182 
The court thus recognized, in the context of industrial designs, some of the 
very drawbacks to applying the secondary considerations that critics would 
later raise in connection with utility patents. 183 
Nevertheless, the treatment that the Federal Circuit afforded ornamen-
tal designs challenged for obviousness during the period under review 
appears evenhanded and, on the whole benign, especially in light of the 
judicial bias against design patents that used to prevail outside the C.C.P.A. 
Of eight cases concerning the validity of design patents known to have 
reached the Federal Circuit between 1982 and the first quarter of 1986,'84 
only one actually resulted in a decision to invalidate for obviousness. 185 Of 
179. See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 E2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (affirming finding that design of eyeglass display rack was not obvious); 
She/core, 745 E2d 621 (holding design for driving simulator toy not invalid for double 
patenting). 
180. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
181. See, e.g., Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 
1984) (unpublished); see also Trans-World, 750 F.2d 1552; Thompson, supra note 96, at 
163 (noting that Trans-World was a case of "outright theft"). In Fiberglass in Motion, 
the court rejected a defense based on an industry practice of copying and declared that 
such "behavior evidences disregard for the property rights . . . in the creative products 
of others." 
182. See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 E2d 1541, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 
1984); Litton, 728 E2d at 1443; Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 
(Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (unpublished). The court also stated that expert testimony 
concerning inventive height could influence but not exclusively determine the issue of 
obviousness, which remained a question of law, not of fact. See, e.g., Petersen, 740 
E2d at 1547-48 . 
. 183. See supra note 169 (presenting views of Merges). 
184. E.g. Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 E2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Interpart Corp. v. 
Italia, S.p.A., 777 E2d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1985), disapproved in nonre/evant part in Bonito 
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); Trans-World, 750 E2d 
1552; Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Petersen, 
740 E2d 1541; Litton, 728 F.2d 1423; Feuling v. Wood, Nos. 84-543, 84-662 (Fed. Cir. 
Nov. 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (unpublished), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1137 (1985); Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 
19, 1984) (unpublished). 
185. See Petersen, 740 F.2d 1541 (affirming the finding that design for "locking plier-type 
wrenches and other 'hand tools' " was invalid for obviousness); infra text accompany-
ing notes 221-33; see also Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc. v. Coratomis, Inc., 702 E2d 671 
(8th Cir. 1983) (affirming the finding that design for surgically implantable heart pace-
makers was obvious). 
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the remainder, one was found invalid for lack of ornamentality; 186 another 
lacked novelty under the "on sale" bar of section 102(b); 187 while five of the 
eight patents in question were upheld on aPl:al. 188 This represented an 
invalidation rate of some thirty-eight percent, 89 as compared with an inval-
idation rate of from seventy-five to one hundred percent for the federal 
appellate courts only a few years earlier. 190 
c. Uncertain Standard of Functionality 
Courts hostile to design patents in the past often suspected manufactur-
ers of trying to use this institution to circumvent the stringent requirements 
governing utility patents. 191 On its face, the Design Patent Act protects 
only the decorative features or appearance of a useful article l92 and not its 
functional aspects. 193 But modem industrial design blurs this legal distinc-
tion by programmatically avoiding the separation of form and function. 194 
The more perfectly a designer integrates the two in a patented creation, the 
more likely it becomes that his legal monopoly of form will yield indirect 
control over functional components of the underlying product that have not 
met the tests of novelty and nonobviousness. 195 
From a worldwide perspective, however, the industrialized countries 
seem increasingly disposed to protect even functional designs that fail to 
186. See Feuling v. Wood, Nos. 84-543, 84-662 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 1984) (unpublished) 
(holding that designs of fan housing on air-cooled engine and of mounting stand for 
attaching accessory to engine lacked ornamentality and were primarily functional). 
187. See Inter part, 777 F.2d at 686 (holding that a suit on patent despite knowledge of sales 
in violation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) justified award of attorney's fees as an exceptional 
case under 35 U.S.c. § 285). 
188. These included Unelle, 785 F.2d 1026; Trans-World, 750 F.2d 1552; Shelcore, 745 F.2d 
621; Utton, 728 F.2d 1423; Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. 
Cir. Apr. 19, 1984); see also Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., 758 F.2d 167 (6th 
Cir. 1985) (three designs of see-through rifle sights were held valid and infringed 
below; two invalidated for functionality on appeal). 
189. The rate of invalidation at the district court level is, of course, different, but of little sta-
tistical interest in this period because the Federal Circuit had not yet emitted clear sig-
nals about design patents. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 96 (criticizing district 
courts' activity in this period). 
190. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text. 
191. See, e.g., Nimetz, supra note 69, at 115-20, 127. 
192. See 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1988); Warbern Packaging Indus. v. Cut Rate Plastic Hangers, 
Inc., 652 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1981); Blisscraft of Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 
F.2d 694,696 (2d Cir. 1961). While the design must "appeal to the eye," the require-
ment is one of industrial aesthetics, not "beauty" in a purely artistic sense. See, e.g., 
Contico Infl, Inc. v. Rubbermaid Commercial Prods., Inc., 665 F.2d 820, 825 (8th Cir. 
1981) ("Perhaps it is too much to expect that a trash-dolly can be beautiful. It is enough 
... that it is not ugly, especially when compared to prior designs."). 
193. See generally I D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2](d). 
194. See, e.g., Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copy-
right in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707, 738-40 (1983). 
195. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 8, at ll-16; Fryer, supra note 77, at 119-21; Nimetz, 
supra note 69, at 114-16, 120-21. 
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meet the standards of patentability, and some exotic legal paraphernalia 
have been concocted for this purpose. For example, the Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, and Japan provide direct protection of functional designs 
under utility model laws in addition to sui generis protection of appearance 
desi§.ns. l96 Although utility model laws, which are growing in popular-
ity, I 7 operate with a stricter legal discipline than that of the design laws, 198 
they weaken the standards nominally supposed to govern a mature patent 
system in subtle and indirect ways.l99 Some countries that remain unwill-
ing to protect utility models nonetheless tolerate a rather high degree of 
functional content in appearance designs protectable under sui generis 
design laws. 2OO Most industrialized countries, following the lead of the 
United States, have also begun to protect integrated circuit designs in spe-
cial laws embodying modified copyright principles.201 One country, the 
196. See, e.g .• 2 S. LADAS. supra note 1. at 949-56; Hausser, Utility Models: The Experience 
of the Federal Republic of Gemumy, 26 INDUS. PRoP. 314 (1987); Reichman. Designs 
Before 1976, supra note 17. at 1217-21 (case of Italy); The Utility Model Law of Japan. 
Law No. 123 of 1959. reprinted in JAPANESE LAWS RELATING To INDUSTRIAL PRoPERTY 
61-88 (l.P.D. rev. ed. 1979). The Japanese law. enacted in 1905. was modelled on that 
of Germany. but it soon evolved into a petty patent law that favored small. domestic 
inventions. See, e.g .• T. Dol. supra note 82. at 68·70. 
197. See, e.g .• I. POUt EL MODELO DE UTIUDAD 1·9 (1982) (arguing that utility model laws 
are especially appropriate for developing countries); Chen Ruifang. The Utility Model 
System and Its Benefitsfor China. 141.I.C. 493 (1983). 
198. In the Federal Republic of Germany. for example. the utility model law classically pro-
tected three-dimensional forms of tools and implements. articles of everyday use. or 
parts thereof for six (now eight) years on condition of "novelty" and "inventiveness." 
But the novelty standard is more permissive than (bat of utility patents (and includes a 
six-month grace period). while the standard of invention tends to be lower in practice 
than that applied to utility patents. despite a certain formal allegiance to the standard 
of nonobviousness. See, e.g .• Hausser. supra note 196, at 314-16. Moreover. utility 
models are not examined and can be obtained by mere registration. which delivers 
immediate protection. Id. at 316-18 (noting that patent and utility model applications 
are often filed conjointly for this reason). The utility model law of the Federal Republic 
was recently updated. with an extension of subject matter eligibility to include electri· 
cal circuits (qua tools or articles of everyday use). which were previously excluded. 
The amendment also codified a standard of invention requiring a mere "inventive act" 
as distinct from the "inventive activity" of the patent law. See Utility Model Act of Jan-
uary 1, 1968. § 1. as amended Aug. 28. 1986. reprinted in GERMAN LAws, supra note 
4. at 12-81 (English test); Hausser. supra note 196, at 315-16. 
199. For example. the tendency is to broaden the sweep of utility models beyond the protec-
tion of functional configurations to petty patents in general, which some view as a boon 
to smaller-and medium·sized firms. See, e.g., Hausser, supra note 196. at 316.318-19. 
But critics see the utility model as an illogical and unwarranted derogation from the 
general patent system and from the rules of competition it sustains. See, e.g., F. 
PERR~ supra note 8. at 188·233; Perot-Morel, L'ambiguite du concept de modele 
d'utilite. in ETUDES EN L'HONNEUR DE R. FRANCESCHELU 425 (1983). 
200. See, e.g., Levin. Recent Developments. supra note 87. at 606-08 (stating that "awareness 
of the protection of functional designs bas been decisive for the creation of the Nordic 
sui generis design protection system and its limits"); see also Levin. Applied Art: On 
the Borderline Between Copyright and Design Protection in Nordic Law (hereinafter 
Levin, Applied Art), in ALAI 1983. supra note 8, at 275·76.280-81; supra note 86. 
201. See, e.g., S.M. STEWART. INTERNATIONAL COPYRlGlIT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 333-42 
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United Kingdom, has just enacted a sui generis law conferring copyright-
like protection on both functional and aesthetic designs that are not subject 
to either a registration requirement or statutory prerequisites of novelty and 
inventive merit. 202 
Formally, the United States has never considered adopting a utility 
model law like those enacted in Italy, Japan, or the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984203 does protect a 
single class of functional designs, however, without insisting on either nov-
elty or nonobviousness. 204 For this and other reasons, the Act has been 
treated as a "neighboring right," allied to and collocated with the Copyright 
Act of 1976,20S and negotiations for an international treaty to deal with 
semiconductor chip topographies are still underway.206 Moreover, the sui 
generis design bills currently before Congress would seem to provide copy-
right-like protection of functional designs without regard to their aesthetic 
content and without requiring either objective novelty or nonobviousness as 
conditions of eligibility. 207 
Against this background, the federal judiciary's traditional concern to 
limit the functionality of patented designs may be viewed as an unwilling-
ness to countenance the protection of utility models in disguise without an 
express congressional mandate to this effect. 208 On the one hand, too 
(2d ed. 1989); Geller, supra note 42, § 4[I][c][i); infra notes 203-06, 939-40 and 
accompanying text. 
202. Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988 [United Kingdom), ch. 48, §§ 213-264; see, 
e.g., R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 297-98; w'R. CORNISH, INTELLECrUAL PRoPERTY: 
PATENTS, CoPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGfITS 384-91 (2d ed. 1989); 
Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46. The precise level of "originality" to be required 
under this law has reportedly been left to the determination of courts. Id. See also 
infra notes 846, 947-63 and accompanying text. Before the passage of this Act, British 
courts protected three-dimensional functional designs in copyright law if they had 
been depicted in two-dimensional technical drawings, a practice overruled by the Act. 
See, e.g., R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 283-95, 361. 
203. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.c. §§ 901-914 (1988). 
204. See id. § 902(b) (excluding nonoriginal and commonplace chip designs and nonoriginal 
variations of such designs). 
205. See, e.g., R. STERN, SEMICONDUCTOR CHIP PRarECTlON 397-99 (l9H6). See generally 
Kastenmeier & Remington, The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: A Swamp 
or Firm Ground?, 70 MINN. L. REV. (1985); McManis, International Protection for 
Semiconductor Chip Designs and the Standard of Judicial Review of Presidential Procla-
mations Issued Pursuant to the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 22 Gro. 
WASH. J. INT'LL. 331 (1988). . 
206. See, e.g., Oman, The "Chips" Treaty: A U.S. Post-Mortem, 1989 NIR 422-25 (1989). 
207. See infra note 771 (listing and discussing current design bills); Brown, supra note 32, 
at 1399-1400 (criticizing this proposed extension of design protection to functional 
designs). 
208. For evidence that resistance to utility models in disguise may have influenced the devel-
opment of the nonobviousness standard even with regard to utility patents, see M. 
Farell, The Supreme Court and the Utility Model Thst of Patentability (Apr. 10, 1990) 
(unpublished paper on file at the Vanderbilt Law School). 
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indulgent a standard of functionality might mean that competitors could not 
make use of a patented design component they needed in order to match or 
improve upon an originator's performance. efficiency. or manufacturing 
costS. 209 On the other hand. too stringent a standard would defeat the very 
purpose of a law enacted to protect ornamental designs of useful articles.210 
The problem. as Nimetz framed it in 1965. was that "the 
configurations of most goods are guided both by mechanical necessity and 
by artistic considerations ... 211 Moreover, configurations eligible for protec-
tion under the design patent law tend to exhibit a much higher degree of 
functionality than courts normally expect to encounter in cases dealing with 
copyrightable "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works.,,212 Were the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to adopt a purist attitude concern-
ing aesthetic features worthy of protection in design patent law, its function-
ality standard would logically have to invalidate the bulk of the very designs 
that its evenhanded standard of nonobviousness had just rehabilitated. 213 
Wholesale invalidation on grounds of functionality, in turn, would only 
intensify the pressures that industrial design had begun to exert on federal 
unfair competition law in the 1980s,214 a development the court was well 
aware of. 21~ 
During the transitional period under review, the Federal Circuit strug-
gled with this problem without elaborating a fully coherent doctrinal frame-
work for resolving it. On the positive side, the court declared that utility 
and design patents constituted two different species, serving different but 
equally valid statutory goals, that were quite capable of peaceful co-exis-
tence when the occasion so required. 216 That the Federal Circuit was pre-
pared to tolerate a denser admixture of functional features in patentable 
designs than the federal appellate courts had condoned in the past217 then 
appeared from decisions upholding _ the designs of an eyeglass display 
209. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 120; supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
210. The term "ornamental" as a requirement was added to the design patent statute in 1902 
in order to guide and restrict previous practice. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 
119-20. 
211. Nimetz, supra note 69, at 117; see also Denicola, supra note 194, at 738-40. 
212. See, e.g., 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988) (defining pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works to 
exclude "their mechanical or utilitarian aspects"); id. § 102(b) (listing nonprotectible 
matter, especially ideas); id. § 113(b) (excluding protection of three-dimensional use-
ful articles depicted in two-dimensional form). See generally I P. GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 28, at 98-112. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 177-90. 
214. See infra text accompanying notes 530-71,608-701. 
215. See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). 
216. See, e.g., Shelcore, Inc. v. Dwham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 628 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 
Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 939 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also P. RosEN-
BERG, supra note 77, § 6.01[5], at 6-28. 
217. See generally Nimetz, supra note 69, at 113-21. 
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rack,218 of fiberglass camper shells,219 and, early in 1986, of a container for 
dispensing liquids. 220 
On the negative side, the Federal Circuit skirted the issue of function-
ality in one difficult case by tacitly linking it with the general tests of 
nonobviousness. In Petersen Manufacturing Co. v. Central Purchasing, 
Inc.,221 the court hinted at one point that the design of a handtool was func-
tionally dictated,222 while at another point it stressed plaintiff's failure to 
prove that commercial success stemmed from ornamental features of the 
patented design rather than from its unpatented functional features. 223 In 
the end, the court invalidated the design for obviousness224 under the 
"skilled designer" test of In re Nalbandian, 225 and it cast a wanton glance in 
passing at design bills that seek to protect functional designs without requir-
ing either ornamentality or a creative contribution.226 
The Petersen decision was regressive in spirit and inconsistent with the 
court's overall approach. It failed to rationalize a doctrine of functionality 
.that would enable the practicing bar to operate efficiently within a regime 
willing to tolerate a high degree of functionality in other designs upheld in 
the same period: 227 It also opened the door to sub rosa invalidation for 
218. See Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 E2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(affirming validity of design for eyeglass display rack). 
219. See Fiberglass in Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) 
(LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (unpublished) (affirming validity of design of 
camper shells made of fiberglass); see also Ex parte Igarashi, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 463 
(PTO Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1985) (finding tire design not obvious without dis-
cussing functionality). 
220. See Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 E2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (valid below; issue of 
validity not raised on appeal). 
221. 740 E2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
222. Petersen, 740 E2d at 1549. Handtools are pristine subjects of foreign utility model 
laws. See supra note 198. 
223. Petersen, 740 E2d at 1547-49. 
224. Id. 
225. 661 E2d. 1214 (C.C.P.A. 1981), cited in Petersen, 740 E2d at 1547; see supra text 
accompanying notes 132-40. 
226. See Petersen, 740 E2d at 1549 n.7 (referring to Judge Rich's concurring opinion in 
Nalbandian); infra note 771 and accompanying text. The Petersen court's reference to 
the then pending design bill thus disclosed that some of the Federal Circuit's most 
respected judges welcomed the prospects of sui generis protection for functional 
designs meeting no particular standard of creativity. See also The Industrial Innovation 
and Technology Act: Hearings on S. 791 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, 
and Trade"..arks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, l00th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-31 
(1987) [hereinafter Design Protection Hearings 1987) (testimony and statement of 
Judge Giles S. Rich in favor of such a law). For criticism of these or similar proposals 
to protect functional designs on soft conditions, see, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 
1395-1404; Cornish, Protecting the Appearance of Products: A British Experiment, in 
ALAI 1983, supra note 8, at 297-311; infra text accompanying notes 769-80. 
227. See supra notes 218-19 and accompanying text. The confusion surrounding function-
ality at this time can be surmised from Feuling v. Wood, Appeal Nos. 84-543,84-662 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (unpublished), cerr. 
denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985). Since the Feuling designs were in effect engine parts 
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obviousness by district courts concerned about functionality, a favorite tac:-
tic of the past,228 and this in turn might be construed as a signal of hostility 
or indifference to design patents in general. 
In retrospect, the methodological inelegance of Petersen was a temporary 
aberration229 that did not prevent the Federal Circuit from maintaining a fairly 
tolerant approach to functionality throughout the transitional period under 
review.23o Of eight cases concerning the validity of design patents known to 
have reached the court between 1982 and the first quarter of 1986, only one 
was actually invalidated for functionality,231 while the only design invalidated 
for obviousness in the same period-i.e., the Petersen design of a handtool-
was, by the court's own admission, too functional to pass muster. 232 If, in 
short, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remained perturbed by 
functionality (an issue it would soon address more comprehensively),233 it was 
not disposed to encourage wholesale invalidation of design patents on this or 
any other ground during the period under review. 
d. Infringement-The New Outcard 
The Federal Circuit's ambivalent view of design patents surfaced most 
clearly in cases that reached the issue of infringement. The usual test for 
infringement, handed down from Gorham Manufacturing Co. v. White,234 
required the accused design to bear such similarities to the protected design 
as to deceive an ordinary observer into purchasing the former supposing it 
to be the latter. 235 This emphasis on elements of confusion or deception, 
which distorts some foreign design laws, too,236 does prevent second comers 
from blatantly trading on the goodwill associated with a protected design. 
But it blunts judicial sensitivity to potential violations of a property right, it 
and "irredeemably functional," see Thompson, supra note 96, at 191, invalidation by 
the Federal Circuit was logical; the mystery is why the PTO had issued a design patent 
in the first place. Id. 
228. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
229. See infra text accompanying notes 269-302. But see Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled 
Prods. Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished) (arguably 
reverting to this same tactic). 
230. See supra text accompanying notes 216-20. 
231. Feuling v. Wood, Appeal Nos. 84-543,84-662 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 1984) (unpublished). 
For the more traditional attitude of some federal appellate courts still handling patent 
cases in this period, see, e.g., Kwik-Site Corp. v. Clear View Mfg. Co., 758 F.2d 167, 
172, 173-77 (6th Cir. 1985) (see-through mounts for rifle sights found valid and 
infringed below; two of three designs reversed for functionality on appeal); Cardiac 
Pacemakers, Inc. v. Coratomis, Inc., 702 F. 2d 671, 672 (8th Cir. 1983)"(affirming the 
finding that design for surgically implantable heart pacemakers was invalid for obvi-
ousness and functionality). 
232. Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
233. See infra text accompanying notes 269-302. 
234. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871). 
235. Jd. at 526-28; see also I D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[4]. 
236. See, e.g., Gaubiac, Autres Problemes de Fron/jeres, in LEoS DEsSINS ET MOOELES EN 
QuESTION, supra note 8, at 57, 87-94 (noting influence of French unfair competition 
law on tests for infringement under French design protection law). 
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undermines the protection of design concepts as such, and it encourages the 
courts to disregard market interests despite the high transaction costs that 
creators must defray.237 In effect, this infusion of principles drawn from 
unfair competition law238 benefits competitors who appropriate the commer-
cially valuable features of patented designs while artfully varying them to 
avoid slavish imitation. 239 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which applied the 
Gorham test unswervingly in this period, did not hesitate to exploit its ambi-
guities by allowing modest dissimilarities to avoid liability when the judges 
felt little inclined to enforce the patent at hand. 24O Nor was a showing of 
commercial success certain to neutralize this predilection for dissimilari-
ties,241 although proof of copying could attenuate it.242 Conceding only 
that Gorham did not impose a "likelihood of confusion" standard243 like that 
used in the proliferation of cases in which commercial designs were pro-
tected as "appearance trade dress, ,,244 the Federal Circuit in this period left 
more design patents stamped "valid but not infringed" than were found 
"valid and infringed. ,,245 
At the same time, the court took pains to develop and refine a second 
prong of its infringement doctrine, known as the "point of novelty" test, 
237. See. e.g., Thompson, supra note 96, at 162. Thompson believes that the "issue of cus-
tomer or observer deception is inherently a narrow test precluding the idea that there is 
a protectable design concept in a manner analogous to a functional concept that might 
be protectable in a utility patent." [d. 
238. See infra notes 530-35 and accompanying text. 
239. Cf Levin, Applied Art, supra note 200, at 276-77 (referring to situation in the Nordic 
countries). Professor Levin finds it "unsatisfactory if a competitor can come fairly 
close to a protected design and still avoid liability for infringement" once a proprietor 
has borne the burdens and costs of registration under a design protection law; see also 
supra note 237 (view of Thompson). 
240. See. e.g., Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 185 F.2d 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1986); 
Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 145 F.2d 621, 629 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding that 
accused design was substantially different), criticized by Thompson, supra note 96, at 
162; Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (finding 
significant differences in crowded field); see also Fryer, supra note 77, at 121 (criticiz-
ing extent to which "small differences . . . seem . . . to avoid design patent infringe-
ment"). 
241. See, e.g., Unette, 185 F.2d 1026; Utton, 728 F.2d at 1427. 
242. See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons. Inc .• 150 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 
1984). noted by Thompson. supra note 96. at 163; Fiberglass in Motion. Inc. v. Hin-
delang; No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19. 1984) (LEXIS. Genfed library. USApp file) 
(unpublished). Whether a design patent could be found valid and infringed without 
evidence of copying in this period has been questioned. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 17. 
at 121 (citing authority). 
243. See Unette, 785 F.2d at 1029. 
244. See infra notes 530-35 and accompanying text. 
245. Of five relevant cases between 1982 and the first quarter of 1986 in which the design 
patents were not invalidated for any reason, three were found "valid but not infringed." 
See Unette, 185 F.2d 1026; Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc .• 145 F.2d 621 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984); Litton. 728 F.2d 1423. Two were found "valid and infringed." See 1i'ans-
World. 150 F.2d 1552; Fiberglass in Motion. Inc. v. Hindelang. No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. 
Apr. 19. 1984). 
44 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
which focused on the nature of the matter that a defendant had appropriated 
as distinct from the issue of similarity. 246 Under the "point of novelty" test, 
a plaintiff must show that any actionable similarities pertain to the novel 
matter claimed to distinguish the patented design from the prior art. 247 
When the sole point of similarity is not a novel feature that bore on the 
threshold claims to eligibility in the first instance, no basis exists for a 
finding of infringement. 248 
The point of novelty test enabled the Federal Circuit to probe two 
issues that lie on opposite sides of the same coin. One concerns the protec-
tability of the matter allegedly taken from the plaintiff's design; the other 
asks whether the similarities shown to exist actually amount to illicit simi-
larities at all. 249 Combining these inquiries permits defendants to excuse 
even a showing of strong similarities by demonstrating the extent to which 
they borrowed only common~lace or generic ideas, functional features, or 
other nonprotectable malte~ 0 while adding sufficient dissimilarities and 
variations of their own within the range of otherwise protectable matter. 2S1 
These tests provided, in short, a functional equivalent in design patent law 
of the bifurcated test of copyright infringement2S2 that the Second, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits had been forging during much of the same period.2s3 
The elaboration of this two-pronged test of infringement plays a critical 
role in the new approach to design protection law that the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit has begun to develop. If the series of "valid but not 
infringed" decisions prominent in this period reflected nothing more than 
the old bias against design patents,254 for example, it would fail to explain 
why the court took such pains to develop the "point of novelty" doctrine 
246. See, e.g., Unette, 785 F.2d at 1028-29; Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444. 
247. See, e.g., Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444; see also I D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[4) (noting 
that "the similarity to the ordinary observer must be attributable to the novel elements 
of the patented design"). 
248. See, e.g., 1 P. ROSENBERG, supra note 77, § 6.01[51, at 6-36. 
249. See, e.g., Unette, 785 F.2d at 1028-29; Litton, 728 F.2d at 1440. 
250. See, e.g., Litton, 728 F.2d at 1440. For more recent cases, see infra notes 303-18 and 
accompanying text. 
251. Compare, e.g., Unette, 785 F.2d at 1028 and Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., hic., 745 
F.2d 621,623,628-29 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444, with Fiberglass in 
Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (LEX IS, Genfed 
library, USApp file) (unpublished) (holding that defendant's slight modifications did not 
justify overturning lower court's finding of infringement given copying and commercial 
success). 
252. See, e.g., Thompson, supra nole 96, at 195 (noting affinities to copyright infringement 
in Fiberglass in Motion). 
253. See, e.g., Cooling Sys. & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 771 F.2d 485,491-93 
(9th Cir. 1985); Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 
(7th Cir.), cerro denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Warner Bros. V. ABC, 720 F.2d 231 (2d 
Cir. 1983). See generally 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 3-45. It must be remem-
bered, however, that copyright law gives no protection against independent creation, 
whereas independent creation is not a recognized defense to an action for infringement 
of a design patent, and copying as such need not be shown. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 
71, at12t. 
254. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 96, at 162, 174, 190 (suggesting this explanation). 
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when the presence of relatively minor differences could justify a finding of 
noninfringement under the Gorham test without more. And why bother to 
fashion such an elaborate doctrinal outcard at all while avoiding the older 
and better established outcards of invalidation for obviousness or function-
ality or both?255 
A more promising line of inquiry is to ascertain why a court that had 
taken pains to treat industrial designs in a more neutral and evenhanded 
manner considered the "point of novelty" test to be of such ancillary impor-
tance. A review of the cases in which this test figured prominently then sug-
gests that the Federal Circuit found it especially helpful when the patented 
design combined decorative and very functional features in an integrated 
whole that enjoyed considerable commercial success. 256 An hypothesis 
worth examining, in short, is that the ambivalence and uncertainty charac-
terizing the infringement doctrine during this transitional period is directly 
related to the court's larger, unresolved quandary about functionality. That 
quandary,257 in turn, stemmed from the court's growing realization that 
greater latitude in admitting functionally influenced designs to patent pro-
tection was needed under modern economic conditions notwithstanding the 
federal judiciary's traditional reluctance to allow design patent law to pro-
tect utility models in disguise. 258 
If the above-mentioned hypothesis proved accurate, then the elabora-
tion of a more refined functionality doctrine-noticeably lacking in this 
period-could itself allow decisions for or against infringement to assume a 
more neutral and predictable configuration than was true between 1982 and 
the first quarter of 1986. The cases decided from mid-1986 to the time of 
writing appear to verify both of these hypotheses. 
3. The New Synthesis: Functionality, Point of Novelty, Illicit 
Appropriation 
The later cases suggest that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit has shed its initial reserve and is systematically fashioning a more 
workable design protection law on the foundations of the preexisting legisla-
tion. Notable in this regard is a more resolute determination to apply all the 
255. This -does not exclude the possibility that old fashioned antiprotectionist bias was pres-
ent in such cases as Unette, 785 F.2d 1026, and Shelcore, 745 F.2d 621, in which the 
qualitative nature of the similarities at issue may have been unduly discounted. The 
point is that the search for a workable doctrinal structure to accommodate industrial 
design fulfilled policy objectives that cannot be explained by the appeal to bias alone. 
256. See, e.g., Unette, 785 F.2d 1026 (finding design of dispensing container for liquids valid 
but not infringed); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(finding design of microwave oven doors valid but not infringed); see infra notes 
303-31 and accompanying text (discussing more recent cases). 
257. For recognition that the Federal Circuit at this period was in a quandary about function-
ality, see Fryer, supra note 77, at 120-21. 
258. See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co., v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 1548-49, 1549 
n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding design of needle-nosed locking plier-type wrench invalid 
for obviousness, but hinting that the underlying functionality problem might be cured if 
proposed design legislation were enacted); supra note 226 and accompanying text. 
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Graham criteria of nonobviousness to industrial designs and the elaboration 
of an overarching doctrine of functionality that affects every phase of the 
infringement action. The evidence further suggests that the clearer signals 
emitted by the Federal Circuit in this period have begun to influence the way 
federal district courts approach design patent cases, too, even though a sta-
tistical analysis to detect trends at the district court level remains prema-
ture. 259 
a. Unreserved Application of Secondary Factors 
On the surface, the Federal Circuit's recent pronouncements concern-
ing the statutory presumption of validity and the weight to be given the Gra-
ham criteria-including secondary considerations-appear to carry for-
ward the doctrinal framework established during the transit~onal phase. 260 
In reality, the court has added a new dimension to its earlier work by stress-
ing the extent to which the ~atenting of aesthetic achievements promotes 
progress in industrial design. 61 The Federal Circuit has thus jettisoned the 
antimonopolistic cant employed against design patents for the past twenty 
years or more,262 and it seems keenly aware of the role that industrial design 
plays in stimulating competition under modern economic conditions.263 
259. Because leading cases that perfect the Federal Circuit's own doctrinal re-elaboration 
were handed down only in 1988-1990, there is an inevitable time lag during which the 
lower courts have to register and digest a more refined message. See infra text accom-
panying notes 270-314. 
260. See, e.g., Avia Group Int'l v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 E2d 1557, 1563-64 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (discussing obviousness); Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 
800 E 2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1986). But see Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of 
Ohio, Inc., 908 E2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of preliminary injunction 
against copying of patented fender design despite presumption of validity). 
261. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563-64 (stressing need to promote the decorative arts as 
policy of the design statute); Pacific Furniture, 800 F.2d 1111 (cited in Avia as an 
instance of promoting the decorative arts); cf Gorham Co. v. White, 81 u.s. (14 Wall.) 
511 (1871) (stating that purpose of the statute is "to give encouragement to the decora-
tive arts"). 
262. See generally Nimetz, supra note 69, at 97-113 (rehearsing the antipatent bias of the 
Machlup tradition in the design patent milieu). 
263. See, e.g., Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 E2d 1186, 1188 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quot-
ing testimony of Judge Rich deploring that there is "no Federal statute today suited to 
the needs of designers and design owners"); see also American Antenna Corp. v. Wil-
son Antenna, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 924,928 (D. Nev. 1988) (stating that "sleek, high tech 
appearance" contributed to company's "unique position in the industry" since introduc-
ing the patented design); Physio-Control Corp. v. Medical Research Laboratories, 7 
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497. 1498 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting that "a poor design appearance 
may create doubts about the level of technical skill and attention devoted to the engi-
neering ... of the device itself'). For the view that "[d]esign is the lifeline of modern 
commercially progressive industries and its role in international competitiveness is 
growing significantly," see D. UGHANWA & M. BAKER, THE RoLE OF DEsiGN IN INTER· 
NAnoNAL COMPETITIVENESS 243, 243-343 (1989); C. LoRENZ, THE DEsiGN DIMEN. 
SION-PRoDUCT STRATEGY AND mE CHALLENGE OF GLOBAL MARKETING 40-47 (1986); 
see also Gregory, supra note 88, in LES DEsSINS ET MODELES EN QuESTiON, supra note 
8, at 231-271 (stating that in "a society based on consumption, the primacy of desire 
over need has given to fonn a preeminence that it never previously attained outside of 
the most socially privileged groups"). For the view that intellectual property rights 
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With these policies in mind, the court has allowed the secondary con-
siderations, including commercial success and copying, their full weight in 
the assessment of validity throughout the period under review. 264 Although 
it insists on proof of a nexus between commercial success and the claimed 
design innovation,265 the Federal Circuit has applied these objective tests in 
a manner consistent with its treatment of utility patents266 and without the 
guarded restraint that characterized the transitional period. 267 At the same 
time, the court has shaped the motion for summary judgment into a tool that 
lower courts can be expected to use more liberally when determining issues 
of either validity or infringement in design patent cases. 268 
b. Nonfunctionality as a "Multiplicity of Forms" 
In more recent decisions, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
has managed to combine its flexible treatment of nonobviousness with a 
mature doctrine of functionality premised on the net separation of the two 
issues. As a result, the court will normally not allow considerations of 
functionality to influence the test of nonobviousness,269 a practice that had 
sometimes clouded its elaboration of both doctrines during the transitional 
phase. 270 
generally stimulate competition under modern economic conditions, see, e.g., Leh-
mann, Property and Intellectual Property-Property Rights as Restrictions on Competi-
tion in Furtherance of Competition, 20 1.I.c. 1, 11-15 (1989); Ullrich, The Importance of 
Industrial Property Law and Other Legal Measures in the Promotion of Technological 
Innovation, 28 INDus. PRoP. 102 (1989). 
264. See, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d at 1564; Pacific Furniture, 800 E2d at 1114 (commercial suc-
cess and copying stressed in lower court's finding of validity; Federal Circuit affirmed, 
allowing treble damages and praising the lower court's reasoning). 
265. See, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d at 1564 (holding that proof of nexus in regard to commercial 
success was demonstrated); Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled Prods. Co., 12 
US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished) (finding that commercial suc-
cess of patented liquid dispenser derived from novel use, not from protectible design 
features, and rejecting first to promote theory); see also Benchcraft, Inc. v. Broyhill 
Furniture Indus., Inc., 681 E Supp. 1190, 1203-07 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (holding that 
nexus between "overall design, standing alone" and commercial success was not dem-
onstrated, but copying of design by at least eighteen other furniture manufacturers was 
"quite persuasive" of nonobviousness), rev'd on other grounds, 10 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 
2036 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished). 
266. See, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d at 1563-65 (applying texts of commercial success and copying, 
stating that "[d)esign patents must meet a nonobvious requirement identical to that 
applicable to utility patents"); see also American Antenna Corp. v. Wilson Antenna, 
Inc., 690 E Supp. 924, 928 (D. Nev. 1988) (holding that acquiescence of the trade 
helped to show that "high tech" design was not obvious). 
267. Compare, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d 1557 and Pacific Furniture, 800 E2d 1111 with Litton 
Sys. Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 E2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
268. See Avia, 853 E2d at 1560-61 (discussing summary judgment). 
269. See, e.g., Avia, 853 E2d at 1563; Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 E2d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); In re Cho, 813 E2d 378, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Power Controls Corp. v. 
Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234,239 (Fed. Cir. 1986). But see Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawk-
eye Distilled Prods. Co., 12 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished) 
(invalidating the design of a liquid dispenser because its overall appearance was "sug-
gested by the combination of references considered by the [lower) court"). 
270. See supra notes 221-30 and accompanying text. 
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Perhaps to ensure that lower courts and the examiners respect the Fed-
eral Circuit's resolve in this regard, a majority in In re Cho27l reversed the 
PTO's decision that the design of a bottlecap was obvious because the Board 
had erroneously anal~zed the cap as if it were the subject of an application 
for a utility patent. 27 Although "it may have been obvious from a utility 
standpoint to place cylindrical depressions in crown-type caps and to 
include flaps in the depressions," the majority declared, it did not follow 
that the claimed design was obvious because "the combined teachings sug-
gest onlr components of the claimed design . . . not its overall appear-
ance ... 27 A dissenting opinion would have affirmed the examiner's rejec-
tion on grounds of functionality;274 but the majority pointedll, refused to 
consider the functionality bar as "not an issue in this appeal." 75 That the 
court would henceforth treat nonobviousness and functionality as separate 
and independent issues was thus a message it carried up to and perhaps 
beyond the breaking point in this opinion. 276 
This gambit served to flush the problem of functionality out into the 
open where the Federal Circuit now proceeded to deal with it on its own 
terms. At one extreme, the court showed it would not hesitate to exclude all 
designs that are dictated by function, in keeping with the older case law. 277 
At the opposite extreme, the court foresaw that purely decorative designs, 
altogether separable from the functional features of the products that 
embodied them, would pose no problem.278 It recognized nonetheless that 
most cases fell between these extremes because functional considerations 
significantly affect the bulk of the designs that figured in litigation today. 279 
If the commercially most valuable designs that are both efficient and attrac-
tive280 were to be denied eligibility merely because of their functional com-
271. 813 F.2d 378 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
272. [d. at 382; see also Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188 (separating tests of functionality and orna-
mentality). 
273. Cho, 813 F.2d at 382. 
274. [d. at 382-84 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
275. [d. at 382. 
276. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 120-21 (criticizing the detachment of ornamentality 
from functionality in the majority's analysis). The dissent preferred that the analysis of 
ornamentality and obviousness should be guided by the same criterion. See Cho, 813 
F.2d at 382; see also Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled Prods. Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (unpublished) (apparently adopting this approach and, to 
that extent, is regressive in method and spirit). The whole point of the cases from 
mid-1986 on was to enable more functionality to enter design patent law at the eligibil-
ity stage while establishing some means of filtering out functional features at the 
infringement stage. See infra text accompanying notes 303-31. 
277. See, e.g., Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(finding that packaging for electrical component was functional). 
278. See, e.g., Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stressing 
that design patents are limited to ornamentation); Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 239 
(finding that design for plastic "clam shell" casing for electrical rotary dimmer switch 
was not primarily ornamental). 
279. See, e.g., Avia Group Infl v. L.A. Gear Cal.,lnc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
280. See, e.g., Fryer, supra note 77, at 120. 
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ponents, the old doctrinal formula barring functionally dictated designs281 
could become an instrument for depriving the design patent law of any stim-
ulatory effect in the drive for domestic economic growth. 282 
In a formative opinion handed down in Avia Group International v. L.A. 
Gear California, Inc.,283 the Federal Circuit demonstrated the liberality with 
which it would aJlow designs that combined functional and aesthetic fea-
tures to survive the threshold tests of eligibility.284 In so doing, the court 
turned away from rigid tests of separability that seek to distinguish form and 
function, with their built-in bias towards nineteenth century kitsch,285 in 
favor of a "multiplicity of forms" approach286 familiar from foreign design 
law. 287 Under this approach, a given design feature, though functionally 
significant, need not be excluded if competitors can obtain comparable tech-
nical yields by using an aesthetically different shape.288 Only' a design fea-
ture that failed this test would automaticaUy be barred at the threshold of eli-
gibility, lest design patent law allow a manufacturer to control important 
mechanical functions289 or perhaps to monopolize features determined by 
market expectations.290 
This left a gray area in which the "multiplicity of forms" test would not 
of itself invalidate a functional design that also embodied strong aesthetic 
281. See, e.g., 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 1.04[2), at 1-192 to 1-194.1 (citing authorities). 
282. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563 (stressing distinction between functionality of article 
and "functionality of the particular design of such article or features thereof that per-
form a function"). 
283. 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
284. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; see also Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 
1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that patentable design may embody functional features); 
Phlaphongphanich v. Fabjancic, No. 88-1128 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed 
library, USApp file) (unpublished) (stating that "design patents may in some cases 
embody functional features"). 
285. See, e.g., Nimetl, supra note 69, at 120 (criticizing "gingerbread conception of 
design"). 
286. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; see also Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188. 
287. See, e.g., Gaubiac, supra note 236, at 66-71 (noting increasing use of "multiplicity of 
forms" test in regard to functionality under French design protection law); infra note 
288 (discussing U.K. law). 
288. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; see also Fryer, supra note 77, at 120; Nirnetl, supra 
note 69, at 120 (arguing, in 1965, that "such a test would make good c:cunumic sense"). 
Strictly applied, however, a "multiplicity of forms" test can become overprotective on 
the premise that there is no useful article whose "demands ... are such that only one 
design will suffice to meet them." See R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 292 (discussing 
decision by United Kingdom's House of Lords in AMP v. Utilux, [1972] RPC 103 
(H.L.). 
289. See. e.g., Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234,240 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(concerning plastic packaging container devised to close like a clam shell around elec-
trical components). According to Professor Fryer, there was no evidence that this 
design improved appearance or that "the package could be built using the same func-
tional arrangement without creating essentially the same appearance." Fryer. supra 
note 77, at 120. 
290. See, e.g., Litton Sys .• Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1984)" 
(holding that microwave oven door shared features in common with all prior oven 
doors). 
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components. Methodologically, the Federal Circuit believed it could isolate 
the pertinent aesthetic features in such cases by piecemeal decomposition of 
the design as a whole, a technique the court expressly authorized the lower 
courts to use for purposes of its refined functionality analysis,291 but not for 
purposes of testing either obviousness292 or infringement. 293 When this 
analysis persuades the district courts that a given design as a whole amounts 
to a utility model in disguise,294 they should invoke the "primarily func-
tional" rule to invalidate it,295 in part because such designs "do not promote 
the decorative arts. ,,296 But the Federal Circuit will not allow the rule 
against primarily functional designs to exclude a priori all the heavily 
functional designs falling within this gray area as might have occurred in 
the past. 297 On the contrary, when functional features are combined with 
strongly marked aesthetic features, as often occurs, and the design as a 
whole does not fail the "multiplicity of forms" criterion , 298 the Federal Cir-
cuit may allow it to survive the functionality hurdle in order to evaluate the 
nature of the taking under the two-pronged test for infringement it has care-
fully elaborated. 299 
It follows that "design patents may in some cases embody functional 
features,,,3oo precisely because-as one federal district court recently 
deduced-"we are concerned not with ornamentation in the conventional 
sense, but with industrial design. ,,301 In this environment, the Federal Cir-
291. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 239-40. 
292. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563; In re Cho, 813 F.2d 378, 382 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
293. See, e.g., Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 240. 
294. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200,208. 
295. See, e.g., Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 240 (holding plastic "clam shell" package to 
encase electrical rotary dimmer switch invalid for functionality); see also Lee v. Day-
ton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1189 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming validity of design for 
massage device, "but a design patent is not a substitute for a utility patent"); supra note 
185. 
296. See Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 238 (citing In re Carletti, 328 F.2d 1020, 1022 (C.C.P.A. 
1964». 
297. See.supra note 100 and accompanying text; see also 1 D. CHISUM, supra note 3, § 
1.04[2], at 1-194.1 to 1-195. 
298. See, e.g., Avia Group Infl v. L.A. Gear Cal., hic., 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988) 
(finding that overall aesthetic design of an athletic shoe was not functional, although 
parts of the design were functional, because each component could have been accom-
plished in other ways). 
299. See, e.g., id. at 1563 (affirming the summary judgment finding that design for upper 
part and outer sole of athletic shoe was valid and infringed); Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188 
(affirming the finding that design for massage device was valid); see also FMC Corp. v. 
Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 528 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (affirming the finding that 
design of full-power, single-power-source changer for tubeless tires was valid). For the 
most recent decision, see Winner Infl Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp., 905 F.2d 375 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) (finding design of steering wheel lock was not inf~inged under point of nov-
elty test, and vacating finding of invalidity). The Lee and FMC decisions portend the 
excesses to which the "multiplicity of forms" test can be carried unless checked by 
other doctrines. See supra note 288; infra note 321 and accompanying text. 
300. Phlaphongphanich v. Fajancic, No. 88-1128 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 1988) (LEX IS, Genfed 
library, USApp file) (unpublished) (citing Lee, 838 F.2d at 1563). 
301. Physio-Control Corp. v. Medical Research Laboratories, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497, 
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cuit warned, courts must either learn to distinguish the functionality of an 
article from the functionality of a particular design or it will "not be gossi-
ble to obtain a design patent on a utilitarian article .of manufacture. ,,30 
c. Relation Between Functionality and Infringement 
The price exacted for this liberality at the threshold to eligibility, how-
ever, is a stricter scrutiny at the infringement stage than the Federal Circuit 
would otherwise require if the design were less significantly influenced by 
functional features. This heightened scrutiny occurs along both edges of 
the two-pronged approach to infringement formulated during the transi-
tional period. 303 
From one angle, the Federal Circuit applies the "point of novelty" test, 
rather like the idea-expression test of copyright law, to exclude nonpaten-
table features, including the prior art,304 and to focus the ordinary purchas-
er's attention on protectable aesthetic components of a patented design. 305 . 
1498 (N.D. Ill. 1988). Noting the "clean and crisp" appearance given by the design of a 
defibrillator used in cardiac arrest emergencies, the district court observed that while 
"very little of it is dictated solely by function. . . the design options are clearly inhib-
ited by function" in an effort to "enhance ... effectiveness ... and at the same time 
present a pleasing appearance." [d. at 1498; see also American Antenna Corp. v. Wil-
son Antenna, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 924 (D. Nev. 1988) (holding that unlike alleged prior 
art, patented device had "sleek, high tech appearance" and that claim of validity was 
likely to succeed on the merits). 
302. Avia, 853 F.2d at 156 (citing Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800 
F.2d lllt (Fed. Cir. 1986); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932,939 (Fed. Cir. 
1983»; see supra note 282. The end result in these cases approximates that of recent 
decisions in the United Kingdom. There the notion that a design is to be excluded if 
dictated by function has come to mean that it was "prompted by a given purpose" with-
out an attempt to add some embellishment to the article beyond those features 
prompted by the purely functional demands of the article. See R. MERKIN, supra note 
3, at 292-94 (discussing Interlego AG v. l)'co Indus., [1988] 3 All E.R. 949; AMP v. 
Utilux, [1972] RPC 103 (H.L.». 
303. See supra notes 246-58 and accompanying text. 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 249-53. "A device that copies the utilitarian or 
functional features of a patented design is not an infringement unless the ornamental 
aspects are also copied .... " Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1189 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988); see also Winner Int'! Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp., 905 F.2d 375 (Fed. Cir. 
1990). 
305. See, e.g., Winner, 905 F.2d at 376; Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565; Lee, 838 F.2d 1186; FMC 
Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 521, 527 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also Unette 
Corp. v. Unit Pack Co., 785 F.2d 1026, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirl-
pool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (cited with approval in this connec-
tion by FMC). In Lee, a panel of the court suggested that the "point of novelty" test 
applied only if the Gorham test of similarity as a whole was met. Lee, 838 F.2d at 
1189. This seems unnecessarily rigid, given that patent law, unlike copyright law, 
requires prior specificity of claims. See, e.g., Winner, 905 F.2d at 376 (stating that pur-
pose of point of novelty test is "to focus on those aspects . . . which render the design 
different from prior art designs"); cf Adelman & Francione, The Doctrine of Equiva-
lents in Patent Law: Questions that Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 673, 
705-06 (1989). While commentators have criticized the Federal Circuit's recent tend-
ency to import the copyright principle of substantial similarity into the doctrine of 
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This ensures that the broadened mix of decorative and utilitarian features 
allowed to escape invalidation under the court's more relaxed tests of func-
tionality and nonobviousness will not indiscriminately obtain protection 
through the back door in the infringement calculus.306 
From a second angle, the Federal Circuit seems likely to circumscribe 
the range of actionable similarities when applying the ordinary purchaser 
test of Gorham Co. v. White307 to highly functional designs that have not 
been copied point for point. In such cases, the court will first satisfy itself 
that the similarities claimed to infringe constitute illicit similarities-that 
is, an appropriation of the patented novelty308-because a competitor does 
not infringe by copying unprotectable functional features. 309 The presence 
of very functional features can then affect the degree of similarity that may 
be required to trigger infringement in either quantitative or qualitative 
terms. By demanding closer imitation within a narrower range of equiva-
lents than would be necessary absent these functional influences, the Fed-
eral Circuit further ensures that only imitators who appropriate more than 
the unprotectable features will fall into the net of infringement. 3 \0 
In sum, when the patented design partakes of highly functional ele-
ments and a second comer invests the time and expense to vary it, the court 
may weigh his variations more favorably than if the patentee had claimed 
markedly aesthetic or decorative effects. 311 The more a given design elicits 
strict scrutiny on account of its functionality, the less its actionable similari-
ties are likely to "deceive" the ordinary purchaser in the court's view. 312 
equivalents applicable to utility patents, see Adelman & Francione, supra note 305, at 
698-706, echoes of such a test in the design patent environment would seem less inap-
propriate because design patent applications can only claim the disclosed features. Use 
of the "point of novelty" test then permits the court to exclude unpatentable subject 
matter from the infringement calculus, and it also permits a more focused directive to 
the ordinary purchaser in order to preserve the greater range of equivalents recognized 
in Avia. 
306. See, e.g., Winner, 905 F.2d at 376 (stating that the point of novelty test cannot include 
the overall configuration and appearance of a patented design "without regard to the 
prior art"); Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188 (holding that design patents protect only ornamental 
features, not structural or functional aspects). 
307. 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511 (1871). 
308. See, e.g., Winner, 905 F.2d at 376; FMC, 836 F.2d at 527. 
309. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565; Lee, 838 F.2d at 1190; FMC, 836 F.2d at 527. In short, 
there must be an illicit appropriation of the patentable novelty, not just an appropriation 
of the patented design. For an analogous approach in copyright law, see supra note 
253. 
310. See, e.g., Lee, 838 F.2d at 1190; FMC, 836 F.2d at 527-28. 
311. See Winner, 905 F.2d 375 (holding that no reasonable jury could find design of steering 
wheel lock infringed because of dissimilarities and defendant's use of unpatented prior 
art); see also Lee, 838 F.2d at 1190 (acknowledging that doctrine of equivalents applies 
to design patents, lest minor differences camouflage piracy; but noting that the doctrine 
can only apply where the designs are "equivalent in their ornamental, not functional 
aspects," and holding design for a massage device valid but not infringed); FMC, 836 
F.2d at 527-28 (assessing both differences and similarities, but finding that the former 
prevailed, despite defendant's intention to market "look-alike" product design for tube-
less tire changer; design patent held valid but not infringed). 
312. See, e.g., FMC, 836 F.2d at 527-28; see also Physio-Control Corp. v. Medical Research 
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But when a second corner is too lazy or in too much of a hurry to make any 
. appreciable variations, his copy wiJI infringe notwithstanding the presence 
of strong functional features in the overall design.313 In this event, even 
though the imitator intended to exploit a different market segment and did 
not engage in direct competition with the originator, he will nonetheless 
infringe upon the protected design concept.~14 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has thus responded to 
criticism concernin~ the failure of design patent law to recognize the doc-
trine of equivalents 15 by indicating that the scope of protection may extend 
beyond literal infringement in appropriate cases,316 even though the range 
of protectable equivalents will shrink as the incidence of functionality 
increases. 317 Should this Willingness to protect the patented design concept 
carryover to future decisions, it could eventually limit the deception ratio-
nale of Gorham318 and further enhance the overall effectiveness of the exist-
ing design protection law. 
4. Positive Evaluation of Current Law 
The foregoing survey of major cases handed down between the second 
quarter of 1986 and the second quarter of 1990 has confirmed that a broad 
range of highly functional designs may now qualify for patent protection, 
even if the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit rightly continues to 
stress that "[t)he great bulk of industrial design is simply not protectable by 
design patents.,,319 As regards the substantive prerequisite of nonob-
viousness, the cases show that eligible designers usually benefit from the 
Laboratories, 7 U.s.p.Q.2d (DNA) 1497, 1498-1500 (N.D. III. 1988) (stating that the 
"ordinary purchaser of these devices is a sophisticated purchaser" who "views the 
design only with respect to the points of novelty"; adding that when "making judg-
ments about appearance in a somewhat crowded field, the dissimilarities take on added 
importance"). 
313. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565 (finding that design of parts of an athletic shoe was 
valid and infringed); see also Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 
800 F.2d 1111,1114 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that design for upholstered armchairs 
was valid and willfully infringed). 
314. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565. 
315. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 96, at 162. For the unsettled state of the doctrine of 
equivalents in regard to utility patents after Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 
833 F.2d 931 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc), see generally Adelman & Francione, supra 
note 305. 
316. See, e.g., Avia, 853 F.2d at 1565 (''To find infringement, the accused shoes need only 
appropriate a patentee's protected design, not a patentee's market as well."); Lee v. Day-
ton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1189-90 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating that "principles of 
equivalency are applicable under Gorlulm"). 
317. See supra notes 311-14 and accompanying text. 
318. See supra notes 234-39 and accompanying text. 
319. Lee, 838 F.2d at 1188 n.3. The reasons for this general condition of nonprotectability 
are twofold: (I) most industrial designs are primarily functional and therefore not 
within the purview of a statute that covers "ornamental designs of useful articles"; and 
(2) most industrial designs are legally obvious by definition. In evaluating the state of 
design protection law both here and abroad, it is important to keep these two issues 
separate. See infra text accompanying notes 947-69. 
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presumption of validity once their patents have issued and from the applica-
tion of secondary or objective factors if validity is later challenged. Because 
the protection of markedly aesthetic designs better promotes the policies 
underlying the statute than the protection of very functional appearance 
designs, the former tend to receive more favorable treatment at the infringe-
ment stage when courts evaluate the nature of the taking. Alleged infring-
ers of highly functional designs must still approach slavish imitation before 
incurring liability, lest the design patent law cover a range of equivalents 
that would unduly encroach upon the delicate frontier with utility patents. 320 
Despite these limitations, the cases emanating from the Federal Circuit 
reveal an impressive effort to reshape the United States Design Patent Act in 
conformity with its original goals. To be sure, a number of issues require 
further elaboration, especially the "multiplicity of forms" test of functional-
ity, whose innate permissiveness has been judicially curtailed in both the 
United Kingdom and France.321 Much also depends on the court's contin-
ued willingness to emit the clearer signals it has been sending since 1986 
and on the continuation of a favorable climate for utility patents as well. 322 
But none of these reservations detracts from the remarkable finding that, of 
thirteen cases concerning ornamental designs of useful articles known to 
have reached the Federal Circuit during the period under review,323 there 
320. See supra text accompanying notes 303-18; see also Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Auto 
Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 951 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming denial of prelimi-
nary injunction on theory that presumption of validity had been sufficiently rebutted, 
especially in regard to functionality; issue on merits "not prejudge[d)"). 
321. See, e.g., supra notes 299, 302. Even under the United Kingdom's Registered Designs 
Act of 1949 as amended in 1988, supra note 3, features prompted by functional 
demands of an article without added embellishment remain ineligible. The pure multi-
plicity of forms test was rejected as too permissive. R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 
292-94; see also Perot-Morel, Protection of Designs and How It Is Related to the Law on 
Patents In French Law, in DEsiGN PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 67, 70-74 [hereinafter 
Perot-Morel, Protection of Designs) (stating that multiplicity of forms test leads to 
excessive protection under French Design Law of 1909, and that modified separability 
or "contours" test, adopted by some courts, excludes elements of form that contribute 
to a practical result); cf Chrysler Motors, 908 F.2d 951. 
322. Cf Nimetz, supra note 69, at 83. One recent unpublished opinion evokes the old bias 
against combination designs and sends a methodological signal not in keeping with the 
Federal Circuit's other decisions. See Neo-Art, Inc. v. Hawkeye Distilled Prods. Co., 
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (invalidating design of container for obvi-
ousness because it was "suggested by the combination of references"). 
323. Published cases include Winner Int'l Corp. v. Wolo Mfg. Corp., 905 F.2d 375 (Fed. Cir. 
1990); Avia Group Int') v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Lee, 
838 F.2d 1186; FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d 501 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In re 
Cho, 813 F.2d 378 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 
234 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800 F.2d 
I1II (Fed. Cir. 1986). Unpublished cases include In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (affirming examiner's rejection on "public use" grounds under 35 US.C. § 
102(b»; Neo-Art, 12 US.P.Q.2d (DNA) 572 (finding design of combined stand and con-
tainer for storing liquids invalid for obviousness); Benchcraft, Inc. v. Droyhill Furniture 
Indus., Inc., 10 US.P.Q.2d (DNA) 2036 (Fed. Cir. 1989), vacating and remanding 681 F. 
Supp. 1190 (N.D. Miss. 1988) (finding nonobvious design for sofa and loveseat invalid 
for inequitable conduct); John Thomas Batts, Inc. v. S.O. Thxtiles Co., No. 88-1134 
(Fed. Cir. Nov. 17, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (affirming unpUblished 
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are only two decisions invalidating patented designs for obviousness, both 
unpublished,324 and there is only one clear instance of invalidation for func-
tionality.325 Moreover, in two of the five cases in which the Federal Circuit 
applied the refined infringement analysis described above, the patented 
designs were found both valid and infringed. 326 
Even when cases from both the transitional and the more mature 
phases are examined together, the results are hardly less astonishing. Of 
some twenty-two relevant cases known to have reached the Federal Circuit 
between 1982 and the first half of 1990, there were only two instances of 
invalidation for functionality.327 Of some eighteen cases in which the inven-
tive height was directly or indirectly challenged, there were only three 
instances of invalidation for obviousness. 328 Of some ten relevant cases 
known to have reached the decisive phas~ of an infringement action during 
the entire period under review, four concerned patented designs that were 
ultimately found valid and infringed.329 
decision of the Southern District of Aorida to invalidate under 35 U.S.c. § 103); 
Phlaphongphanich v. Fabjancic, No. 88-1128 (Fed. Cir. June 17, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed 
library, USApp file) (affirming award of priority by PTO Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences); In re Blaisdell, No. 87-1524 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 8, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed 
library, USApp file) (affirming examiner's final rejection of claimed design under 35 
U.S.c. § 103). 
324. Neo-Art, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 572; Batts, No. 88-1134 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 17, 1988); see 
supra note 323. Rule 18 opinions designated as unpublished "shall not be employed as 
precedent" by the Federal Circuit, except in regard to a claim of res judicata, collateral 
estoppel, or law of the case. 
325. See Power Controls, 806 F.2d at 238-40. Not included in these statistics is Chrysler 
Motors Corp. v. Auto Body Panels of Ohio, Inc., 908 F.2d 95t (Fed. Cir. 1990). See 
supra note 320. 
326. Compare Avia, 853 F.2d 1557 (holding designs for shoe sole and upper part valid and 
infringed) and Pacific Furniture, 800 F. 2d lilt (holding design of upholstered armchair 
valid and infringed) with FMC, 836 F.2d 501 (affirming lower court finding that design 
of single-power-source tire changer was valid but not infringed in action for declaratory 
judgment by alleged infringer) and Lee, 838 F.2d 1186 (holding design for massage 
implement valid but not infringed) and Winner, 905 F.2d 375 (vacating finding of inva-
lidity and holding design of antitheft bar-type steering wheel lock not infringed under 
point of novelty test). 
327. These cases include Power Controls, 806 F.2d 234; Feuling v. Wood, Nos. 84-543, 
84-662 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 30, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library, USApp file) (unpublished) 
(finding designs for engine fan housings and mountings to be primarily functional); see 
supra notes 227, 289; see also supra text accompanying notes 221-28, 276 (discussing 
Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Neo-An, 
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 572 (holding highly functional designs invalid for obviOUsness». 
Not included in these statistics is Chrysler Motors, 908 F.2d 951. 
328. These cases include Petersen, 740 F.2d 1541; Neo-An, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 572; Bans, 
No. 88-1134 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 17,1988). See supra notes 221-28,323 and accompanying 
text. Nothing is known about the last case at either level. 
329. Compare Avia, 853 F.2d 1557 and Pacific Furniture, 800 F.2d IIII and Trans-World 
Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Fiberglass in 
Motion, Inc. v. Hindelang, No. 83-1266 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 19, 1984) (LEX IS, Genfed 
library, USApp file) (all holding design patents valid and infringed) with Winner, 905 
F.2d 375 and Lee, 838 F.2d 1186 and FMC, 836 F.2d 501 and Unette Corp. v. Unit Pack 
Co., 785 F.2d 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1986) and Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 
1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984) (all holding design patents valid but not infringed). 
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To anyone familiar with the dismal record of the past, these findings 
proclaim an altogether different message. They do not, of course, add up to 
a modern design protection law along the lines that reformers both here and 
abroad have sought to develop from the 1950s on.330 They do signify a 
major change of direction in United States design patent law, one that is 
more consonant with the spirit of the Supreme Court's early decision in 
Gorham Co. v. White. By providing some exceptionally creative designs 
with a strong and effective form of protection, albeit on strict conditions, 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has brought the domestic 
design protection law closer to the models operating abroad. In so doing, it 
has at long last enabled the United States to fulfill the obligation "to protect 
industrial designs" that article 5 quinquies of the Paris Convention imposed 
on all Member States. 331 
B. Copyright Protection of Applied Art: The RetreatJrom Partial 
Cumulation 
1. Forty Years After Mazer v. Stein: 1954-1983 
Because the federal appellate courts had virtually stopped enforcing 
issued design patents by the 1950s,332 the modern period of design protec-
tion in the United States really opened with the landmark case of Mazer v. 
Stein333 in 1954, in which the Supreme Court first upheld copyright protec-
tion for works of applied art. 334 Judicial recognition of applied art as statu-
tory subject matter brought domestic law into line with the minimum stan-
dards prevailing under the international copyright conventions.335 But the 
Supreme Court neglected to provide any legal criterion for distinguishing 
commercial designs now eligible for protection as "works of applied art" 
330. See infra text accompanying notes 918-37. 
331. See supra notes 33, 109 and accompanying text. 
332. See supra notes 72, 108-09 and accompanying text. 
333. 347 U.S. 201 (1954) .. 
334. See generally Latman, supra note 51. In Mazer, the copyright authorities persuaded the 
Supreme Court to hold that statuettes of male and female dancing figures were copy-
rightable despite their commercial use as lamp bases and notwithstanding the availa-
bility of statutory protection for ornamental designs under the Design Patent Act of 
1842. Mazer, 347 U.S. 201, affg 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953). Prior to 1948, the 
Copyright Office had generally refused to register three-dimensional designs of useful 
articles for copyright protection despite enabling language in the statute itself. See, 
e.g., Derenberg, supra note 72, at 627, 646-48; Note, Protecting the Artistic Aspects of 
Articles o/Utility: Copyright or Design Patents, 66 HARV. L. REV. 877,879 n.16 (1953). 
335. In 1948, the Berne Union countries agreed to require some recognition of applied art in 
the domestic copyright laws of member states without setting minimum standards. See 
S. RICKETSON, supra note I, at 276-79; 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 828-37; supra note 
42. That same year, the United States Copyright Office cautiously allowed certain 
works of artistic craftsmanship to register for protection if they qualified as "works of 
art in the historical and ordinary sense." The decision in Mazer, by upholding this 
qualified recognition of applied art, facilitated future copyright relations between the 
Berne Union countries and the United States, which adhered to the Universal Copyright 
Convention in 1952. See generally Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 
1149-53,115000.26-27,1174-81. 
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from those that would qualify only as "ornamental designs of useful art i-
c1es,,336 under either the existing design patent law or any sui generis design 
law that might later be enacted.337 On this most crucial issue of demarca-
tion, moreover, the international conventions offered little guidance, given 
that at least three orthodox national viewpoints had survived all efforts to 
reach some unifying consensus at the Brussels Conference to Revise the 
Berne Convention in 1948.338 
The United States Copyright Office had traditionally opposed the 
"unity of art" doctrine championed by France and the frinciple of broad 
copyright protection for industrial design to which it led. 39 After an abor-
tive experiment with a regime of partial cumulation like that in the Federal 
Republic of Germany,34O the Register interpreted Mazer as authority for 
establishing a neo-Italian regime of noncumulation, built around the criterion 
of separability, in regulations promulgated in 1958.341 These regulations 
336. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1171-73. 
337. Although the United States had actively opposed copyright protection of commercial 
designs and supported the revision of the Paris Convention, supra note I, art. 5 
quinquies, see supra notes 16-18,33, 109 and accompanying text, its domestic design 
law arguably remains inconsistent with the spirit of the Brussels compromise of 1948, 
see supra'note 335, owing to the lack of a sui generis design law. See, e.g., Final 
Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, at 
609-12, reprinted in 10 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 97-100 (1986) (discussing tension between 
current United States law and the Berne provisions concerning applied art). Whether 
United States law is or was inconsistent with the letter of the Paris Convention presents 
a different and closer question. See supra note 109; text accompanying note 331. 
338. See supra notes 43-46, 335 and accompanying text (discussing the French regime of 
total cumulation between copyright protection of applied art and that country's special 
design law; the Italian regime of noncumulation between copyright law and a special 
design law; and the various regimes of partial cumulation typified by that of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany). 
339. See supra notes 16,335-37. For a discussion of the "unity of art" doctrine in relation 
to United States law, see Reichman, Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1153-74. 
340. In 1956, the Copyright Office issued regulations that interpreted Mazer as allowing 
copyright protection only for an object that was "clearly a work of art in itself." See, 
e.g., Bailie v. Fisher, 258 E2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1958). This test resembled the one used 
by courts in the Federal Republic of Germany to distinguish a few exceptionally crea-
tive designs eligible for copyright protection from the bulk of commercial designs 
confined to a sui generis law. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. It also resem-
bled the criterion later incorporated into article 21 of the Uniform Benelux Designs 
Law, supra note 4. But the 1956 regulation antagonized the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit, which questioned the Register'S authority to implement a regime of par-
tial cumulation along these lines and hinted at tension with the principle of non-
discrimination expressed in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 
(1903). See Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 
E2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958), modifying 155 E Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The Copyright 
Office withdrew this regulation in 1958. See generally Reichman, Designs Before 
1976, supra note 17, at 1174-82. The United States experience in the period 1956 to 
1'958 thus anticipated later judicial resistance in the Netherlands to the "clearly marked 
artistic character" criterion adopted by article 21 of the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, 
supra note 4. See. e.g., Cohen Jehoram, Netherlands. supra note 46, § 2[c); infra notes 
407-08 and accompanying text. 
341. See Reichman. Designs Before 1976, supra note 17. at 1181-82. The authorities took 
pains to identify Italian law as the fount of their own expedient, a inove that made it 
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served to exclude virtually all modern, three-dimensional designs from pro-
tection as works of applied art under the Copyright Act of 1909.342 
When, in 1976, Congress finally codified the criterion of separability 
in section 101 of the new Copyright Act,343 it seemed to preclude further 
consideration of full copyright protection for industrial art in the name of 
Mazer. 344 But the congressional decision not to enact a sui generis design 
bill, pending since the 1950s,345 also meant that the commercially most val-
uable appearance designs were relegated once again to the very design pat-
ent law whose ineffectiveness had initially triggered the movement for 
reform. 346 Only when the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit later 
took steps to revitalize the design patent law347 would this codified criterion 
of separability actually begin to discharge its systemic function of shunting 
some noncopyrightable industrial designs into an operative design protec-
tion law. As the domestic design patent law began to revive after 1982, the 
corresponding provisions in copyright law became less incoherent than they 
had appeared in 1976.348 
a. Separability Is Sometimes Conceptual 
The treatment afforded works of applied art in domestic law nonethe-
less manifests numerous incongruities that defy systematic rationalization. 
This occurs in part because of ambiguities inherent in the doctrine of sepa-
eminently acceptable at the international level. See iLl. at 1182 n.201 (citing authori-
ties). Sources close to the Copyright Office arranged for the publication of at least two 
articles discussing the theory of dissociation, which justified the Italian position. See 
Note, Present Design Protection in the United States, 5 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 139 
(1958); Note, Toward a More Systematic Approach to the Protection of Applied Art to 
Industry, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 287 (1959) [hereinafter Note, Systematic 
Approach) (translating Italian Supreme Court decision on separability). 
342. See. e.g., Note, Systematic Approach, supra note 341; Reichman, Designs Before 1976, 
supra note 17, at 1182-86 ("An Interim Theory of Dissociation"); iLl. at 1213-23 ("Sep-
arability Italian Style"); cf. Fabiani, I Modelli. supra note 85, at 231-36, 251-53; 
Auteri, Industrial Design, in OIzIONARI DEL OIRITIO PRIVATO 565, 577-82, 585-90 (N. 
Irti ed. 1981); see also infra text accompanying notes 369-98. 
343. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
344. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; infra notes 369-74. 
345. See supra notes 13-22, 72-75, 109 and accompanying text. The United States had 
played an active role in the movement to strengthen the international protection of 
industrial designs within the framework of the Hague and Paris Conventions that got 
underway in the 1950s. See. e.g., Fisher Address. supra note 16, at 207; see also M.A. 
PEROT-MOREL, LES PRINCIPES, supra note 8, at 18-19. The Hague Agreement Con-
cerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs of 1925 permits a single inter-
national deposit of protected designs. Act of The Hague, Nov. 6, 1925,47 Stat. 1789, 
T.S. No. 941, 74 L.N.T.S. 341, revised at London, June 2, 1934,205 L.N.T.S. 179, 
reprinted in WIPO & BIRPI, MANUAL OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CoNVENTIONS, items 
A-I, B-1. See generally Maugue, The International Protection of Industrial Designs 
under the International Conventions, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 393 (1989). 
346. See H.R. RER No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1976); supra notes 72-77 and 
accompanying text. 
347. See supra text accompanying notes 171-331. 
348. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1220-23. 
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rability itself349 and in part because certain traditional categories of applied 
art retained their privileged status under the 1976 Act, notwithstanding the 
restrictive definition of "pictorial, graphic and sculptural works" set out in 
section 10 I .3S0 
(l) Established Categories of Applied Art 
For example, most two-dimensional designs, including fabric and tex-
tile designs, remain copyrightable even when subsequently embodied in 
useful articles,3s1 according to the official interpretation of separability 
derived from Mazer. 3s2 A troublesome subcategory comprises "maps, 
globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings," which are 
expressly treated as pictorial, graphic and sculptural works within the broad 
definition codified by section 101. 3S3 Maps must sometimes satisfy a 
higher standard of creativity,354 while architectural works were in effect 
assimilated to designs of useful articles and subjected to a variant of the 
separability criterion.3ss 
Fortunately, copyright protection of blueprints or of other technical 
drawings as pictorial or graphic works3s6 cannot normally extend to the use-
ful articles they portray, owing to the codification, in 1976, of a line of prec-
349. See infra text accompanying notes 374-98. 
350. See supra notes 20-21. 
351. See, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 E2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1917); 
Dolori Fabrics, Inc. v. The Limited, Inc., 662 E Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). See gener-
ally I P. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 151-53. 
352. 347 U.S. 201 (1954); see supra notes 340-44 and accompanying text. The reasoning is 
that a two-dimensional painting does not forfeit eligibility when embodied in a useful 
article. See, e.g., Dleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Baker 
v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (discussing works that appeal to aesthetic taste in dicta). 
Most two-dimensional designs are then assimilated to paintings, including technical 
drawings and architectural plans. But see Deverly Hills Design Studio (N.Y.), Inc. v. 
Morris, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (DNA) 1889 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (upholding the denial of copyright 
registration to two-dimensional paper patterns used to cut fabric for garments). The 
Beverly Hills decision in the United States would be consistent with the dominant line of 
cases in Italian law, which regards two-dimensional fabric and textile designs as insep-
arable from the useful articles that embody them. See, e.g., G. SENA, I DIRITn SULLE 
INVENZ!oNE E SUI MODELU INDUSTRIAU 537-38 (1984). But see Auteri, supra note 
342, at 590-91 (contending that two-dimensional designs, including fabric designs, 
should be deemed separable as a matter of law). 
353. See supra note 21 (quoting 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988». 
354. See generally I P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 176-79 (criticizing direct observation 
rule and assimilating maps to the treatment of factual works in general). 
355. See generally id. at 98-102,202-04 (noting that a copyright in architectural plans gave 
only the exclusive right to reproduce the plans in copies) (citing authorities). In effect, 
only monumental or ornamental buildings could secure copyright protection. 
However, bills were recently introduced to bring the protection of architectural works 
more into line with the minimum standards under the Berne Convention, and Congress 
adopted one of these bills late in 1990. See The Judicial Improvement Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-650 (H.R. 5316), Title VII, "Architectural Works," reprinted in 41 Pat-
ent, lrademark & Copyright J. (DNA) 133, 134-35 (Dec. 6, 1990). Works of architec-
ture as such are beyond the scope of this Article. 
356. See supra note 21. 
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edents descending from the Supreme Court's 1879 decision in Baker v. SeI-
den. 357 These precedents subordinate the exclusive reproduction right of 
copyright law to the traditional right of third parties to reverse engineer the 
ideas embodied in unpatented products of mechanical and technical skills. 
For this reason, a third party may freely imitate a dress or unpatented auto-
mobile parts so long as he does not copy the two-dimensional plans from 
which these objects were initially made,358 in contrast with the situation 
prevailing in the United Kingdom prior to the Copyright Designs and Pat-
ents Act of 1988.359 
Some three-dimensional works of applied art have also survived 
codification of the separability test in 1976. For example, the creators of 
dolls, costume jewelry, figurines, some toys, and certain other three-di-
mensional objects still obtain copyright protection360 either because courts 
deem such items not to be useful articles at a1l361 or more typically because 
they qualify as separable works of sculpture even if embodied in useful arti-
c1es.362 These subject matter categories thus fall within the shadow tradi-
357. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 113(b) (1988) (codifying Baker v. Selden, 101 US. 99 (1879) 
and its progeny); supra note 23 (citing authorities). See generally Reichman, Designs 
Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1229-32 (explaining evolution of § 113(b». 
358. See. e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 105 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
US. CoDE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801; Combustion Eng'g, Inc. V. Murray Thbe 
Works, Inc., 222 US.P.Q. (BNA) 239, 244 (E.D. Tenn. 1984) (holding that a copy-
righted blueprint of a boiler did not bar construction of a similar boiler by reverse engi-
neering the finished article); supra notes 401-03. See generally Reichman, Programs as 
Know-How, supra note 23, at 693 n.288 (clarifying historical implications of Baker v. 
Selden in relation to § 113(b) and the practice of reverse engineering). However, archi-
tectural works may now receive greater protection. See supra note 355. 
359. See supra notes 46,202 and accompanying text; infra note 846 and accompanying text. 
See generally R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 283-95. 
360. See. e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982); 
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821 (11th Cir. 1982); 
Kamar Infl, Inc. v. Russ Berrie and Co., 657 E2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1981); Gund, Inc. v. 
Swank, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1233 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding stuffed toy lion was infringed). 
See generally 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 156-58. 
361. See, e.g., Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 E2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984)(declining to hold 
abstract design of a swimsuit a useful article as a matter of law); Gay Toys, Inc. v. 
Buddy L. Corp., 703 E2d 970,974 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that toys lack any intrinsic 
utilitarian function "other than the portrayal of the real item"); see also Masquerade 
Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 E2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that animal 
nose masks were not designs of useful articles). A work that is not the "design of a use-
ful article" is not subject to the test of separability, as these terms are defined in 17 
US.c. § 10 1. See supra note 21 . 
362. See. e.g., Denicola, supra note 194, at 497-98. However, such designs often consist of 
commonplace ideas or generic versions of natural objects that lack personal expression, 
which adversely affects both eligibility and the scope of protection. See 17 US.c. 
§ 102(b) (1988); I P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 156-57. Sculptural embodiments 
of artistic works first expressed in two-dimensional form, such as a doll that embodies a 
cartoon character, are protectible under a line of precedents codified in § 113(b) of the 
1976 Act, which freezes two lines of cases derived from Baker v. Selden, WI US. 99 
(1879). The other line of cases denies protection to utilitarian articles portrayed in 
two-dimensional graphic representations. See supra notes 357-58 and accompanying 
text. 
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tionally cast by Mazer, and they often figure in litigation. 363 
Most three-dimensional designs of useful articles remain unprotec-
table, of course, owing to the separability criterion in coplsright law364 and 
to the nonobviousness requirement in design patent law. 5 Between these 
two doctrinal barriers, however, lies an uncharted territory inhabited by 
exceptionally creative designs that might have qualified for design patent 
protection had their originators not neglected to file timely applications 
within the one year novelty grace period that United States patent law gener-
ously provides. 366 The question that sooner or later bedevils the highest tri-
bunals in every country that has ever enacted a design protection law367 is 
how to deal with palpably superior designs of this kind when their penitent 
creators supplicate at the door to copyright law after having failed to comply 
with the burdensome prerequisites of any design law that happens to be in 
force. 368 
(2) Partial Cumulation in the Second Circuit 
Shortly after Congress codified separability as the criterion for distin-
guishing copyri~htable works of applied art from noncopyrightable "indus-
trial designs, ,,36 the federal appellate courts denied copyright protection to 
the attractive, modern forms of an outdoor parking lamp and of a set of 
363. 1 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 156. 
364. See supra notes 19-21, 343-44 and accompanying text; infra notes 369-74 and accom-
panying text. The definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works expressly 
denies protection to the "mechanical or utilitarian aspects" of "works of artistic crafts-
manship." See supra note 21 (quoting 17 U.s.c. § 101 (1988»; Mazer v. Stein, 347 
U.S. 201 (I 954). 
365. See supra notes 175-90,260-68,319-31 and accompanying text. 
366. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text. Such designs have destroyed their own 
novelty. 
367. For the most recent tensions of this kind in foreign law, see, e.g., Cohen Jehoram, 
Cumulative Design Protection-A System for the EC? [hereinafter Cohen Jehoram, 
Cumulative Protection], in DISEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PROTEZIONE EUROPEA 55, 60-64 
(1989); infra notes 406-08 and accompanying text. 
368. To the extent that courts view certain exceptional designs as copyrightable works of 
applied art, they exempt originators from the very formalities of registration and 
deposit that design protection laws normally require. See. e.g., Berne Convention, 
supra note I, art. 5(2) (providing that the "enjoyment and the exercise of these rights 
shall not be subject to any formality"); WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZA-
TlON, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION RJR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTIS-
TIC WORKS (PARIS ACT, 1971) 33-34 (1978) [hereinafter WIPO GUIDE]. This in turn 
undermines the policies that prompt legislatures to enact special design laws in the first 
place. See. e.g., Fabiani, La protezione dell'arte applicata. supra note 18, at 415. To 
the extent that courts deny copyright protection to these same designs in deference to a 
design law, they risk violating the principle of nondiscrimination present in all devel-
oped copyright laws. From a comparative standpoint, the recurrence of this dilemma 
under even the most up-to-date design protection laws explains why the legal history of 
industrial art in the twentieth century may be viewed as a continuing effort to establish 
special regimes of design protection without unduly derogating from the general prin-
ciples of copyright law. 
369. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
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wire-spOked hubcaps. None of these designs could stand alone as a work of 
art when separated materially from the utilitarian articles they embel-
Iished. 37o As to an "isolated reference" to conceptual separability in the 
legislative history,371 these courts stressed that Congress did not intend by 
this notion to tolerate long-term copyright protection for the very designs to 
which it had just denied even short-term relief in a sui generis law. Rather, 
the legislative intent was to exclude copyright protection for the overall 
shape or configuration of a utilitarian article no matter how "aesthetically 
satisfying and valuable" it might be. 372 On this interpretation, enactment of 
the separability criterion traded the ineligibility of modern designs as a 
class for the difficulties inherent in making judgments about art in specific 
cases. 373 
These early decisions under the United States Copyright Act of 1976 
reflected the same strategy that Italian courts used to "avoid the ambiguities 
inherent in the theory of dissociation by holding three-dimensional designs 
of useful articles to be inseparable as a matter of law in nearly all cases.,,374 
The theory of dissociation as elaborated in Italy, however, does recognize an 
exception to the general rule of separability for conceptually separable 
designs that can stand alone as works of art.375 Strictly interpreted, the 
design of a useful article meets this conceptual separability test only if it 
can be reproduced and applied to other material supports without 
sacrificing either its individuality or its existence as an artistic work inde-
pendent of the object with which it is associated. 376 For example, the form 
370. See Norris Indus., Inc. v. lIT Corp., 696 E2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding designs of 
wire-spoked automobile wheel covers not copyrightable because functional and artistic 
components were inseparable); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 E2d 796, 800 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (holding the modern design of an outdoor lamp not copyrightable under the cri-
terion of separability codified in the 1976 Act), cert. denied, 440 US. 908 (1979); see 
also Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 E2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding typeface designs were 
not works of art under § 5(g) of the 1909 Act). 
371. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 US. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801 (stating that an ornamental design of a useful 
article can qualify as a copyrightable work of applied art only if it "contains some ele-
ment that, physically or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitarian 
aspects of that article"); Esquire, 591 E2d at 800-01, 803-04 (discussing and interpret-
ing this reference). 
372. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, 55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 US. 
CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801; Esquire, 591 E2d at 800; accord Norris, 696 
E2d at 924; see also Fabrica, Inc. v. EI Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890,892-94 (9th Cir. 
1983); infra text accompanying notes 553-70. 
373. See Esquire, 591 F.2d at 805 (stating that the decision of Congress to discriminate 
against modern, "high-tech" designs as a class was a legitimate, if regrettable, conse-
quence of the legislative policy against copyright protection for industrial designs). 
374. Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 352. For the theory of dissociation, 
which underlies the criterion of separability in foreign law, see generally Reichman, 
Designs Before 1976. supra note 17. at 1182-86, 1213-23 (citing authorities). 
375. See generally G. SENA, supra note 352. at 535-39; Fabiani, I Modelli. supra note 85, at 
231-36. 
376. See, e.g .• Auteri, supra note 342, at 580,588. Professor Auteri contends that the eco-
nomic value of the formal element must not depend on the utility of the material sup-
port. See also E PERR~, supra note 8, at 262-63. 
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of Cellini's saltcellar would qualify as a conteptually separable work of 
applied art on this approach, not because of its artistic intensity, but because 
one could apply the same shape to other material supports, such as an ink-
pot or a candy container, without diminishing its artistic integrity.377 Con-
versely, the tendency of today's most gifted designers to integrate form and 
function would inherently disqualify the bulk of their production. 378 
This strict reading of the conceptual separability doctrine satisfies 
those commentators who believe that ornamental designs of useful articles 
are properly confined to industrial property law because copyright protec-
tion would unduly distort competition on the general products market. 379 
That Italian courts agree appears from recent decisions denying copyright 
protection to designers whose works are renown for their artistry.380 Other 
writers contend, however, that conceptual separability should turn on the 
artistic intensity of the design in question, which sometimes transcends its 
material support and renders the useful article an object of contemplation in 
its. own right. 381 Exponents of this view urge courts to assess the artistic 
impact of particular designs with a view to enabling Italy's most talented 
designers to qualify for copyright protection under the conceptual separabil-
ity exception to the general rule of separability.382 In effect, this school pre-
fers the case-by-case approach of regimes that allow partial cumulation 
371. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 262-63; Auteri, supra note 342, at 58!), 588. The 
same would not be true for the shape of a shoe or an automobile, since in these cases the 
shape is not superimposed upon the objects but constitutes the object itself. F. PERRET, 
supra note 8, at 262-63. 
378. See, e.g., Auteri, supra note 342, at 580-82, 589-90. 
379. See, e.g., id. at 570-74,592; Fabiani, 1 Modelli, supra note 85, at 235-36. Professor 
Fabiani warns that "were copyright law to absorb all the products of industrial design 
(including automobile spare parts, for example), it would risk weakening the very con-
cept of a law to protect authors." Fabiani, La protezione dell' arte applicata, supra note 
18, at 415. (trans.). 
380. See, e.g., Fabiani,l Modelli, supra note 85, at 581-82 (noting denial of copyright pro-
tection to the design of a mUlti-purpose container by Enzo Mari and to certain designs 
of tables and chairs by Rietweld, a leader of the Der Stijl movement); see also 
Estabilimento Miliardi-Zanova S.r.I. v. Cassina (Court of App., Florence, Italy, Feb. 4, 
1989), reprinted in 60 h. DIRn-ro DI AtITORE 444, 449-53 (1989). This decision denied 
copyright protection to three LeCorbusier designs of chairs despite their singular style, 
elegance of line, balance, and novel shapes, because the forms could never be dissoci-
ated from the industrial products and reproduced in the ideal sense as independent 
sculptural works. The decision also denied protection in unfair competition law 
because qualified consumers would not be confused by the similarities of design and 
because competitors could not further vary the unpatented, noncopyrightable designs 
without compromising their aesthetic integrity. See also Stanghellini, Opera d'arte 
applicata e disegni e modelli industriali, 60 h. DIRllTO DI AtITORE 453-67 (1989) (dis-
cussing EstabilimenlO Miliardi-Zanova). 
381. See, e.g., G. SENA, supra note 352, at 538-39 (citing Auletta, Greco and Vercellone, 
Bonasi Benucci, among others); Benussi, supra note 8, at 63-64. See generally 
Magelli, La tutela del design nell'interpretazione della dottrina giuridica e della 
giurisprudenza, 38 RIv. DIRn-ro INDUSTRIALE 205,208-11 (1989). 
382. See, e.g., G. SENA, supra note 352, at 529-30 (contending that the patent approach hind-
ers designers who make an enormous contribution to the Italian way of life and econ-
omy); Benussi, supra note 8, at 64 ("the object must altain at least a certain artistic 
level"). 
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between cop~right and design laws, such as occurs in the Federal Republic 
of Germany, 83 to the total exclusion of modern designs from copyright law 
under a strict regime of noncumulation as implemented in current Italian 
law. 384 
The latter school of thought won an eminent convert to its cause when, 
in 1980, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld 
copyright protection for two prize-winning belt buckle designs38S that dem-
onstrated "substantial originality" and that "rose to the level of creative 
art.,,386 On the authority of Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 387 
exceptionally creative designers could sometimes invoke the "conceptual 
separability" doctrine388 to prevent competitors from appropriating designs 
that might have met the nonobviousness standard of patent law if a timely 
application had been filed. 389 Rejecting the District of Columbia Circuit's 
thesis that such an exception to the general rule of separability contravened 
the overall congressional policy against copyright protection of industrial 
designs,39O the Second Circuit declared that, "so long as the statute remains 
in its present form," it will "always be necessary to determine whether in a 
given case there is a physically or conceptually separable artistic sculpture 
or carving capable of existing independently as a work of art.,,391 
Wittingly or unwittingly, this inftuential American court had sided 
with those Italian writers who viewed conceptual separability as a test of 
artistic intensity or degree. 392 In so doing, its unorthodox methodology 
closely tracked that of the Supreme Court in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, which affords copyright protection to a few highly creative designs 
whose "esthetic content . . . is greater than that asked of objects that are 
mere designs and models ... 393 Courts in numerous other countries have 
383. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; Dietz, Germany, Federal Republic, in INTER-
NATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAw, supra note 42, §§ I[b), 2[c). 
384. See, e.g., G. SENA, supra note 352, at 539 (citing authorities); see also Franzosi, Arte e 
dirilto, 26 RJVISTA DI DIRITrO INDUSTRIALE 285, 295 (1977) (criticizing the separabil-
ity test and endorsing a test based on the prevalence of artistic over utilitarian values). 
385. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 E2d 989,990-91 (2d Cir. 1980). 
386. Id. at 992-94; see also L. Batlin & Sons, Inc., v. Snyder, 536 E2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en 
banc) ("substantial originality"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976). 
387. 632 E2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980). 
388. The court conceded that the designs in question would not satisfy the strict test of mate-
rial separability, which it had applied in other circumstances. See, e.g., Durham 
Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 E2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980). 
389. See supra text accompanying notes 366-68. 
390. See supra notes 371-73 and accompanying text. 
391. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 E2d at 994. 
392. See supra text accompanying notes 381-84. 
393. Reimer, supra note 45, at 40-42. The key operative phrase added by the German Higb 
Court was: ''The line of demarcation between copyright protection and that of designs 
and models must not be too low." Id.; accord E. ULMER, URHEBER-UND 
VERLAOSRECHT 147 (3d ed. 1980). In effect, the German High Court (BGH) borrowed 
the evaluative criteria of patent law to distinguish the few copyrightable designs of use-
ful articles that make "an artistic contribution" from the great mass of designs whose 
fate depends on eligibility under a sui generis design law. See generally Kunz-
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adopted similar techniques at various times to fashion what commentators 
term a regime of "partial cumulation ... 394 
The Kieselstein-Cord decision thus opened a second front with respect 
to the separability criterion codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.395 Ironi-
cally, when the Copyright Office had first expressed its preference for par-
tial cumulation in 1956, it was the Second Circuit-in the well-known 
Vacheron case-that had balked at any digression from the Bleistein princi-
ple of nondiscrimination. 396 Wiser by some twenty-five years of experience 
with the works of applied art that Mazer had ushered in,397 the successors to 
this same court discovered-in Kieselstein-Cord-why so many of their for-
eign counterparts had ultimately derogated from general principles of copy-
right law when adjudicating legal monopolies in borderline utilitarian works 
that appeal to both the copyright and the patent paradigms. 398 
b. Conceptual Separability Reconsidered 
To keep Kieselstein-Cord in perspective one must realize that the major-
ity opinion actually upheld the Copyright Office's own decision to register 
the belt buckle designs in question. 399 The action of the Copyright Office, 
in turn, can be reconciled with its long-standing preference for a regime of 
partial cumulation.400 Comparative legal history teaches, however, that 
regimes of partial cumulation remain fully functional only so long as courts 
require objective evidence of exceptional achievement as a precondition of 
Hallstein, Design Protection in Ger11Ulny, in DIsEONO INDUSTRIALE E PRCJrEZIONE 
EUROPEA 67, 76-77 (1989) (stressing the relevance of expert testimony, especially of art 
specialists, and of recognition by museums); Kruger, Designs Between Copyright and 
Industrial Property Protection, 151.I.C. 168, 177-81 (1984). 
394. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. Japanese law reportedly adopts a similar 
regime. See T. Dol, supra note 82, at 100-01. 
395. See generally Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 271-350 ("Partial 
Cumulation in the Second Circuit"). But see infra text accompanying notes 458-75 
(citing evidence that the Second Circuit began to retreat from partial cumulation in 
1987). . 
396. See supra note 340 and accompanying text; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 
188 U.S. 239 (1903); Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch 
Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958) (criticizing Copyright Office regulation of 1956 based 
on the "clearly a work of art in itself' criterion). 
397. See supra notes 333-34 and accompanying text. 
398. See generally Reichman, Designs Befort! 1976, supra note 17, at 1167-70. 
399. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 991 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(noting that the designs had been registered as "jewelry" or, in the alternative, as "orig-
inal sculpture and design"). The latest registration was dated 1980. Id. 
400. By treating exceptionally creative designs of belt buckles as "conceptually separable" 
works of applied art, the copyright authorities had carried forward, albeit by different 
stratagems, the policy of allowing copyright protection for an object that was "clearly a 
work of art in itself." See supra note 340 and accompanying text. For evidence that the 
Copyright Office's practice manual at this time was more consistent with partial cumu-
lation than with a strict view of separability, see U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CoMPENDIUM 
OF CoPYRIGffT OFFtcE PRAC11CES (I) 2-274 (1973) (describing in effect a "prevalence" 
or "artistic surplus" test like that used in Germany before the Second World War). 
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copyrightability while confining ordinary commercial designs to whatever 
design protection laws happen to be in place. 401 The admonition of the 
Supreme Court in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, that the 
"line of demarcation between copyright protection and that of designs and 
models must not be [set] too low"402 explains why partial cumulation in that 
country has stood the test of time. 403 
When, in contrast, appellate tribunals balk at derogating repeatedly 
from the copyright law's general principle of nondiscrimination, their very 
hesitation soon frustrates the goal of drawing principled distinctions 
between eligible and ineligible designs. 404 As inconsistent decisions multi-
ply over time,405 downward pressures on the criterion in force pull towards 
ever more expansive copyright protection of industrial art.406 In the most 
recent example, "nostalgics of the copyright approach" have persuaded the 
Benelux Court of Justice to soften the "markedly artistic character" test of 
applied art adopted in a regional harmonization treaty,407 with the result that 
industrial designs in the Netherlands may yet obtain long-term copyright 
protection in a judge-made regime of total cumulation under the "unity of 
art" banner. 408 . 
The Bleistein principle of nondiscrimination is deeply ingrained in the 
American copyright tradition,409 as the dissenting opinion in Kieselstein-
401. See, e.g., Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 333-40,367-70. 
402. Reimer, supra note 45, at 40-42 (quoting authority); see supra note 393 and accompany-
ing text. 
403. See supra notes 4S, 393 and accompanying text; see also Dreier, Le systeme de cumul 
partiel de protection par les lois specifiques et par Ie droit d'outeur, in OsJECTIF 1992, 
supra note 46, at 107-IS. Dreier observes that, in recent years, the Supreme Court in 
the Federal Republic may have become slightly more permissive than a decade ago, 
when Reimer wrote. See Reimer, supra note 4S. Even today, however, apart from cer-
tain dolls, animal figures and the like, only a few designs that demonstrate "a level of 
originality . . . palpably higher than the bulk of creations in this domain" can hope to 
qualify as copyrightable works of applied art in the Federal Republic of Germany. See, 
e.g., Dreier, supra, at 110-14; Dietz, Germany, Federal Republic, supra note 383, § 21c] 
(citing authorities). 
404. See generally Desbois, supra note 7. 
4OS. See, e.g., id. at 74 (criticizing inconsistent decisions "discouraging for their subtlety" 
that plague foreign regimes of partial cumulation and noncumulation alike). 
406. rd.; see also Gaubiac, supra note 7, at 62-63,66-70. 
407 .. See the Benelux Designs Convention (adopting the Uniform Benelux Designs Law), 
supra note 17; Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 4, at 293-97 .. 
408. See supra notes 46, 367 and accompanying text; Braun, suPra note 46, at 97-106; 
Cohen Jehoram, Cumulative Protection, supra note 367, at 6O-6S (discussing the 
Screenoprints decision by the Benelux Court of Justice on May 22, 1987, and the deci-
sion by the Netherlands Supreme Court concerning the same case on January IS, 
1988). The Screenoprints decisions appear to permit btoad cumulation between the 
Benelux copyright laws and the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, notwithstanding the 
anticumulationist language in article 21- of that design law, which limits copyright pro-
tection to designs possessing a "markedly artistic character." See Uniform Benelux 
Designs Law, supra note 4, art. 21; infra note 861. 
409. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (establishing univer-
sally recognized principle of nondiscrimination in United States copyright law). 
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Cord made plain.4lo This worried the United States copyright authorities, 
who soon had reason to fear that judicial loyalty to Bleistein might deter 
courts following Kieselstein-Cord from limiting the conceptual separability 
doctrine to a few exceptionally creative designs. 411 Rather than run this 
risk, the Copyright Office has recently repudiated its previous decision to 
register the belt buckle designs in Kieselstein-Cord as a misinterpretation of 
the separability criterion itself.412 . 
As the copyright authorities now see it, conceptual separability has 
nothing to do with aesthetic value, or with the functionality of a design, or 
with the amount of effort that went into creating it.413 Nor does it matter 
that a particular useful object might be worn as jewelry, or that it was the 
product of a famous designer, or that it had earned prizes and other forms of 
recognition for artistic excellence.414 What matters officially is that the 
form or shape in question can be reproduced in a drawing or on other objects 
without sacrificing its integrity as an autonomous work of art. In other 
words, given a design that is "physically inseparable by ordinary means 
from the utilitarian item," the Copyright Office has determined that concep-
tual separability could only arise if its aesthetic features were "nevertheless 
clearly recognizable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work which can be 
visualized on paper . . . or as free standing sculpture . . . independent of 
the shape of the useful article" with which it was associated.415 
410. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1980) (Wein-
. stein, J., dissenting). 
411. See, e.g., Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 208 
(D. Del. 1982) (holding sculptural features of certain plastic display racks to be concep-
tually separable works of applied art); see also infra note 518 and accompanying text 
(citing recent district court cases on separability). 
412. See Schrader, Copyright Office Registration of Industrial Designs, 19 U. BALT. L. REV. 
445 (1989). According to Ms. Schrader, the examiner in Kieselstein-Cord did not apply 
the correct test of conceptual separability, and his approach to the problem was further 
skewed by treating tbe belt buckles as a form of jewelry. Id. But the examiner's "erro-
neous" approach to conceptual separability was in fact consistent with the CoMPEN-
DIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFiCE PRACTICES (I) as it stood at the time. See supra note 400 
(citing authorities); Reicbman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 328 0.341. 
413. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFiCE, CoMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGm' OFFIcE PRACTICES (II) 
§ 505.05 (1984) [bereinafter COMPENDIUM II); Schrader, supra note 412. 
414. See Schrader, supra note 412; CoMPENDIUM II, supra note 413, § 505.05. Hut see 
Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 992-93 (stressing these very factors); if. Kunz-Hallstein, 
supra note 393, at 77 (noting that Supreme Court in Federal Republic of Germany pre-
fers evidence that design seeking to enter copyright law is recognized by artistic circles 
and museums). 
415. COMPENDIUM II, supra note 413, § 505.03; if. Estabilimento Miliardi-Zanova S.r.I. v. 
Cassina (Court of App., Florence, Italy, Feb. 4, 1989), reprinted in 60 IL DIRrrro DI 
AuToRE (taking exactly the same line in regard to conceptual separability under Italian 
law). The CoMPENDIUM OF CoPvRIGm' OFFiCE PRActICES II adds that the artistic fea-
tures must be of a kind that "can be imagined separately and independently from the 
useful article without destroying the basic shape of the useful article. The artistic fea-
tures and the useful article could both exist side by side and be perceived as fully real-
ized, separate works-one an artistic work and the other a useful article." But "the 
test. . . is not met by merely analogizing the general shape of a useful article to works 
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Under this reformulation of the criterion set out in section 101 of the 
1976 Act, the designs of the belt buckles in Kieselstein-Cord were never sep-
arable either physically or conceptually from the shapes of the buckles 
themselves. The Copyright Office today, according to its General Counsel, 
if faced with a similar application for registration, would therefore invoke 
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer and Norris Industries, Inc. v. lIT Corp. to deny copy-
right protection as applied art416 and would not follow the majority opinion 
in Kieselstein-Cord for which it was directly responsible!417 Indeed, the 
Office now views the belt-buckle designs exactly as the dissenting judge in 
Kieselstein-Cord argued they ought to have been viewed when he wrote that 
the "works sued on are, while admirable aesthetically pleasing examples of 
modern design, indubitably belt buckles and nothing else.,,418 
Remarkable as this may seem, it will not escape the attentive reader 
that the language now used by the United States copyright authorities to 
implement the conceptual separability doctrine parallels the approach to 
that same doctrine recommended by the strict constructionists in Italy, who 
have so far persuaded the Italian tribunals to heed their advice.419 It is, in 
short, the language of noncumulation preferred by Professors Auteri and 
Fabiani,420 rather than that of partial cumulation preferred by Professors 
Benussi, Franzosi, and Sena.421 In this manner, the United States Copy-
right Office has written off its historical predilection for regimes of partial 
cumulation as a lost cause, at least in the absence of a congressional decision 
to enact a sui generis design law. It has sided with those at home and abroad 
who would never allow a modern "high tech" design into copyright law no 
matter how "aesthetically satisfying and valuable" it might be. 422 
of modern sculpture," because the "alleged 'artistic features' ... cannot be perceived 
as having [a] separate, independent existence." CoMPENDIUM II, supra note 413, 
§ 505.05. Schrader also stresses that the key to the tests as currently administered is 
that a copyrightable design must be both separable and capable of independent exis-
tence as a work of art. Schrader, supra note 412. The latter requirement is often over-
looked by practitioners. 
416. Norris Indus., Inc. v. lIT Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 
591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cerro denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); see supra notes 370, 
372; Schrader, supra note 412 (stating that the Copyright Office took an active part in 
obtaining the decision in No"is). 
417. Schrader, supra note 412. 
418. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Judge Weinstein added 
that it was "the originator's success in completely ·integrating the artistic designs and 
the functional aspects of the buckles that precludes copyright." [d. at 995; cf 
Schrader, supra note 412 (observing that virtually no modern functional design can 
pass the test of separability as currently applied). 
419. See supra notes 374-80 and accompanying text. 
420. See supra notes 376-80. Professor Perret of Switzerland, a leading exponent of the dis-
sociation theory, also takes this position. See F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 262-63. 
421. See supra notes 381-84. 
422. See supra note 372; supra notes 369-74 and accompanying text. "Thus, the mere fact 
that a famous designer produces a uniquely shaped food processor does not render the 
design of the food processor copyrightable." CoMPENDIUM II, supra note 413, § 
503.05. 
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These developments pose two rather intriguing questions. First, one 
may justifiably wonder how long the Copyright Office will adhere to its own 
official line, given its past record and the fact that the bulk of the designs 
qualified to enter copyright law under this doctrine may be less worthy of 
protection from either an artistic or a commercial standpoint than those 
likely to be excluded.423 Assuming the Office sticks to its revisionist line, 
the second question concerns the judicial response likely to ensue. Will the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in particular, fall 
meekly into line with this administrative conversion to a strict non-
cumulationist regime? Or will its more protectionist members cling to the 
majority opinion in Kieselstein-Cord and maintain the regime of partial 
cumulation that the copyright authorities had themselves convinced the 
court to establish in 1980r24 
2. Demise of the Neo-German Model? 
a. Judicial Aversion to Noncumulation 
The first major decision to probe these issues was Carol Barnhart, Inc. 
v. Economy Cover Corp.,425 which concerned two sets of life-sized human 
torsos used to display wearing apparel in retail clothing stores. One male-
and-female set of torsos wore sculpted shirts; the other was left unclad. All 
exhibited life-like and anatomically correct features, except that they lacked 
necks and arms and were hollowed out at the back to hold excess fabric 
when displaying garments.426 Since the defendant admitted copying both 
sets of mannequins, the case turned on the validity of the copyrights that the 
originator thought he had perfected when the Copyright Office agreed to 
register the forms as sculptural works. 427 
The lower court disregarded the plaintiff's certificate of registration 
and denied copyrightability on the ground that the mannequins possessed 
no aesthetic features capable of independent existence when separated phys-
ically or conceptually from the utilitarian aspects of the forms. 42 On 
appeal, a panel of the Second Circuit disregarded the presumption of valid-
ity to which a certificate of copyright registration was nominally entitled,429 
unlike the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which had strengthened 
the presumption of validity afforded to issued design patents.430 This con-
423. See supra notes 360-65 and accompanying text. 
424. See supra notes 385-400 and accompanying text. 
425. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
426. Id. at 412-13. 
427.ld.at413. 
428. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp. 364 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd, 
773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985). 
429. See 17 U.S.c. § 41O(c) (1988), which states that a timely certificate of registration 
"shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and of the facts 
stated in the certificate." The provision adds, however, that the "evidentiary weight to 
be accorded the certificate . . . shall be within the discretion of the court." Id. 
430. See supra notes 163, 172 and accompanying text. 
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elusion followed, according to the majority, because the Copyright Office 
did not examine the prior art, nor did its officials need special expertise to 
decide whether to register a work or not. Hence, judges were as qualified as 
the Register to view the forms and determine their eligibility under the 
law,431 a point the Second Circuit had already stressed in Kieselstein-
Cord. 432 
When it came to implementing this task, however, the Second Circuit 
and the Copyright Office turned out to be speaking two different languages. 
The Copyright Office had accepted the torso forms for registration because 
a string of precedents, derived from Mazer, protected dolls, figurines, and 
other representational shapes applied to useful articles. The Office there-
fore regarded the human torso in any form as copyrightable subject mat-
ter. 433 Viewed from the front, moreover, these particular torsos could stand 
alone, as sculptured human figures, which brought them within the strict 
interpretation of separability set out in the 1984 revision of the Compen-
dium of Copyright Office Practices.434 The Copyright Office thus feared to 
deny eligibility lest it appear to have rejected the torso designs merely 
because they served a useful purpose, contrary to the United States Supreme' 
Court's explicit holding in Mazer v. Stein. 43s To the extent that Mazer 
rejected a "destination" or "purpose" test, in short, the authorities felt 
unable to exclude these mannequins without straying from that precedent 
and from the long-standing administrative practices built around it. 436 
In contrast, the majority opinion in Carol Barnlwrt perceived the 
Copyright Office's decision to register these mannequins as illogical largely 
because the panel seemed unaware that the Office had repudiated its previ-
ous action in Kieselstein-Cord.437 In Kieselstein-Cord, the Office implicitly 
asked the court to validate belt buckle designs whose exceptional aesthetic 
qualities made them a museum piece.438 The mannequins used to display 
retail clothing were hardly creative achievements. Faithful to Kieselstein-
Cord, the majority in Carol Barnlwrt rejected the proposition that the design 
'of a useful article was entitled to a "lower level of scrutiny" in determinin~ 
its eligibility "merely because ... [it] falls within a traditional art form.'t43 
431. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 414. The court held that the presumption of validity in 
copyright law merely ordered the burdens of proof. Id. 
432. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989,994 (2d Cir. 1980). 
433. See supra notes 360-63 and accompanying text; Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
434. See CoMPENDIUM II, supra note 413, §§ 505.03 to 505.05 (quoted in supra note 415). 
This interpretation did not require a separable work of applied art to retain its economic 
value when reproduced on different material supports, only its overall artistic integrity. 
For the contrary view in regard to the proper implementation of dissociation theory in 
Italian law, see supra note 376 (citing the view of Auteri). 
435. 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, II3(a) (1988». 
436. See supra notes 360-63 and accompanying text. 
437. See supra note 412 and accompanying text. 
438. Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Carol Barn-
hart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985) (stressing this 
aspect of Kieselstein-Cord). 
439. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 418. 
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Admitting the torso designs to copyright -law thus appeared inconsistent 
with both the legislative history, which denied protection to most aestheti-
cally satisfying commercial designs,440 and with the court's prior decision 
in Kieselstein-Cord, which had declared that "the vast majority of belt buck-
les" would not "rise to the level of creative art" under the tests of creativity 
and conceptual separability the Second Circuit had laid down.441 
To complicate matters further, Judge Newman, the dissenting member 
of the Carol Barnhart panel, flatly rejected any criterion of aesthetic 
achievement that derogated from the Bleistein principle of non-
discrimination.442 He thus indirectly attacked the majority opinion in 
Kieselstein-Cord at its most vulnerable point,443 much as Judge Clark, dis-
senting in Vacheron, had attacked Register Fisher's "clearly a work of art in 
itself" test some twenty years earlier.444 The Carol Barnhart dissent then 
proposed a new test, to be known as the "temporal displacement" test, that 
would characterize aesthetic features as conceptually separable if "the arti-
cle stimulate[s] in the mind of the beholder a concept that is separate from 
the concept evoked by its utilitarian function" or "that can displace at least 
temporarily the utilitarian concept.'t44S Asked to apply his proposed test to 
the facts at hand, Judge Newman declared that one set of torsos indubitably 
satisfied the criterion of conceptual separability as thus defined, while his 
decision concerning the second set would require more evidence than the 
record contained!446 
A majority of the panel, led by Judge Oakes, dismissed this improvised 
~est of conceptual separability as administratively unsound and as an "illu-
sory standard" that led to the "bottomless pit" of copyright protection for 
industrial art of every kind.447 In other words, the proposed "temporal dis-
placement" test appeared to be a thinly disguised formula for converting the 
440_ See id. at 418 (noting. however, the contradiction between this policy and the trend 
toward increased copyright protection for other articles having a utilitarian dimension. 
such as computer programs); cf. supra text accompanying notes 25-27. 
441. See Kieselstein-Cord. 632 F.2d at 994 (stating that the expert witnesses testified and "the 
Copyright Office's action implied ... [that] the buckles rise to the level of creative 
art"). 
442. See Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419, 422-23 (Newman, 1., dissenting). 
443. See. c.g., Reichman, Designs After 1976. supra note 17, at 369, 3Rt. 
444. See Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 
637, 643-45 (1958) (Clark, J., dissenting); supra note 340 and accompanying text. 
445. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 422,423 (Newman, 1., dissenting). This proposed crite-
rion would allow expert testimony to show that the appearance of an article "would 
engender in the observer's mind a separate nonutilitarian concept that can displace at 
least temporarily the utilitarian concept." [d. at 423. 
446. [d. at 424-26. Under this test, one of the designs in Carol Barnhart was conceptually 
separable because it could be entertained in the mind without simultaneously perceiv-
ing the forms as mannequins at all. [d. at 425. For the difficulties of administering 
such a criterion and the consequences likely to ensue, see infra text accompanying notes 
502-06. 
447. Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d at 419 n.5 (criticizing the temporal displacement-test as "so 
ethereal as to amount to a 'non-test' "). But see. e.g., W. PATRY, LA~N'S THE Copy-
RIGHT LAw 44-45 (6th ed. 1986) (approving the "temporal displacement" test). 
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exclusionary criterion of separability into an inclusionary formula inspired 
by the late Professor Melville Nimmer's "unity of art" leanings.448 The 
majority then ended the debate by denying copyright protection on the 
grounds that "the features claimed to be aesthetic or artistic, e.g., the life-
size configuration of the breasts and the width of the shoulders, are inextri-
cably intertwined with the utilitarian features, the display of clothes. "449 
Nevertheless, the Second Circuit emerged from this fracas on a colli-
sion course with the Copyright Office for the first time since the Vacheron 
decision in 1958.450 Ironically, the two sides were now on opposite sides of 
the fence, with the Second Circuit rooting for partial cumulation and the 
Copyright Office penitently adhering to a strict noncumulationist line. 
Meanwhile, the scarecrow of nondiscrimination, raised by the dissent in 
Carol Barnhart, was about to paralyze the court's ability to administer its 
own fledgling regime of partial cumulation. 
b. Healing a Split in the Circuits 
These tensions came to a head in 1987, when Brandir International, 
Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber CO. 451 reached the Second Circuit on appeal. 
This case concerned the modern design of a bicycle rack, made of bent tub-
ing, which the designer had derived from an original wire sculpture that 
lacked any utilitarian purpose at the time he first created it. On the one 
hand, the case resembled Kieselstein-Cord in that considerable objective evi-
dence established the superior artistic character of the design. 452 On the 
other hand, the evidence also showed that the designer had subsequently 
modified his original wire sculpture in order to make the design function-
ally more efficient for use as a bicycle rack, a use discovered after he cre-
ated the form. 453 
This time the Copyright Office had refused to register the design of the 
bicycle rack because it contained no element "capable of independent exis-
tence as a copyrightable pictorial, graphic or sculptural work apart from the 
shape of the useful article. ,,454 The Office thus closed the very door to con-
448. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. The dissenting opinion dwells at length on 
Professor Nimmer's own interpretation of conceptual separability. See Carol Barnhart, 
773 F.2d at 420-22 (Newman, J., dissenting); I M. & D. NIMMER, supra note 28, 
§ 2.08[B)[3]. 
449. Carol Barnlwrt, 773 F.2d at 419; see also Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 
905 (2d Cir. 1980). 
450. See supra notes 340, 399-400 and accompanying text. 
451. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987). 
452. "The RIBBON Rack has been featured in Popular Science. Art and Architecture, and 
Design 384 magazines, and it won an Industrial Designers Society of America design 
award in the spring of 1980." Id. at 1146. In 1984, the rack was selected for an exhi-
bition entitled "The Product of Design: An Exploration of the Industrial Design Pro-
cess," which was written up in the New York TImes. Id. 
453. Id. at 1143, 1146-47. 
454. Id. at 1146. The Register of Copyrights was named as a third-party defendant under 
17 U.S.C. § 411 (1988), but the Copyright Office chose not to appear after denying eli-
gibility. Id. at 1143. 
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ceptual separability it had opened in Kieselstein-Cord and contemporane-
ously implemented the strict interpretation of separability to which it had 
converted in the revised Compendium of 1984.455 The authorities also 
refused registration on the dubious alternative ground that .the design con-
sisted of standard, public-domain shapes lacking the requisite degree of 
originality and creativity, an assessment belied by the laurels this design 
later won for its creator. 456 
A panel of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in contrast, 
disregarded any question of originality457 and formally declined to acqui-
esce in the Copyright Office's own retreat from partial cumulation. "'Con-
ceptual separability' is ... alive and well, at least in this circuit," declared 
Judge Oakes, writing for the majority, "[t]he fsroblem ... is determining 
exactly what it is and how it is to be applied."4 8 Unable to resolve the con-
troversy over the proper line of demarcation that Carol Barnhart had ren-
dered so acute,459 this panel, like its predecessors, then divided once again 
on the meaning of conceptual separability. 460 
A majority ultimately agreed with the conclusion reached by the copy-
right authorities that the design of the bicycle rack could not qualify as 
applied art due to the designer's perfect integration of form and function. 461 
In evaluating the conceptual separability exception to the general rule of 
455. See supra notes 411-18 and accompanying text; see also Animal Fair, Inc. v. Amfesco 
Indus., Inc .• 620 E Supp. 175, 186-88 (D. Minn. 1985). affd without opinion, 794 E2d 
678 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding the design of a slipper resembling a bear's paw that the 
Copyright Office had accepted for registration). 
456. See Brandir, 834 E2d at 1146. 
457. [d. Use of a quantitative creativity requirement, couched in terms of "substantial orig-
inality" or of a "substantial variation" from pre-existing designs. was not anomalous in 
itself after 1976, particularly in the Second Circuit. This doctrine could also exclude 
variations attributable to physical or manufacturing skills, rather than to true artistic 
skills. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 E2d 905, 910-11 (1980); L. 
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder. 536 E2d 486 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cerr. denied, 429 U.S. 
857 (1976). The Copyright Office has properly begun to make more aggressive use of 
this doctrine to exclude borderline utilitarian works that reveal only miniscule varia-
tions from matter still in copyright or already in the public domain. See, e.g .• I P. 
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 68-71 (noting recent cases requiring nontrivial varia-
tions). But see Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 E2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (questioning 
authority of Register to deny copyrightability of a videogame for lack of creativity and 
because the design was not an original work of authorship within 17 U.S.c. § 102(a». 
vacating and remanding 695 E Supp. 1204 (D.D.C. (988). In applying the Batlin stan-
dard of substantial creativity to both industrial art and industrial literature. the Copy-
right Office examiners need to avoid piecemeal decomposition. a lesson that the patent 
examiners had to absorb from 1980 on. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying 
text; Reichman. Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 683-89 (" 'Originality' and 
the Burden of Overlapping Claims"). 
458. Brandir, 834 E2d at 1144. Judge Oakes was the author of all the majority opinions 
under review. viz, those in Brandir, 834 E2d 1142; Carol Barnhart. Inc. v. Economy 
Cover Corp., 773 E2d 411 (2d Cir. (985); and Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl. 
Inc., 632 E2d 989 (2d Cir. (980). 
459. See supra notes 438-50 and accompanying text. 
460. Compare Brandir, 834 E2d at 1142-50 (majority opinion by Oakes. J.) with id. at 
1150-52 (Winters, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
461. See id. at 1147-48; infra text accompanying notes 470-75. 
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separability, however, the majority pointedly declined to enquire whether 
the design in question displayed "substantial originality" and "rose to the 
level of creative art," as the majority in Kieselstein-Cord had done.462 Given 
the merger of form and function in this highly artistic design of a bicycle 
rack, that was the logical issue to pursue under the neo~German regime of 
partial cumulation the Second Circuit had appeared to favor in 1980.463 
Such an analysis would have broken too openly with the principle of 
nondiscrimination that had surfaced in Carol Barnhart, however. Instead, a 
chastened majority, speaking through Judge Oakes, now joined with the 
Copyright Office in officially disavowing further attempts to measure con-
ceptual separability in terms of artistic achievement because they had been 
"reminded . . . by numerous . . . opinions . . . that we judges should not 
let our own views of styles of art interfere with the decisionmaking process 
in this area.,,464 In the Second Circuit as in the Copyright Office, in short, 
the Bleistein principle of nondiscrimination would formally restrict the legal 
criteria used to draw the line of demarcation between applied art and indus-
trial designs once again. 
The matter did not rest there, however, because the Brandir majority 
then declined to take the easy way out by simply endorsing the C0l2'right 
Office's own revisionist interpretation of the separability criterion. 5 On 
the contrary, the majority now professed to discover a new test of conceptual 
separability, launched by Professor Denicola in 1983,466 which distin-
guished between copyrightable works of applied art "whose origins lie out~ 
side the design process, despite the utilitarian environment in which they 
appear," and ordinary industrial designs that inhibit "the unconstrained per-
spective of the artist.'>467 On this approach, which might be termed the 
"design process and nature of the work" test,468 conceptual separability 
would depend on "the extent to which the work requires artistic expression 
uninhibited by functional considerations.'>469 
Armed with this new key to the two-hundred year old mystery of how 
to collocate industrial designs within the framework of the world's intellec-
tual property system, the Brandir majority inspected the design of the bicy-
cle rack for elements that could "be identified as reflecting the designer's 
artistic judgment exercised independently of functional considerations.'047o 
In so doing, it affirmed the belief that the shape of a telephone influenced by 
Arp, Brancusi, or Moore would surely satisfy this new test of conceptual 
462. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145; supra notes 385-98 and accompanying text. 
463. See supra note 45; supra notes 392-95 and accompanying text. 
464. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 n.3; see supra notes 412-15 and accompanying text (noting 
that Copyright Office disavows artistic value as factor in assessing conceptual separa-
bility). 
465. See supra notes 412-15 and accompanying text. 
466. See Denicola, supra note 194, at 741-48. 
467. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Denicola, supra note 194, at 741). 
468. [d. 
469. [d. (quoting Denicola, supra note 194, at 741). 
470. [d. 
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separability.471 To the dismay of the dissent,472 however, the bicycle rack in 
Brandir failed even this test because its form, as finally adopted, was 
significantly influenced by utilitarian concerns.473 Any plea that the design 
might qualify as minimalist art was therefore unavailing, as were the 
numerous awards it had garnered. 474 Indeed, these very awards only 
served to establish that the designer of the bicycle rack had "achieved . . . 
the highest goal of modern industrial design, that is, the harmonious fusion 
of function and aesthetics," which now made it uncopyrightable by 
definition!47s 
3. Critical Evaluation of Current Law 
The Brandir decision is the least persuasive of the cases applying the 
conceptual. separability test after 1976. For example, the majority's exag-
gerated concern about violating the rule in Mazer476 would have been 
justified under the regulations issued prior to 1976 because nothing in Mazer 
or the 1909 Act expressly supported the separability criterion that the Copy-
right Office had engrafted upon the Supreme Court's opinion.477 After the 
codification of 1976,478 however, section 101 authorized courts to rule that 
even modern shapes analogous to abstract works of sculpture might forfeit 
eligibility as works of applied art if their forms were inse~arably joined with 
a functional application in the design of a useful ariicle. 4 9 Doctrinally, this 
follows from the strict interpretation of separability, which denies protection 
to shapes that cannot be reproduced on other material supports without loss 
of artistic integrity.48O In policy terms, this result serves to prevent the 
exclusive reproduction rights of copyright law from disrupting the applica-
tion of design patent law to "high tech" designs that are sold on the products 
market rather than on the market for artistic works as SUCh.481 
The Brandir majority complained that, under the Copyright Office's 
current interpretation of separability, a superior modern design of a bicycle 
rack could not enter copyright law while a telephone shaped like Mickey 
471. [d. at 1145 n.3. 
472. [d. at 1150-52 (Winter,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
473. [d. at 1147. 
474. [d. 
475. [d. at 1147-48 (stating that "there remains no artistic element of the RIBBON Rack that 
can be identified as separate and 'capable of existing independently, of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article' "). 
476. See id. at 1144. 
477. See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text. Indeed, there was language in Mazer 
that could be read to support the "unity of art" approach, as the late Professor Nimmer 
was fond of pointing out. See supra note 51 (quoting Nimmer). 
478. See supra notes 19-21,343-44 and accompanying text. 
479. See supra note 21 (quoting definitions of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" and 
"useful article" in 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988»; H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
54, 55 (1976), reprinted in U.S. CoDE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659-801; see also Dur-
ham Indus., Inc. v. Thmy Corp., 630 F,2d 905,910-15 (2d Cir. 1980). 
480. See supra notes 374-80 and accompanying text. 
481. See infra text accompanying notes 832-47 (,The Two-Market Conundrum"). 
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Mouse would pass muster.482 This unpalatable result might understandably 
have prompted the Second Circuit to stress the transcendental qualities of 
the bicycle rack qua art, as it had done for the belt buckles in Kieselstein-
Cord. 483 But the majority could neither bring itself to confirm that Erece-
dent, in deference to Bleistein and the principle of nondiscrimination, 84 nor 
to affirm the strict version of separability now in favor at the Copyright 
Office. Rather, the majority tried to weasel out of its dilemma by stressing 
that the designer had not applied his sculpture to a useful object in the pure 
and unadulterated form with which it had come into being. 485 
In other words, the majority refused to protect a sculptural form 
because the creator had subsequently altered its dimensions in order to 
increase its efficiency as a bicycle rack.486 By emphasizing the purpose of 
these posterior design modifications, however, the opinion allowed eligibil-
ity to turn fortuitously on the process or sequence of decisions taken by the 
designer, and it raised the spectre of a de facto destination test that did 
conflict with Mazer as codified in 1976.487 Dissenting Judge Winter chided 
his brethren for this aberration,488 which he and Judge Newman had brought 
about by over-emphasizing the role of Bleistein in an industrial milieu,489 
and the Copyright Office has distanced itself from the reasoning-but not 
the end result-in Brandir.490 At least one district court has also rejected 
this aspect of Brandir while latching onto the protectionist opportunities 
latent in the majority's dicta concerning the continued vitality of conceptual 
separability in the Second Circuit.491 
The Brandir majority's ruminations on aesthetic philosophy were even 
more disconcerting than its propensity to tinker with the venerable theory of 
dissociation. The opinion suggests that the pioneers of modern design 
would have sympathized with the "design process" test because the stream-
lined shape of a telephone "may be equally divorced from utilitarian influen-
ces as a telephone shaped like Disney's Mickey Mouse. ,,492 In reality, Arp, 
Brancusi, and Moore would have been appalled to learn that the modern 
design of a telephone they inspired might become copyrightable in the 
United States because courts deemed it "sufficiently divorced from utilitar-
ian influences." They would insist that, in their telephones, art and utility 
482. See Brandir, 834 E2d at 1145 n.3; see also Denicola, supra note 194, at 746. 
483. See supra notes 385-91 and accompanying text. 
484. See Brandir, 834 E2d at 1145 n.3. 
485. See id. at 1147. 
486. Id. (stressing that "the designer has clearly adapted the original aesthetic elements to 
accommodate and further a utilitarian purpose"). 
487. See, e.g., 17 U.S.c. §§ 202, 113(a) (1988); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
488. See Brandir, 834 E2d at 1152 (Winter, J., concurring in pan and dissenting in part). 
489. See supra notes 442-44 and accompanying text. 
490. See Schrader, supra note 412. 
491. See National Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 E Supp. 1348, 1353 (S.D. 
Cal. 1988). 
492. See supra notes 471, 482. That only the telephone shaped like a mouse was protectible 
under precedents recognized by the copyright authorities looked like an anomaly in the 
doctrine of separability, as the majority chose to view it. 
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had merged, that no "divorce" whatsoever was possible or desirable, and 
that the object had to be protected as a superior creative achievement for that 
very reason.493 
Whatever its merits, the Supreme Court in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many could accommodate such an argument under that country's prototypi-
cal regime of partial cumulation, especially if expert testimony objectified 
the level of artistic achievement,494 and this had been the Second Circuit's 
approach in Kieselstein-Cord.49s In contrast, the Supreme Court of Italy, 
while capable of accommodating this argument without any theoretical dif-
ficulties' would decline to implement it in practice lest lower courts under-
mine the primacy of the sui generis design law through the vagaries of a 
case-by-case analysis of conceptual segarability.496 In other words, both 
the Italian Supreme Court after 19574 7 and the United Stales Copyright 
Office after 1984 would apply the strict doctrine of separability to cases like 
Brandir on the grounds that their respective legislators had established 
design patent laws to promote the decorative arts without unduly burdening 
free competition. 
Between these extremes, the Brandir majority implied that Professor 
Denicola's "design process" test enabled the Second Circuit to establish a 
new and more flexible approach to conceptual separability that would avoid 
the supposed anomalies of dissociation theory without derogating from the 
principle of nondiscrimination.498 Those familiar with the long history of 
foreign design law, however, will have reason to doubt that the "design pro-
cess" test discovered in Brandir was very new at all. On the contrary, 
Denicola's test, like its Italian counterpart launched by Professor Franzosi in 
1977 ,499 bears marked affinities to similar tests that were used and dis-
carded in France and other countries during the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries. S()() It also evokes the "aesthetic surplus" or "prevalence" test, 
493. See, e.g.,1. HESKETT, INDUSTRIAL DEsiGN 85-104 (1980). 
494. See supra notes 401-03 and accompanying text; Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 393, at 
76-77. 
495. See supra notes 386-89 and accompanying text. 
496. See supra notes 374-80 and accompanying text. 
497. See Note, Systematic Approach, supra note 341, at 288.- This anonymous "note" on 
Italian law, condensed and translated from IL DiRITIO D~ORE 27-32 (1957), was 
mysteriously published in its United States version about the time that the Copyright 
Office was introducing the criterion of separability into its 1958 Regulation. 
498. See supra notes 465-69 and accompanying text. The Copyright Office assimilates 
Denicola's test to the "primary purpose" test it had sometimes used in the past. See 
supra note 400 and accompanying text; Schrader, supra note 412 (stressing that the 
Office does not apply the Denicola test). 
499. See Franzosi, supra note 384, at 295 (proposing that a design should be deemed separa-
ble and protectible if the observer "appreciates the work more for its aesthetic value 
than for its utilitarian value. If the observer finds its artistic value more significant_ 
than its utilitarian value, or if indeed the artistic value should make one almost forget 
the utilitarian value," the separability test would be met) (trans.). Compare Franzosi, 
supra note 384, at 295 with supra text accompanying notes 466-69 (discussing 
Denicola's "design process" test) and supra text accompanying notes 442-46 (discuss-
ing Judge Newman's "temporal displacement" test). 
500. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 242; Gaubiac, supra note 7, at 46-47 (attributing 
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used for a time by the High Court of Germany after the First World War, 
which recognized a protectable work of applied art "when the extra esthetic 
element added to the functionalism of the forms, whatever the artistic value, 
attains to such a degree that one can speak of art, taking into account gener-
ally accepted opinion."sol 
If one bothers to ask why these and innumerable other tests that appear 
plausible on their face are always discarded sooner or later in this peculiar 
corner of the law, the answer is always the same: Such tests inherently defy 
consistent administration on a case-by-case basis. S02 Over time, courts 
applying any of these tests will either succumb to protectionist pressures 
thrusting downwards towards the "unity of art" position-as seems to be 
occurring in the Benelux countries todayS°3-or they will tilt upwards 
towards an overt test of aesthetic accomplishment, as occurred in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany after the Second World War. S04 In effect, the 
Supreme Court in the Federal Republic allows copyright law to shelter orna-
mental designs of useful articles from competition on the products market 
only if they meet a de facto nonobviousness standard of aesthetic achieve-
ment borrowed from industrial property law for the specific purpose of 
the criterion based on the secondary or accessory character of the aesthetic features to 
PmLIPPON, TRAITE THEORlQUE E PRATIQUE DE LA PRoPRIETE DES DEssINS ET DEs 
MOOELES INDUSTRIELS (1880), who emphasized the gratuitous nature of art "applied" to 
industrial objects as distinct from designs determined by the utilitarian object itself). 
In all, French courts and commentators struggled with at least five different criteria in 
seeking to determine the line of demarcation between industrial designs and applied 
an during the nineteenth century. See generally Reichman, Designs Before 1976, 
supra note 17, at 1154-55. The unity of art doctrine was adopted in exasperation with 
them all. See F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 246 (denigrating this result as a makeshift 
solution). 
501. Reimer, supra note 45, at 40-41. The Copyright Office reads Denicola's test this way. 
See supra note 498. 
502. See, e.g., Gaubiac, supra note 7, at 46-47; Desbois supra note 7, at 74. The judges who 
must administer such tests are alternately appalled now by acts of design piracy, now 
by the modest creative content of the bulk of the designs clamoring for protection. If 
they set a low standard of eligibility for copyright protection in order to repress imita-
tion, it becomes impossible to exclude the bulk of designs chronically lacking in crea-
tivity. If they set a high standard for copyright protection, they must borrow evaluative 
criteria from patent law despite the nondiscrimination principle of copyright law, and 
they must be willing to tolerate slavish imitation in the name of free competition. See 
generally Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 366-73. Use of such criteria 
inevitably produces a zig-zag line of cases that furnishes the "unity of art" school with 
its most potent ammunition. See, e.g., E. POUILLET, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE 
DEs DESSINS ET MODELES 51 n.l (5th ed. 1911) (deploring that, under such tests, "the 
result is the worst inconsistencies and the most unexpected contradictions"); Desb9is, 
supra note 7, at 74 (stating that the unity of art thesis "avoids controversies discourag-
ing for their subtlety and inconsistent decisions on the merits") (trans.). This dilemma 
pushes courts and legislators into one of the three competing options still available 
today-total cumulation in copyright law; total noncumulation outside copyright law; 
or partial cumulation "baSed on de facto criteria of anistic achievement. See supra 
notes 42-46, 368 and accompanying text. 
503. See supra notes 46, 367-68,407-08 and accompanying text. 
504. See supra notes 401-03 and accompanying text. Under this test, the anistic aspect 
need not exceed the functional aspect at all. See, e.g., Reimer, supra note 45, at 42-43. 
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defending the integrity of the design protection law in force. sos 
That the "design process" test endorsed in Brandir suffers from these 
defects was later conceded by its originator, Professor Denicola, and by Pro-
fessor Brown, who believes that it will "leave too much room for self-serving 
declarations of aesthetic aims ... S06 Perhaps the most ironic ~nd instructive 
aspect of the Brandir opinion is that the majority, having discovered this 
test, may not actually have· applied it in the end. Pressed by the dissent to 
follow Kieselstein~Cord to its logical conclusion,s07 the majority was forced 
to acknowledge that the bicycle rack in question was just a "product of 
industrial design" whose "[f]orm and function [were] inextricably inter-
twined . . . being as much the result of utilitarian pressures as aesthetic 
choices. "S08 Like the outdoor lamp in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, S09 the artistic 
elements of the bicycle rack, though "worthy of admiration," were insepara-
ble from the functional elements in which they merged, even if the form of 
the rack existed independently as a work of art in the minds of the 
experts. S 10 The Brandir majority thus ended by denying protection for 
much the same reason that the Register of Copyrights had refused to register 
the d'esign in the first place,sll and a collision between the court and the 
Copyright Office was narrowly averted at the last moment. 
That the Second Circuit has tired of its experiment with partial cumu-
lation can hardly be doubted after this decision, as Judge Winter's dissent 
gleefully pointed out. S 12 If Brandir's award-winning design of a bicycle 
rack, derived from an original wire sculpture, was not conceptually separa-
ble, despite the majority's dicta about "design process," then the operative 
test of separability in the Second Circuit resembled the test used in those 
other federal appellate courts that had excluded the designs of an outdoor 
lamp, of wire-spoked hubcaps, and of carpet display folders on grounds of 
inseparability.sl3 Weary of more bloody struggles in the name of non-
discrimination, Judge Oakes in particular may henceforth tend to view con:-
505. See, e.g., E. ULMER, supra note 393, at 147-50; Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 393, at 77 
(relating the high threshold of eligibility to the German judges' traditional reluctance 
"to grant the rather long lasting copyright protection to those creations for which the 
special protection under the ... [design law) is available"); see also Katzenberger, 
Protection of Industrial Designs in Germany, reprinted in DEsIGN PRoTEcnON, supra 
note 8, at 100-02. However, some recent decisions appear slightly more liberal in 
regard to copyright protection than in the past. See Dietz, ·supra note 383, § 2[4)[c). 
506. See Brown, supra note 32, at 1351, 1352 n.51 (reporting the later views of Denicola). 
Both Brown and Denicola reject broad copyright protection of industrial designs under 
any theory. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1349; Denicola, supra note 194, at 
726-27. 
507. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1150-52 (Winter, J., concurring in:part and dissenting in part). 
508. Id. at 1147. The majority added that "Brandir has achieved the highest goal of modem 
industrial design, that is, the harmonious fusion of function and aesthetics." Id. 
509. 591 F.2d 796, 800-01 (D.C. eir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1978); see supra 
notes 370-73 and accompanying text. 
510. See supra note 452. 
511. See supra notes 454-55 and accompanying text. 
512. See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1151. 
513. See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text; see alSo Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's 
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ceptual separability as a theoretical construct that, in practice, is seldom 
allowed to temper the policy of whatever design protection law happens to 
be in force. 
If so, the Second Circuit's approach to copyrightable applied art in the 
future will draw nearer to the neo-Italian construction of Esquire, and the 
split in the circuits, opened in 1980, could largely heal of its own accord. 5 14 
Meanwhile, one should not forget that both the majority and the dissent in 
Brandir quietly agreed to remand the design of the bicycle rack to the lower 
court with instructions to consider its eligibility for protection as "appear-
ance trade dress" under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 5 15 Mindful of the 
growing opportunities to expand the protection of industrial designs under 
federal unfair competition law, which both the Second and Ninth Circuits 
had pioneered,5t6 the majority in Brandir may well have concluded that the 
struggle to install a measured regime of partial cumulation between the pat-
ent and copyright laws was no longer worth either the effort or the risks it 
entailed. 
Nevertheless, the Brandir majority had gone on record as favoring a 
"design process" test of conceptual separability, while the dissenting judge 
in Brandir had sided with the Carol Barnhart dissent in advocating a "tem-
poral displacement" test of conceptual separability. 517 Either test could-
become highly protectionist over time if endorsed by the Second Circuit as a 
whole or by other circuits that have not yet pronounced upon these matters. 
Although the copyright authorities oppose both tests and have intensified 
their defense of the noncumulationist fortress, district courts in different 
jurisdictions seem increasingly inclined to cite the protectionist dissents in 
Brandir and Carol Barnhart' 18 rather than the orthodox formulation of Com-
pendium (II) of Copyright Office Practices.519 
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the experimental regime of 
partial cumulation operating since 1980 in one United States federal appel-
Costumes Co., 721 F. Supp. 1566 (E.D.N.Y.) (finding masquerade costumes not con-
ceptually separable), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 
1989). 
514. For the split in the circuits opened in 1980, see generally supra text accompanying 
notes 47-50, 369-95. 
515. Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1148-49, 1152. 
516. For opening moves in this strategy, see infra notes 540-52 and accompanying text; for 
later and more decisive moves by the same courts, see infra notes 553-70, 620-33 and 
accompanying text. 
517. See supra text accompanying notes 466-75. 
518. See, e.g., National Theme Prods., Inc. v. Jerry B. Beck, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1348, 1354 
(S.D. Cal. 1988) (holding costume artwork, including overall shape of at least one cos-
tume, copyrightable under "design process" test of Brandir because "the artists' com-
munication of their aesthetic judgments (was] exercised independently of functional 
considerations"); W. PATRY, supra note 447. at 45 (contending that the "temporal dis-
placement test is ... the most persuasive approach to ... a perplexing issue"). But 
see Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie's Costumes Co., 721 F. Supp. 1566 (E.D.N.Y.) (costume 
designs were not conceptually separable), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 891 
F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989). 
519. See supra notes 412-18 and accompanying text. 
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late jurisdiction has really ended or is just temporarily suspended. If the 
laUer, then-absent prompt and carefully contrived sui generis design legis-
lation-there is still reason to fear that "nostalgics of the copyright 
approach" may yet overpower the partisans of noncumulation in this coun-
try as they appear to have done in the Netherlands only a short while ago. S20 
C. Concu"ent Protection o/Trade Dress: The Judge-Made Design Law 
1. "Appearance Trade Dress" Without Aesthetic Functionality: 
1975-1985 . 
Comparative intellectual property law demonstrates that, unless 
restrained by the enactment of sui generis design laws or by the periodic 
strictures of higher authority, foreign judges are reluctant to condone sys-
tematic design piracy in blind obedience to liberal economic theory. Given 
room to maneuver, there is a nearly universal tendency521 to strain trade-
mark and unfair competition laws s!Junding in the confusion and deception 
rationales to the point where they at least occasionally deter slavish imita-
tion on' a case-by-case basis. 522 Moreover, courts in some industrialized 
countries still view slavish imitation as a tort in its own right, S23 a tendency 
that has been reactivated by the advent of new technologies that fit imper-
fectly within the established framework of world intellectual property 
law. 524 
520. See supra notes 46, 367, 406-08 and accompanying text; Braun & Evrard, La /oi 
uniforme Benelux surles dessins et modeles, 52 R.I.D.A. lOt, 118-20 (1975) (criticizing 
"nostalgics of the copyright approach" for attempting to undermine the Uniform Bene-
lux Designs Law of 1975). 
521. See supra note 502, infra note 522; Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 50, at 
794-95 (citing authorities). 
522. In the Netherlands, for example, heavy-handed judicial recourse to the misappropria-
tion branch of unfair competition law, coupled with pressures from abroad, finally con-
vinced the authorities to enact the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, supra note 4, which 
took effect in 1975. See, e.g., Braun & Evrard, supra note 520, at" 101-22; von 
Nieuwenhoven Helbach, Design Protection and Parent Law, Trade11Ulrk Law, and the 
Law of Article 1401 Civil Code, in Benelux and DUlCh Law, in DEsIGN PRcm:cnON, 
supra note 8, at 5-7, 12-18. The Benelux design law attempts to limit concurrent pro-
tection in trademark and unfair competition law. See, e.g., ill. at 15 (discussing Uni-
form Benelux Designs Law, supra note 4, art. 14(5». Whether this effort has suc-
ceeded is doubtful. See, e.g., Rose, Passing Off, Unfair Competition and Community 
Law, 12 E.I.P.R. 123, 126 (1990). In contrast, Italy, which takes its design law seri-
ously, has been little inclined to recognize slavish imitation of unprotected designs as 
unfair competition. See, e.g., Franzosi, The Legal Protection of Industrial Design: 
Unfair Competition as a Basis of Protection, 12 E.I.P.R. 154, 156-57 (1990) [hereinafter 
Franzosi, Unfair Competition]. In Italy as elsewhere, however, there are strong coun-
tervailing pressures. See, e.g., Cuonzo, I limiti al principio di libera imitabilitd dei 
prodotti altrui al di fuori della privative industriali: verso la fine di un dog11Ul?, 38 
RlvlSTA DI DIRI'ITO INDuSTRIALE 190 (1989); Mangini, II morehio e gli auri segni 
distintivi in 5 TRATTATO DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE E DI DIRITTO PuBBLlCO 
DELL'EcoNOMIA 168-82 (F. Galgano ed. 1982). 
523. See, e.g., P.l. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 83-85, 89. 
524. See, e.g., Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 50, at 792-93 (discussing problems 
of protecting applied scientific know-how). Although the Federal Republic of Germany 
is said to resist this approach, see P.l. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 92-96, courts in 
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That similar pressures were mounting in the United States soon 
appeared from a number of federal appellate decisions in the 1970s.525 
These cases held that nonfunctional design features left unprotected by the 
Copyright Act of 1976 might qualify for protection under section 43(a) of 
the United States trademark law, known as the Lanham Act, which prohib-
ited "a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation" 
of goods or of "containers for goods. ,,526 
Only a decade or so earlier, the extension of section 43(a) to product 
simulation appeared illegal owing to constitutional limitations on the pro-
tection of unpatented, noncopyrightable product configurations set out in 
the Supreme Court's Sears-Compco decisions of 1964.521 Language in 
these opinions could be construed to prevent both state and federal courts 
from inhibiting the free imitation of any products not covered by statutory 
intellectual property laws,528 except in true cases of passing off: 529 By the 
that country have been using unfair competition law to protect computer programs. 
See, e.g., Lowenheim, Legal Protection for Computer Programs in West Germany, 4 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 187, 195, 198-200 (1989) (stating that "most cases to date have pro-
tected computer programs on the basis of unfair competition law rather than copyright 
law"). Moreover, article 5(c) of the new Swiss Unfair Competition Law may be viewed 
as a codified misappropriation law aimed at high technology. See, e.g., Probst, Protec-
tion of Integrated Circuits in Switzerland, 4 E.I.P.R. 108, 109-10 (1988); Reichman, 
Programs as Krww-How, supra note 23, at 666-67. For an endorsement of this general 
approach, see Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine: 
Cornman Law Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55 (1987). 
525. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 E2d 200 
(2d Cir. 1979); Truck Equip. Servs. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 E2d 1210 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 429 US. 861 (1976); Boston Professional Hockey Ass'n v. Dallas Cap & 
Emblem Mfg., Inc., 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cen. denied, 423 US. 99 (1975); see aLro 
Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 456 US. 844 (1982). See generally 1 IT. 
McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:25D (2d ed. 1984). 
526. Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427,441 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 
US.c. § 1125(a) (1988». Section 132 of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 
amended § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which now extends civil liability to: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any con-
tainer for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, 
or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or mis-
leading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which 
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as 
to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person. . . . 
15 US.C. § 11.25(a) (1988). The amended text attempts "to codify the interpretation 
... [§ 43(a)) has been given by the courts" because it "fills an important gap in federal 
unfair competition iaw." S. REP. No. 515, lOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 40-41 (1988). 
527. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
v. Stiffel Co., 376 US. 225 (1964). 
528. See, e.g., Compco, 376 US. at 237 ("To forbid copying would interfere with the federal 
policy, found in . . . the Constitution and in the implementing federal statutes, of 
allowing free access to copy whatever the federal patent and copyright laws leave in the 
public domain."); Sears, 376 US. at 231 ("An unpatentable article ... is in the public 
domain and may be made and sold by whoever chooses to do so."). Following these 
decisions, courts "were reluctant. . . to grant relief under state or federal law for prod-
uct imitation or trade dress infringement; many interpreted Sears and Compco as dis-
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1970s, however, some federal courts had begun to challenge this interpreta-
tion. S30 In their view, if a competitor seemed likely to confuse consumers 
about the source of a product by imitating nonfunctional design featuresS31 
that had acquired secondary meaning through use,532 the aggrieved pro-
ducer could invoke section 43(a)533 to combat one kind of "false designation 
of origin"S34 or simply to protect his unregistered trademark. S3S On either 
couraging any protection in this area." Note, The Problem of Functional Features: 
Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COWM. L. REV. 
77,82-83 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Trade Dress Infringement]; see also Brown, supra 
note 32, at 1349, 1384-86; Meyer, Misapplication of the Misappropriation Doctrine to 
Merchandising: A Reply to Professor Bauer, 35 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 69, 105 
& n.174 (1988) (arguing that use of § 43(a) to repress copying is inconsistent with 17 
US.c. § 301(a»; Nimetz, supra note 69, at 93-94 (giving a broad interpretation of 
Sears-Compco). 
529. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1359-60, 1383-86. Narrowly construed, the "pass-
ing off' doctrine protects the buying public against deception in regard to the source of 
offered products. See generally R.S. BROWN & R. DENICOLA, CASES ON CoPYRIGHT, 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND OTHER ToPICS BEARING ON THE PRarECTIoN OF LITERARY, 
MUSICAL, AND ARTISTIC WORKS 513-47 (5th ed. 1989) (distinguishing the business tort 
of passing off from that of misappropriation). 
530. See supra note 525. 
531. For the evolution of the nonfunctionality requirement, see infra text accompanying 
notes 572-633. 
532. ''The prime element of secondary meaning is a mental association in buyers' minds 
between the alleged mark and a single source of the product." 1 IT. McCARTHY, supra 
note 525, at 659; see also Pegram, The Scope of Industrial Design Protection Under 
Trademark and Unfair Competition Laws, 19 U BALT. L. REV. 333 (1989) (stressing that 
trademark law requires symbolization of the source, not the product as such). 
533. As thus interpreted, §§ 43(a) and 44 oUhe Lanham Act, whIch were further refined in 
the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, see supra note 526, implemented interna-
tional obligations that the United States had assumed at different times, including arti-
cles 10 and 10 bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, and 
these measures became available to both nationals and foreigners on equal footing. See 
15 US.c. § 1125(a) (1988); Paris Convention, supra note I, arts. 10, 10 bis; G. 
BODENHAUSEN, supra note 109, at 138-48; 3 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 1701-03 (noting 
that the vast body of federal case law "representing an effective set of rules against 
unfair business practice" was cut off by Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 US. 64 (1938»; 
see also Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of 
the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U L. REY. 1029, 1029-32 (1957). 
534. On its face, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, as codified in 1946, prohibited only false label-
ling and false ciesignations of origin in the geographical sense. See Lanham Act, ch. 
540, § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427, 441 (1946). By the 1970s, however, the federal appellate 
courts had converted § 43(a) into a nationally applicable federal law of unfair competi-
tion by interpreting "false designation of origin" to mean "false designation of manu-
facturer." See, e.g., Germain, Unfair Trade Practices Under Section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act, 43IND. L. REV. 84, 1l0-11 (1973). This made ittechnically possible to bring 
confusingly similar product designs and dress within its ambit. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 
515, IOOth Cong., 2d Sess. 40,49 (1988); Pegram, supra note 532, at 338. See gener-
ally Bauer, A Federal Law of Unfair Competition: What Shauld Be the Reach of Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act?, 31 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1984). 
535. See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541,1549 (Fed. Cir. 
1984) (claim that use of a patented design that had acquired secondary meaning 
through use constituted "a false designation of origin" was "inartfully pleaded," but 
court interpreted complaint as stating a claim that "the shape had become, in effect, its 
trademark," protectable against confusingly similar use under § 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, 15 US.C. § 1 1 25(a) (1988». 
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rationale, these courts avoided the preemptive sweep of Sears-Compco by 
stressing that federal policies concerning trademarks and unfair competition 
were rooted in the Commerce Clause and thus operated on a par with other 
federal policies implemented by the patent and copyright laws.s36 As resist-
ance to Sears-Compco mounted generally and the Supreme Court appeared 
to relax its strict antiprotectionist stance,S37 this view gained the ascend-
ancy.538 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, for example, had relied 
on section 43(a) in the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders decision of 1979, which 
protected decorative features of a football uniform against imitators who 
caused a likelihood of confusion as to the source or sponsorship of compet-
ing goods.539 In 1981, the Second Circuit returned to this theme on at least 
536. See, e.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964) ("If the 
design is not entitled to a design patent or other federal statutory protection, then it can 
be copied at will.") (emphasis supplied); cf. 17 U.S.c. § 301(d) (1988) (stating that 
other federal laws are not preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976); see also Pegram, 
supra note 532, at 337-38, 343-46; Bauer, supra note 534, at 685-90. On this view of 
the matter, if Congress disagreed with judicial perceptions of the interplay between 
these policies, it could directly regulate federal torts arising under § 43(a). See, e.g., I 
J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 525, § 7:26; supra note 526 (quoting Lanham Act § 43(a) 
as amended in 1988); see also Goldstein, The Competitive Mandate: From Sears to 
Lear, 59 CAUF. L. REV. 873-904 (197 I). 
537. That the tide was running against Sears-Compeo in this period is undisputed. See, e.g., 
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (holding contract to pay royal-
ties enforceable despite invalidation of corresponding patent); Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (finding state trade secret laws not preempted); 
Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (holding that state law giving copyright 
protection to sound recordings left unprotected by federal copyright law was not pre-
empted). See generally Wiley, Bonito Boats: Uninformed But Mandatory Innovation 
Policy, 1989 SUP. CT. REv. 283, 287-88 (1989). 
538. See, e.g., In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J., concur-
ring) (stating that "this court has adopted the position that each [federal] statute must 
be interpreted independently of the other ... and that no one of these [copyright, pat-
ent, and trademark] statutes affording protection to a design, preempts the other"); 
Bauer, supra note 534, at 685-91, 725 n.219, 728. See generally J. GILSON, TRADE-
MARK PRarF.cnON AND PRACTICE §§ 2.13(1), 2.13[5] (1988) (stating that "almost 
every judicial circuit in the United States has come to apply Section 43(a) in trade dress 
cases, and the trend shows no sign of abating. Sears and Compeo are almost never 
mentioned by the courts. They are, in fact, moribund."). But see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. 
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989); infra text accompanying notes 713-16. 
The extent to which state trademark and unfair competition laws can still prevent imita-
tion of the overall shape or configuration of a product, despite the Supreme Court's 
Sears-Compeo decisions in 1964, remained controversial. See, e.g., Gemveto Jewelry 
Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 800 F.2d 256 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (stressing the power of Sears-
Compeo to preclude state claims grounded in product simulation, except where the 
injunction was narrowly drawn to address "palming off' only); Brown, supra note 32, 
at 1374-83. But see H20 Swimwear, Ltd. v. Lomas, Nos. 40498, 40499, 40500 (N.Y. 
App. Div. Aug. 16, 1990) (finding noncopyrightable designs of swimwear not pre-
empted under state unfair competition law). 
539. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, lnc_ v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (affirming preliminary injunction and finding that combination of colors and 
collocation of decorations had become an unregistered trademark within § 43(a». 
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two occasions,540 notably in Warner Brothers, Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc.,541 
which dealt with the design of a toy automobile made famous in a national 
television series.542 Once again the court used section 43(a) to enjoin a 
competitor from marketing an unauthorized, look-alike version of the origi-
nal product, in part because it fostered a "likelihood of confusion as to the 
source or sponsorship" of the toy automobile543 and in part because the 
competitor should not be allowed to "reap where [it] had not sown."544 
Viewed strictly in the context of other federal unfair competition cases 
that emphasized a confusion or a deception rationale, the Warner Brothers 
decision of 1981545 constituted a remarkable example of judicial indiscre-
tion. By blurring the distinction between a design that identified a producer 
and a design that identified a product,546 for example, this opinion ignored 
any limitations that Sears-Compco might have placed on the protection of 
product configurations as such. 547 It also appealed boldly to the very mis-
appro~riation rationale, drawn from International News Service v. Associated 
Press, 48 that the Supreme Court had tried to suppress in 1964.549 
540. Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981); Harlequin Enters. Ltd. v. 
Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding cover design for series of 
novels protected by § 43(a». 
541. 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981) [hereinafter Warner Bros. I). 
542. Id. at 77-78. The court enjoined the use of certain nonfunctional distinctive symbols in 
the manufacture and sale of defendant's toy car, the "Dixie Racer." These included the 
bright orange color, the Confederate flag decal, door numerals, and the symbol "Gen-
eral Lee," placed upon a toy replica of a 1969 Dodge Charger as used in "The Dukes of 
Hazzard," a successful television show.ld. 
543. Id. at 79. 
544. Id. at 80. 
545. For a second decision in this case, see Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327 (2d 
Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Warner Bros. II] (discussing issue of functionality). 
546. The court cited several cases that it claimed had allowed § 43(a) "to encompass a broad 
spectrum of marks, symbols, design elements and characters" that the public associates 
with a "product" or a producer. Warner Bros. I, 658 F.2d at 76, 78. But the mental 
association necessary for secondary meaning must occur between a mark and a pro-
ducer. See supra note 532. The opinion also downplayed the power of proper labelling 
to dispel·any source confusion that might otherwise have arisen. See Warner Bros. I, 
658 F.2d at 78, 79. 
547. While the ability to protect nonfunctional design features that had acquired secondary 
meaning under Lanham Act § 43(a) was not seriously in doubt at this period, see supra 
notes 530-38 and accompanying text, the ability to protect the overall shape of a prod-
uct under § 43(a), even when it had acquired secondary meaning, remained controver-
sial owing to the express application of the Sears-Compeo decisions to product 
configurations. See, e.g., Petersen Mfg. Co. v. Central Purchasing, Inc., 740 F.2d 1541, 
1549-50 & n.1O (Fed. Cir. 1984) (recognizing the uncertain status of overall product 
shapes as trademarks under § 43(a) and looking to the law of the regional circuits in 
particular cases). 
548. 248 U.S. 215, 239 (1918) (only Supreme Court decision to suggest that slavish imita-
tion in itself might constitute the tort of "misappropriation"). 
549. This panel's open appeal to International News Service and its misappropriation ratio-
nale was manifestly too forthright to exert any lasting influence. See, e.g., Compeo, 
376 U.S. 234; Sears, 376 U.S. 225 (confirming thesis of Kellogg and rejecting quasi-
property interest in products of skilled efforts as such); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit 
Co., 305 U.S. III (1938) (rejecting broad misappropriation rationale of International 
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Apart from these unsettled constitutional issues, the first Warner Broth-
ers decision ignored a long-standing technical doctrine, known as aesthetic 
functionality, that might have compelled a different result. sso 
This doctrine, borrowed from the Ninth Circuit, had traditionally 
disqualified a distinctive or fanciful design from protection as a mark if its 
aesthetic qua~ities made that design "an important ingredient in the com-
mercial success of the product" itself. SSI When the Ninth Circuit appeared 
to retreat from its own doctrine of aesthetic functionality that very same 
year, S52 it became clear that two of the country's foremost intellectual prop-
erty tribunals had singled out the legality of product simulation under sec-
tion 43(a) as a means of relieving some of the pressure generated by the fail-
ure of Congress to enact a special design law in 1976. 
a. Product Configurations as Pseudo Trade Dress 
These portents were confirmed in 1983 when the Court of Appeals for 
News Service). See generally Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy 
of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 428-29 
(1983); Note, Developments in the Law: Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 
932-37 (1964) [hereinafter Note, Competitive Torts) (casting misappropriation as a 
residual doctrine of unfair competition law devised to protect intangibles in the absence 
of statutory relieO. Since both Sears-Compco and § 30 I of the Copyright Act of 1916 
had narrowed the misappropriation doctrine as an unwarranted interference with free 
competition, see supra notes 528-29, infra note 565 and accompanying text, it followed 
that "[t)o imitate and copy another's goods is not a legal wrong unless the victim of 
copying has a legal right that has been invaded." Brown, supra note 32, at 1357-58; 
see also P.l. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 73, 100-09, 113-17; Abrams, Copyright, 
Misappropriation, and Preemption: Constitutional and Statutory Limits of State Law 
Protection, 1983 SUP. CT. REV. 509, 509-15, 537-50, 575-81 (1983); Baird, supra note 
549, at 428-29. 
550. The aesthetic functionality doctrine created a presumption that ornamental designs of 
useful articles served to enhance the sales appeal of products and not to identify their 
producer at all. If so, they remained legally "functional" and thereby unprotectable in 
trademark and unfair competition law even though they lacked the attributes of utilitar-
ian functionality and had acquired secondary meaning. See, e.g., Pagliero v. Wallace 
China Co" 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); Brown, supra note 32, at 1367-68. See 
generally Duft, "Aesthetic" Functionality, 73 TRADEMARK REP., 151, 151-53, 167-203 
(1983); Oddi, The Functions of "Functionality" in Trademark Law, 22 Hous. L. REV. 
925, 931-33, 951-63 (1985). The doctrine of aesthetic functionality thus reinforces the 
competitive balance entrusted to the design patent and copyright laws, whose terms of 
duration are constitutionally limited in time. See, e.g., Duft, supra note 550, at 151 
(citing cases). A parallel 'exists between the exclusion of industrial designs from trade-
mark and unfair competition law by dint of their aesthetic functionality and the exclu-
sion of similar designs from copyright law due to the separability doctrine after 1958. 
551. See, e.g., International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 
(9th Cir. 1980), cerro denied, 452 U.S. 941 (1981); Pagliero, 198 F.2d at 343 (holding 
floral designs on tableware functional because they "satisf[y) a demand for the aes-
thetic as well as for the utilitarian," and stating that public interest requires free compe-
tition in regard to unpatentable design features that are "an important ingredient in the 
commercial success of the product" (citing RESTATEMENT OF ToKJ'S § 742 (1938»; see 
also supra note 550. 
552. See Vuitton et Fils S.A. V. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981) (narrow-
ing Pagliero); see also Fabrica, Inc. V. EI Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983); 
infra notes 553-71. 
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the Ninth Circuit handed down Fabrica. Inc. v. El Dorado Corp.553 
Initially, this decision held that the design of a folder used to display samples 
of carpeting fabrics was inseparable from the utilitarian article embodying 
it and therefore ineligible for copyright protection.554 In this respect, the 
Ninth Circuit belatedly endorsed the restrictive interpretation of separability 
that both the District of Columbia Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit had 
approved.555 With this task accomplished, however, the panel proceeded to 
find that the noncopyrightable design of the folder amounted to protectable 
trade dress within. section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 5S6 
That section 43(a) covered unregistered trade dress was, by 1983, 
unexceptionable in itself. 557 In the past, however, the Ninth Circuit had 
taken pains to distinguish between an article of commerce, which could be 
freely imitated, and the package in which the article was marketed, which 
could not. 558 The design of the folder at issue in Fabrica served both as a 
package, in that it displayed the plaintiff's carpet samples to the public, and 
as a product, in that any other carpet company could use a similar folder to 
display its own .carpet samples to its own customers. Because the defendant 
had imitated the folder in conjunction with its own carpet samples, the liti-
gation arguably concerned the configuration of a product rather than a pack-
age in the conventional sense of the term. SS9 
The panel nonetheless decided that the overall design of the folder con-
stituted a form of trade dress, which a competitor could not copy without 
confusing consumers about the source of the carpet itself.560 This and sim-
ilar decisions thus began to stretch the notion of trade dress to the point 
where prior distinctions between "package" or "container" and "product 
configuration" became blurred and hardly worth defending. 561 
553. 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983). 
554. [d. at 892·94 (denying copyright protection to the three-dimensional design of a display 
folder because it contained no features that could "be separated out" or that could "exist 
independently oftheir utilitarian features"). 
555. [d. at 892·94; see supra notes 369-74 and accompanying text. 
556. Fabrica, 697 F.2d at 892. 
557. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1358. 
558. See, e.g., Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 557 (9th 
Cir. 1960) (quoting Tas-T-Nut Co. v. Variety Nut & Date Co., 245 F.2d 3, 6-7 (6th Cir. 
1957», cited in Fabrica, 697 F.2d at 895. 
559. The defendant tried valiantly to make this point, arguing that "the carpet sample fold-
ers are not really trade dress, but constitute products in and of themselves." Fabrica, 
697 F.2d at 895. But the court confused the issue by talking about the effect of the 
folder design on consumers of carpets rather than on carpet manufacturers who com-
prised the market for carpet display folders as such. [d. 
560. [d. at 895 (stating that the display folders are advertising materials that "aid consumers 
in selecting the actual product-the carpeting"); see supra note 559. Query, how con-
sumers would be confused about the source of the carpeting if another firm displayed 
its own carpet samples, clearly marked with its own brand name and symbols, in a 
comparable display folder whose secondary meaning was never mentioned in the opin-
ion? 
561. See, e.g., J. GILSON, supra note 538, § 7.02[3](a] (stating that the distinction is no 
longer material); Brown, supra note 32, at 1358 (criticizing such a move). 
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Assimilatin~ product configurations to trade dress,562 although analyti-
cally strained,56 yielded two technical advantages. First, it reduced ten-
sions with positive intellectual. property law because section 43(a) applied 
expressly to "containers for goods." Indeed, most courts and commentators 
now believed that the protection of trade dress under section 43(a) would not 
conflict with either Sears-Compco564 or section 301(a) of the Copyright Act 
of 1976.565 
562. "Most trade dress infringement actions involve the packaging or labeling of goods. 
Recently, however, courts have recognized that the design of a product itself may con-
stitute protectable trade dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act." John H. Harland Co. 
v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966,980 (11th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted) (holding 
noncopyrightable design of bank checks to be protectable trade dress under § 43(a». 
The first case to adopt this tactic for this purpose was reportedly Truck Equip. Servo Co. 
v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding exterior design of semi-trailer 
truck to be trade dress protectable against copying under Lanham Act § 43(a», een. 
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976); see also 1 J. GILSON, supra note 538, § 7.02[2)[a); id. 
§ 2.13[1) (noting that federal unfair competition law under § 43(a) has "supplanted" 
the protection of product configurations and of "overall trade dress" in state common 
law); Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, at 77,79,82-83. 
563. If the product comes in a package or container and its configuration is also viewed as 
trade dress, then every product has at least two trade dresses as a result of this 
approach. More to the point, the tactic undermines any statutory design protection 
scheme in force. See infra notes 72545 and accompanying text. 
564. See supra note 562. The Sears opinion had declared that state unfair competition law 
could continue to protect "distinctive dress in the packaging of goods." Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 US. 225, 232 (1964). States could also require adequate 
labeling to prevent source confusion. Id. The Compeo opinion had recognized that 
"other federal statutory protection" remained concurrently applicable. Compeo Corp. 
v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 US. 234,238 (1964). If state laws could still regulate 
trade dress and if other federal statutory havens were not precluded, then protecting 
commercial designs as trade dress was arguably not inconsistent with Sears-Compeo. 
See, e.g., SK&F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 
1065-66 (3d Cir. 1980); Truck Equip., 536 F.2d 1210; Note, Trade Dress Infringement, 
supra note 528, at 82-85. See generally Dratler, Trademark Protection for Industrial 
Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 887,916-37 (1988); Schuman, Trademark Protection of 
Container and Package Conjigurations-A Primer, 59 CHI. [-)KENT L. REV. 779, 790-92 
(1983). But see Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32 (apparently limiting the confusion rationale 
as a basis for "an injunction against ... copying that which the federal patent laws per-
mit to be copied," and stressing that "[s]haring in the goodwill of an article unpr<>-
tected by patent or trademark is the exercise of a right protected by all"); Kellogg Co. v. 
National Biscuit Co., 305 US. 111, 122 (1938) (a major precedent in pre-Erie, federal 
unfair competition law). For the view that the trademark and unfair competition laws, 
state or federal, are not to disrupt the federal intellectual property scheme by affording 
protection against copying to subject matter that Congress has declined to protect, see, 
e.g., Meyer, supra note 528, at 105; ef. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 
489 U.S. 141 (1989). 
565. In principle, the separability test of copyright law, see supra notes 20-21 and accompa- . 
nying text, was perfected in § 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act, which codified basic 
premises of the Sears-Compeo decisions. See 17 US.C. § 301 (1988). Section 301 
arguably preempted the protection of noncopyrightable industrial designs under state 
unfair competition laws sounding in misappropriation as such. See, e.g., Gemveto Jew-
elry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 800 F.2d 256 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Durham Indus., Inc. v. 
Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1980) (preempting state unfair competition claim 
where copyright claim on same design was invalidated for lack of originality); ef. John 
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Second, not even ardent judicial partisans of aesthetic functionality, 
such as the Ninth Circuit,566 had ever applied this doctrine to packaging or 
true trade dress,567 because consumers did not buy packages for their own 
sake.568 By insisting that the display folder at issue in Fabrica was trade 
dress and not a product configuration, the panel hinted that it did not need to 
invoke aesthetic functionality at all.569 Lest critics object that it had 
wrongly distinguished trade dress from trademarks on the facts of this case, 
moreover, the panel stated its belief that the Ninth Circuit was unlikely to 
apply aesthetic functionality even to product configurations in the future 
because this doctrine no longer served any useful purpose. 570 
By treating a product configuration as pseudo trade dress, in other 
words, this and other federal appellate courts" I had quite deliberately 
begun to transform the very three-dimensional designs of useful articles 
that the Copyright Act of 1976 had banished to the public domain into 
unregistered trademarks protectable in perpetuity under an evolving federal 
law of unfair competition. 
H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc .• 503 F. Supp. 146 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that 
state laws of unfair competition were not preempted by § 301 where they required 
proof of nonequivalent rights ~ounding in the confusion or deception rationales). aff'd 
on other grounds. 111 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1983). See generally 2 P. GOLDSTEIN. supra 
note 28. at 411-502, 553-62. 513-85; Abrams. supra note 549. at 531-66. However. 
§ 301(d) of the 1916 Act expressly exempted "any rights or remedies under any other 
Federal statute" from the preemptive sweep of § 301(a). Federal rights legitimately 
arising under Lanham Act § 43(a) are therefore not preempted by § 301 (a) of the copy-
right law or by the residual impact of Sears-Compco unless there is some inherent 
conflict between the two equally valid federal statutes that requires reconciliation. See. 
e.g .• Meyer. supra note 528. at 105 & n.114 (arguing that "[i]mporting the misappropri-
ation doctrine into § 43(a) frustrates the stated purpose of the preemption statute. . . 
by threatening to create a parallel system of rights equivalent to copyright"). 
566. See. e.g .• International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912.911 
(9th Cir. 1980); Pagliero v. Wallace China Co .• 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); supra note 
550. But see Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters .• Inc .• 644 F.2d 169.113 (9th Cir. 
1981) (declining to apply aesthetic functionality bar to distinctive and decorative 
designs of luggage and handbags). 
561. "[T]his court has specifically limited application of the Pagliero functionality test to 
product features and has refused to apply tbe test to cases involving trade dress and 
packaging." Fabrica. 691 F.2d at 895 (citing Audio Fidelity. Inc. v. High Fidelity 
Recordings, Inc .• 283 F.2d 551 (1960». 
568. See. e.g., Duft. supra notc 550. at 191-92 (stressing that "in the case of product design, 
the potential exists for an absolute prohibition against copying and manufacturing . . . 
a particular good formed in a particular way"). 
569. Fabrica. 691 F.2d at 895-96. 
510. ''This court ... bas specifically rejected the notion that a design feature is functional 
by definition if it increased appeal and sales of the product." [d. at 896 (citing Vuitton 
et Fils. 644 F.2d 169). That aesthetic functionality had ceased to interest the Ninth Cir-
cuit was confirmed expressly in a subsequent decision. See First Brand Corp. v. Fred 
Meyer. Inc .• 809 F.2d 1318. 1382 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (dictum); see also infra text 
accompanying notes 608-33. It followed that only the utilitarian functionality test 
could henceforth disqualify design features that otherwise met the requirements of 
§ 43(a) regardless of whether these features pertained to a product or to the trade dress 
of a product. See Fabrica. 691 F.2d at 896. 
511. See supra notes 540-50. 562. 
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b. A Revisionist View of Utilitarian Functionality 
Meanwhile, in a series of decisions that continued up to its demise in 
1982,572 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) had been mak-
ing it harder for the Patent and Trademark Office to invoke utilitarian func-
tionality as grounds for refusing to register three-dimensional product and 
container designs as trademarks573 on the Principal and Supplementary 
Registers. 574 Nonfunctionality became the chief obstacle to actual registra-
tion575 once product and container designs had qualified as eligible subject 
matter in the period 1958 to 1964.576 
Historically, the nonfunctionality requirement excluded candidate 
marks that served a mechanical purpose577 or that otherwise contributed to 
the efficiency, utility, or aesthetic commercialization of a product,578 
regardless of any secondary meaning such marks may have acquired or of 
their inherent distinctiveness. 579 Nonfunctionality thus prevented trade-
572. See supra note 141 (noting that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit replaced 
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals after September 30,1982). 
573. See, e.g., In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Pent-
house Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682 (C.C.P.A. 1977); In re World's Finest Chocolate, 
Inc., 474 F.2d 1012, 1014 (C.C.P.A. 1973); In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 
925,933 (C.c.P.A. 1964) (Rich, 1, concurring); see also In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 
F.2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 
1961). See generally Oddi, supra note 550, at 933-51. 
574. "Registration on the Federal Principal Register requires either that the mark is arbi-
trary or inherently distinctive, or . . . it must be proven to have acquired secondary 
meaning." Schuman, supra note 564, at 791. Inscription in the Supplemental Register 
allowed the symbol to become a registered trademark if it later acquired secondary 
meaning. For the benefits of registration on either Register, see id. at 794-96. 
575. See, e.g., In re Honeywell,lnc., 532 F.2d 180, 182 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (denying registration 
of thermostat design as most utilitarian of a limited number of available designs); 
Oddi, supra note 550, at 940 n.95 (citing cases). 
576. The eligibility of container configurations for federal trademark protection was not 
established until 1958. See, e.g., In re Kotzin, 276 F.2d 411,414 (C.C.P.A. 1960); Ex 
parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., 118 US.P.Q. (BNA) 229 (Comm'r Pat. 1958); Schuman, supra 
note 564, at 797; see also In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1967) 
(holding design of wine decanter not unregisterable despite expiration of design patent, 
Sears-Compeo notwithstanding). A proprietor's right to register product configurations 
was not confirmed until 1964. See, e.g., In re Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 
836 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (authorizing registration on Supplemental Register of triangular 
shaped chemical cake if applicant showed distinctiveness or potential secondary mean-
ing, unless PTO proved overriding utilitarian functionality); see also Deister Concen-
trator, 289 F.2d 496. See generally Oddi, supra note 550, at 933-38. The theory that 
product and container configurations could be registered as trademarks on the Federal 
Principal Register turned on their ability to denote either the source of the goods in the 
container or the source of the product itself. "That is, the shape of the product is a 
trademark for its own source." I J.T. McCARTHY, supra note 525, § 7:31, at 263. 
577. See, e.g., Ex parte Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 US.P.Q. (BNA) 74 (Pat. Off. 
Examiner-in-Chief 1952); Nimetz, supra note 69, at 88-90; if. Kellogg Co. v. National 
Biscuit Co., 305 US. Ill, 120 (1938) .. 
578. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 comment a (1938) (subdividing functionality 
into "efficiency," "utility" and "aesthetic" factors); Oddi, supra note 550, at 931 
(observing that judicial recognition of the "aesthetic" variant remained controversial); 
see also Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, at 80-90. 
579. See, e.g., Oddi, supra note 550, at 928; Brown, supra note 32, at 1361 n.91 (criticizing 
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mark and unfair competition laws, whether state or federal, from undermin-
ing the patent system and from hindering free competition,580 policies that 
acquired constitutional underpinnings in the Sears-Compeo decisions of 
1964.58 ! However, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals believed that 
nonfunctionaIity as traditionally interpreted overemphasized a competitor's 
right to copy at the expense of a producer's right "to protect ... [his] 
method of trade identification" and of the public interest in stimulating 
product differentiation. 582 
As the C.C.P'A. explained in its Morton-Norwich decision of 1982,583 
most three-dimensional configurations would necessarily affect the per-
formance or efficiency of the products embodying them merely because of 
their utilitarian nature.584 Yet, registering these configurations as marks 
would seldom hinder competition in practice if courts took pains to separate 
source-identiftng features from the functional components of the products 
in question. 58 This conclusion followed from the premise that the number 
of arbitrary design features capable of source identification-despite some 
incidental functional attributes-was large, while the number of critically 
functional features also capable of source identification was small. 586 To 
Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, for implying that proof of secondary 
meaning might overcome a valid functionality defense). 
580. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraftex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 824 (3d Cir. 1981); Deister 
Concentrator, 289 F.2d at 504; Duft, supra note 550, at 145-55 (linking doctrine of util-
itarian nonfunctionality with attempts to protect designs of useful articles, and stating 
that the doctrine ensures that competitors would not be "forever precluded from '[shar-
ing] in the benefits of unpatented utilities' "). In all cases, according to the RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS § 742 (1938), the test of functionality turned on "whether prohibition of 
imitation by others will deprive the others of something which will substantially hinder 
them in competition." Id. 
581. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1361; Oddi, supra note 550, at 938. 
582. In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1337 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (stressing that 
fundamental right to compete gives way to protection of "established symbol of trade 
identification"); ill. at 1340 (affirming need to "strike a balance" between these goals); 
ill. at 1339 (insisting that public policy is "not the right to slavishly copy articles . . . 
not protected by patent or copyright. but the need to copy those articles which is ... 
the right to compete effectively") (emphasis in original); see also In re Minnesota Min-
ing & Mfg. Co., 335 F.2d 836 (C.C.P.A. 1964); In re Deister Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 
496. 503 (C.C.P.A. 1961); Note, Trade Dress Infringement. supra note 528, at 88 
(finding that legislative history viewed major purpose of Lanham Act to be that of "pro-
moting product distinguishability"). 
583. 671 F.2d 1332 (C.C.P.A. 1982). 
584. See. e.g., ill. at 1338-39 (emphasizing that the issue for trademark protection is "not 
... [the] mere existence of utility ... but [the] degree of design utility") (emphasis in 
original); see also Deister Concentrator, 289 F.2d at 502 (stating that "mere possession 
of a function (utility) is not sufficient reason to deny protection"). 
585. See, e.g., Morton-Norwich. 671 F.2d at 1338, 1340-41 (stating that functionality in this 
context always refers "to the design of the thing under consideration (in the sense of its 
appearance) and not the thing itselJ," adding that "the effect upon competition 'is really 
the crux of the matter' ") (emphasis in original). 
586. See, e.g., ill. at 1342; Deister Concentrator, 289 F.2d at 503 (distinguishing between 
"functional shapes that are never capable of being monopolized. even if they become 
'distinctive of the applicant's goods: and shapes which can be monopolized because 
they are of such an arbitrary nature that the law does not recognize a right in the public 
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allow competitors to copy design teatures that had acquired secondary 
meaning, perhaps as the result of costly advertising campaigns, because 
they contributed to the utility or efficiency of a product without more thus 
converted nonfunctionality into a formula that encouraged consumer confu-
sion and the appropriation of unearned good will to boot. 587 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals accordingly began to distin-
guish between package and product designs that were descriptively or "de 
. facto functional" in that they pertained to useful articles and those deemed 
"de jure functional," which would not be allowed to register even if capable 
of source identification. 588 To establish legal or de jure functionality, it 
would not suffice that the design component, viewed in isolation, contrib-
uted to the efficiency of the underlying product or affected its utility, or even 
that the number of alternative shapes available to competitors was relatively 
limited.589 Rather, the court proposed to disqualify an otherwise eligible 
design only if, viewed as a whole, it was demonstrably "superior in function 
. . . or economy of manufacture" and for this reason had to be copied as a 
competitive fact of life. 590 If, in sum, a source-identifying product 
configuration or package did not amount to "the best or one of a few supe-
rior designs available," the C.C.P.A. would not allow the trademark authori-
ties to deny it registration without evidence that the maintenance of effective 
competition in a given product area required a higher standard of nonfunc-
tionality.59t 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals thus favored a nonfunc-
tionality doctrine for purposes of trademark law that resembled the nonfunc-
to copy them. even if some incidental function is associated with them"). The hard 
cases fell in between these two poles. See Pegram, supra note 532. at 339-40. 
587. See Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1342-43 ("If the functions of appellant's boule can be 
performed equally well by containers of innumerable designs and. thus, no one is 
injured in competition. why did the board state that appellant's design is functional and 
for that reason not registrable?") (emphasis in original); supra note 586; see also Duft. 
supra note 550, at 158 (stressing twin evils of increasing consumer confusion and 
allowing unnecessary "infringing upon [a design] owner's trade"); cf. Truck Equip. 
Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1976)(ciled with approvalin 
Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1339). But see Brown, supra note 32, at 1361 & n.9O, 
(criticizing Truck Equip. for its reliance in part on a misappropriation rationale). 
588. See Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1337. But see Brown, supra note 32. at 1369 n.126 
(criticizing this distinction as unhelpful jargon). 
589. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1338-43. 
590. Id. at 1338-39, 1341; see also Duft. supra note 550, at 158; Oddi, supra note 550. at 
941-42. 
591. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1339-41 ("superiority of design" test rests upon the 
"essential to effective competition" foundation, citing Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby 
Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 643 (2d Cir. 1979»; see also Pegram, supra note 532, at 342 
(stating that "the effect on competition issue was viewed by the court as the crux of its 
analysis"). The Morton-Norwich court acknowledged the continued relevance of 
assessing whether the design "was created primarily with an eye toward the utility of 
the article" or primarily for source identification. when evaluating the lack of distinc-
tiveness in relation to functionality. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1343 (emphasis in 
original). But a "nondistinctive design does not necessarily equal a 'functional' 
design," id. at 1343, and the functionality bar nonetheless requires a finding that the 
design be "functionally or economically superior." Id. at 1342. 
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tionality standard that the Court of Ap~als for the Federal Circuit would 
later introduce into design patent law.5 2 ]0 either case, a plaintiff could 
parry the charge that his design was "dictated by function"593 by recourse to 
a "multiplicity of forms" test that allowed him to prove that the defendant 
could compete effectively without imitating the protected form. 594 As 
applied to the facts in the Morton-Norwich case of 1982,595 this approach 
recognized that a product or container design could indicate the source of 
manufacture while contributing to the utility of the underlying product,596 
much as a patentable ornamental design could imETOve the appearance of an 
article whose utility it simultaneously enhanced. 97 . 
In effect, the revisionist test of utilitarian functionality formulated in 
Morton-Norwich, coupled with a disdain for the aesthetic functionality doc-
trine also manifested in 1982,598 meant that the c.c.P.A. had narrowed the 
general requirement of nonfunctionality governing the registration of all 
product and container configurations599 without even mentioning the Sears-
Compeo decisions of 1964.600 It followed that "the more functionality 
592. See supra text accompanying notes 269-302. 
593. See supra note 591; Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1342 (stating that, while "the overall 
composite design comprising both bottle and spray top . . . must be accommodated to 
the functions performed, we see no evidence that it was dictated by them and resulted 
in a functionally or economically superior design of such a container") (emphasis in 
original); see also Duft, supra note 550, at 158 n.28 (stating that "dictated by func-
tional considerations" has to mean that "the design must be the way it is lest its superi-
ority (in utility or economy of manufacture) be diminished"). 
594. See, e.g., Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d at 1342-43 (finding that competitors "had no need 
to simulate appellant's trade dress, in whole or in part, in order to enjoy all of thefunc-
tionai aspects of a spray top container"); supra note 587. For the "multiplicity of 
forms" test in United States design patent law after 1982, see supra notes 269-302 and 
accompanying text. 
595. Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d 1332 (holding that registration of a container configuration 
for a plastic spray bottle was not barred by the functionality rule, despite existence of a 
design patent on the same configuration and of a utility patent on the spray mechanism, 
and remanding for determination of distinctiveness or secondary meaning). 
596. See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 532, at 341 (noting that the design at issue fell "in the 
middle of the range between one entirely determined by function. . . and an arbitrary 
one"). 
597. See supra text accompanying notes 280-302. . 
598. See In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 E2d 1042 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (declining to apply broad aes-
thetic functionality dudrine to two-dimensional configurations of dolls); Oddi, supra 
note 550, at 949-53. 
599. See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 532, at 341-42 (stating that Morton-Norwich "clarified 
. . . and appeared to liberalize" the "law applicable to registration of product 
configurations," although the case "involved the shape of a spray container used for 
cleansers"). The court repeatedly stressed the extent to which its formula applied to 
both container and product configurations. See Monon-Norwich, 671 E2d at 1337-38, 
1342. At the outset of the opinion, however, there is a curious disclaimer "that this is 
not a 'configuration of goods case." Id. at 1336 (emphasis in original). Whatever dis-
tinction the court initially had in mind was thus lost in its general doctrinal reformula-
tion, even though the new formula might be applied differently on a different set of 
facts. 
600. See supra notes 562-65 and accompanying text. But cf DC Comics, 689 E2d at 
1052-53 (Nies, J., concurring) (discussing the interrelatedness of federal trademark, 
patent, and copyright laws pertaining to designs of useful articles). 
94 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
could be circumscribed, the more design features would be nonfunctional 
and protectable. ,,6()l The formula adopted by Judge Rich in Morton-Nor-
wich thus invited the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which took 
office a few months later,602 to permit registration of numerous three-di-
mensional configurations that would have failed the utilitarian functionality 
test only a decade or so earlier. 603 
Ironically, the Federal Circuit has shied away from implementing the 
broadest implications of Morton-Norwich,604 and in a prophetic aside, it 
warned that the Supreme Court had never rescinded the application of Sears-
Compco to three-dimensional designs of useful articles. 60S Outside the 
Federal Circuit, however, the c.c.P.A.'s pioneer decision concerning regis-
tered marks in 1982606 profoundly influenced other federal appellate courts 
to relax the few remaining doctrinal barriers still limiting the protection of 
package and product designs as unregistered trademarks under section 43(a) 
of the Lanham Act. 607 
601. Brown, supra note 32, at 1361. The Supreme Court, in dictum, provided another 
definition of functionality that same year: "In general terms, a product feature is func-
tional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or qual-
ity of the article." Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 US. 844, 
850 n.lO (1982). But the Court did not resolve the functionality issue before it, another 
definition in a concurring opinion was quite different, and the dictum in Inwood Lobo-
ralories was but "one of several competing views of the meaning of functionality." 
Brown, supra note 32, at 1361-62. 
602. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
60). Compare, e.g .• In re Honeywell, Inc., 532 F.2d 180 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (denying application 
to register the configuration of a round thermostat cover as a trademark on grounds of 
functionality and noting that thermostat was covered by expired design patent plus two 
utility patents) with In re Honeywell, Inc., 8 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1600 (PTO Trademark 
Tr. & App. Bd. 1988) (reversing examiner's decision to deny registration to slightly dif-
ferent configuration of thermostat cover, despite limited number of alternative designs, 
because examiner had not demonstrated de jure functionality under Morton-Norwich); 
see also In re Bose Corp., 772 F.2d 866,872 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Pegram, supra note 532, 
at 341-44; Oddi, supra note 550, at 943 (citing cases). 
604. See. e.g., Power Controls Corp. v. Hybrinetics, Inc., 806 F.2d 234 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(holding clam shell package for dimmer switch functional for purposes of Lanham Act 
§ 43(a»; Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(holding loudspeaker enclosure functional for purposes of § 43(a»; see also Textron, 
Inc. v. United Stales Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re 
Teledyne Indus., Inc .• 696 F.2d 968 (Fed. Cir. 1982). But see Black & Decker, Inc. v. 
Hoover Serv. Center, 886 F.2d 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that lower court erred in 
finding wedge-shaped bowl of vacuum cleaner functional under § 43(a) without evalu-
ating defendant's ability to compete using other forms and without evidence of 
confusion). As regards unregistered marks that happen to reach the Federal Circuit in 
connection with mailers exclusively within its jurisdiction, the court formally applied 
the law of the circuit in which the case arose. 
605. See Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1984). For the 
fulfillment of the court's premonitions concerning Sears-Compco, see Bonito Boats, 
Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 US. 141 (1989); infra text accompanying notes 
713-24. 
606. See supra notes 598-603. 
607. See infra text accompanying notes 608-705. 
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c. Eclipse of the Aesthetic Functionality Doctrine 
The more that the Morton-Norwich view of utilitarian functionality 
seduced other circuits applying section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, the more 
these courts balked at the idea of penalizing commercially successful 
appearance designs for their aesthetic functionality.608 If the relaxed test of 
utilitarian functionality applied without regard to commercial success, few 
package or product designs that had acquired secondary meaning would 
ever look so technically or economically superior as to necessitate copying 
for competitive purposes.609 Yet, critics of aesthetic functionality posited 
that the pool of appearance designs capable of indicating origin was poten-
tially unlimited, whereas the corresponding pool of technically proficient 
designs also capable of source identification was not. ~1O To allow the broad 
aesthetic functionality doctrine to exclude most commercially successful 
appearance designs while courts implementing the revisionist view of utili-
tarian functionality no longer disqualified even technically significant 
designs thus appeared to yield a paradoxical result. It afforded greater def-
erence to the border between trademark and design patent law than to the 
economically more important border separating trademarks from utility pat-
ents.611 
Such reasoning tends, however, to obscure the different policies under-
lying utilitarian and aesthetic functionality by overemphasizing the notion 
of "functionality" as their common denominator. A lowering of the utilitar-
ian functionality barrier has no necessary or logical bearing on the height of 
the aesthetic functionality barrier so long as commercial success adversely 
affects both highly functional and not very functional product 
configurations on the same independent grounds. Those who think com-, 
mercial success irrelevant then ignore the competitive mandate underlying 
the congressional decision not to afford sui generis protection to industrial 
designs in 1976,612 as if the federal trademark and unfair competition laws 
constituted a world apart. 
Perhaps to cover this nakedness, courts and commentators seeking to 
justify a protectionist bent now discovered that the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine had led all along to a socially undesirable result. The more that 
608. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983) IWarner 
Bros. II} (approving Morton-Norwich view of utilitarian functionality and declining to 
apply aesthetic functionality bar); infra notes 610, 613-30 and accompanying text; see 
also Dratler, supra note 564, at 941. 
609. See supra notes 588-603 and accompanying text. 
610. See, e.g., Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417,429 (5th Cir. 1984); John J. 
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 982-83 n.27 (11th Cir. 1983); Duft, 
supra note 550, at 181, 202. 
611. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 564, at 941 (identifying aesthetic functionality as inade-
quate attempt to mediate tension between design patent law and trademark law). 
612. See, e.g .• Bauer. supra Dote 534, at 725 n.219 (concluding that trademark law need not 
defer to patent law because the trademark law promotes creativity and investment!). But 
see Brown, supra note 32. at 1383-86; Meyer, supra note 528 (responding to Bauer). 
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ornamental designs stimulated sales of given products because consumers 
appreciated their aesthetic qualities, the less eligible they became for protec-
tion as unregistered marks. or dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
ACt.613 The aesthetic functionality doctrine thus discouraged investment in 
imaginative and attractive designs, to the detriment of the social environ-
ment and of the nation's industrial competitiveness.614 Conversely, if courts 
lowered this doctrinal barrier, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act could stimu-
late domestic industries to improve the eye appeal of their products,6lS 
which was "an important element in today's competitive economy.'t616 
By 1984, in short, it had become fashionable to tout the social benefits 
of rewarding design innovation for an unlimited period of time under the 
federal unfair competition law even though Congress had refused to grant 
short-term sui generis protection for that very purpose in 1976.617 In this 
climate, the Third, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits formed a united front 
in rejecting the aesthetic functionality doctrine as traditionally con-
ceived.618 In the Second Circuit, however, the status of this doctrine 
remained uncertain because two of its panels had reached opposite conclu-
sions in the period 1983 to 1984.619 The extent to which this prestigious 
court would protect commercially successful product configurations as 
unregistered marks only became clear in 1985, when the Second Circuit 
reexamined these issues in LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp.620 
613. See, e.g., Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 427-28; Keene Corp. v. Paraftex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 
825 (3d Cir. 1981); Duft, supra note 550, at 180-83,201-03. 
614. See, e.g., Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 428; In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042, 1051-52 
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, 1., concurring); infra text accompanying notes 621-33 (discuss-
ing LeSporisac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71,77 (2d Cir. 1985»; see also Note, 
Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, at 88-89; Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic 
Functionality, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 345,376 (1982) [hereinafter Note. Broad Sweep). 
615. See, e.g., Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 428 (stressing public interest in providin~ incentives for 
better appearance designs); Keene Corp., 653 F.2d at 825 (stating that "[i]t would be 
unfortunate were we to discourage use of a spark of originality which could transform 
an ordinary product into one of grace"); Schuman, supra note 564, at 803; Bauer, supra 
note 534, at 725 n.219 (stating that "in the long run prohibition of trademark copying 
will encourage creativity and investment in new products and product features") . 
. 616. Note, Broad Sweep, supra note 614, at 376 (cited in Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 428). 
617. For criticism of this phenomenon, see, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1358-62,1385-86; 
Meyer, supra note 528, at 101-12. 
618. See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 426-30; John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 
966,982-84 (11th Cit. 1983); Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890,895-96 
(9th Cit. 1983), discussed in supra text accompanying notes 553-71; Keene, 653 F.2d at 
825-26. 
619. Compare Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Ud., 725 F.2d 18, 
19-20 (2d Cit. 1984) (holding design of sofa unprotectable under Lanham Act § 43(a) 
because it contributed to commercial success of the product and thus violated aesthetic 
functionality doctrine) with Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 E2d 327,331 (2d Cir. 
1983) (holding design oftoy car identified with television series not barred by aesthetic 
functionality and approving nexus between narrow utilitarian functionality doctrine 
and narrow aesthetic functionality doctrine after Morton-Norwich). 
620. 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985) (affirming the grant of preliminary injunction against copy-
ing the overall design of lightweight luggage that qualified as unregistered mark and 
dress under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act). 
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In this opinion, a veteran panel reaffirmed the now prevalent theory 
that the overall design of a product, including its three-dimensional shape, 
could itself function as the packaging of that same product and thus qualify 
as "appearance trade dress.,,621 Once the "look" of any given product, 
viewed as a whole, had demonstrably acquired secondary meaning,622 sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act would therefore oblige producers of competing 
products to differentiate their own trade dress to avoid a likelihood of con-
sumer confusion.623 It followed that the defendant could not copy the over-
all designs of certain LeSportsac luggage for an indefinite period of time,624 
assuming the design had acquired secondary meaning,625 unless he proved 
that it failed to meet the requirements of either utilitarian or aesthetic non-
functionality.626 Because the luggage designs easily satisfied the revisionist 
test of utilitarian nonfunctionality that the Second Circuit had embraced in 
1983,627 the defendant had only the aesthetic functionality defense to fall 
621. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75 (case heard by Feinberg, Chief Judge; Kaufman, Circuit 
Judge; and Rosenn, Senior Judge, Third Circuit, sitting by designation); see supra notes 
553-71 and accompanying text. The panel approved previous Second Circuit decisions 
to this effect in Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981), see supra 
notes 541-51 and accompanying text, and Harlequin Enters. Ud. v. Gulf & Western 
Corp., 644 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1981). It also cited John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, 
Inc., 711 F.2d 966 (I IthCir. 1983). 
622. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75, 78 (stating that the purchasing public must associate the 
image of the product with a single producer or source "rather than just with the product 
itself"). The panel thus seemed to align the Second Circuit with those circuits that 
require evidence of secondary meaning for product configurations eligible under 
§ 43(a), as opposed to other circuits that will also protect both product configurations 
and packaging deemed to be inherently distinctive. See, e.g., J. GILSON, supra note 
538, §§ 7.02[21, 7.02(2)[c] (citing authorities); infra text accompanying notes 691-94. 
623. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75, 79. If the competitor merely copied a design that had 
already acquired secondary meaning, the trier of fact could infer a likelihood of confu-
sion without more. 
624. Unregistered trademark protection, once acquired, has no fixed duration, although it 
may be forfeited either through non-use for an extended period or because the mark 
ceases to function as a designation of origin and no longer distinguishes the goods from 
those of others. See, e.g., J. GILSON, supra note 538, §§ 1.03[11, 3.06. Although the 
notion that trademarks last forever is open to criticism, see In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 
F.2d 1042. 1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (Nies, J .• concurring). the fact remains that, under 
ordinary circumstances, this form of protection will deter imitation of the mark for the 
life of the product or so long as it remains of interest to competitors. This contrasts 
with intellectual property rights subjcct to US. CoNlloT. art. I. § 8 (allowing grants of 
exclusive rights for "limited times" only). 
625. See supra note 622. Since the appeal in LeSportsac questioned the grant of a prelimi-
narY'injunction, the case was remanded for trial on the merits as regards secondary 
meaning. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78. 
626. LeSportsac. 754 F.2d at 75-78. The Second Circuit thus sided with those courts that 
placed the burden of proving illicit functionality on the alleged infringer. See iii. at 76 
(accepting the thesis of Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528. at 87 n.78). 
627. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76-77 (quoting Warner Bros. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327. 
331 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332. 1342 (C.C.P.A. 
1982». The particular combination of design features was to be viewed as a whole and 
not disassembled into its component parts for purposes of the utilitarian functionality 
test. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76. Under this test, nothing prevented third parties from 
marketing suitably differentiated products of the same general type. Id. at 77. 
98 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
back upon, a defense that one panel of the Second Circuit had reaffirmed in' 
Industria Arredamenti Fratelli Saporiti v. Charles Craig, Lld.628 
By 1985, however, the Second Circuit had resolved no longer to deny 
trademark protection to unpatented, noncopyrightable product 
configurations merely because they constituted "an important ingredient in 
the commercial success of the product" or otherwise enhanced the "salabil-
ity of the goods.,,629 On the contrary, this panel emphatically joined the 
chorus of courts and commentators that had repudiated aesthetic functional-
ity as an unwarranted disincentive to the development of imaginative and 
attractive designs.63o 
Formally, to be sure, the LeSportsac opinion reserved the "important 
ingredient" test for cases in which the alleged infringer might still prove that 
the design in question was "primarily functional" even in the aesthetic 
sense. 63 I In principle, this allowed the defendant some opportunity, on 
remand, to show that consumers bought the luggage at issue principally 
because they found its overall design aesthetically pleasing, and that the 
. capacity of the design to identify some of the goods left them indifferent. 632 
In reality, later decisions confirmed that the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, in the LeSportsac decision of 1985, had "weakened if not elimi-
nated" the last doctrinal barrier that prevented the transformation of section 
43(a) into a judge-made design protection law. 633 
2. The Most Protectionist Design Law of Them All 
The magnitude of the changing judicial approach that LeSportsac con-
secrated becomes clear when one contrasts its bold thesis with the doctrinal 
constraints courts had thought they labored under only a few years earlier. 
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
628. 725 E2d 18 (2d Cir. 1984). 
629. LeSporlsac, 754 E2d at 77-78. 
630. Id. at 77 (quoting Keene Corp. v. Paraftex Indus., Inc., 653 E2d 822,825 (3d Cir. 1981); 
citing with approval Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 E2d 769,773 (9th 
Cir. 1981». But see Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 
E2d 76 (2d Cir., 1990) (rehabilitating a modified test of aesthetic functionality); infra 
note 721 and accompanying text. 
631. LeSportsac, 754 E2d at 77-78; see, e.g., Villeroy & Bach, S.a.r.l. v. THC Sys., Inc., 10 
US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2027 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding china pattern was aesthetically func-
tional within space left by LeSportsac); see also Brown, supra note 32, at 1364-65. 
632. LeSportsac, 754 E2d at 78. 
633. See, e.g., Morex S.p.A. v. Design Inst. Am., Inc., 779 E2d 799,801 (2d Cir. 1985) (per 
curiam) ("The Craig standard for functionality was implicitly rejected ... by our 
decision in LeSportsac."); Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco,lnc., 618 E Supp. 273, 
275 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd without opinion, 800 E2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that, 
in LeSportsac, "the principle that an aesthetic design can be functional purely because 
its aesthetic quality promotes sales was weakened, if not eliminated"); see also PAF 
S.rJ. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 E Supp. 394, 401-02 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). But see, e.g., 
Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 E2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(finding that silverware design was aesthetically functional because the limited range 
of adequate alternative designs hindered effective competition). , ' 
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which had criticized the aesthetic functionality doctrine in 1981, still hesi-
tated to protect a product configuration in federal unfair competition law out 
of respect for the Supreme Court's Sears-Compeo decisions of 1964.634 
After LeSportsae, however, most federal appellate courts overcame any 
residual inhibitions of this nature simply by treating the overall shape of a 
product as its trade dress desFite the traditional view to the contrary. 635 
This magical transformation63 then enabled these courts to rescue unpat-
ented, noncopyrightable product configurations from the public domain on 
the theory that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act implemented valid, con-
gressionally approved federal policies of its own.637 
634. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981) (declining to pro-
tect design of outdoor "architectural luminaire" under Lanham Act § 43(a) because it 
integrated form and function and Sears-Compeo were thought to govern); see also 
Prufrock, Ltd. v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 133 (8th Cir. 1986) (approving aesthetic func-
tionality doctrine and stating that "if the trade dress is an important ingredient in the 
commercial success of the product, it is clearly functional"). 
635. The following lines from LeSportsae were widely quoted or paraphrased: "Most trade 
dress infringement actions involve the packaging or labeling of goods. Recently, how-
ever, we have recognized that the design of a product itself may function as its packag-
ing, serving to distinguish it from other products, and hence be protectable trade dress 
under § 43(a)." LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75. The following cases are representative: 
Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,517 (lOth Cir. 1987); Vaughan Mfg. 
Co. v. Brikam Int'I, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 n.2 (7th Cir. 1987); American Greetings 
Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (3d Cir. 1986); M. Kramer 
Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 n.25 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that trademark 
infringement focuses on "one aspect of a product's 'image,'" while "trade dress 
infringement focuses on 'the total image of plaintiff's product, package and advertis-
ing' " (quoting 1 1.T. McCARTHY, supra note 525, § 8.1, at 282-83». 
636. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1358, 1361 n.91 (stating that the "distinction 
between dress of goods (packaging and display) and the configuration of . . . useful 
articles ... [is) vital"). The Third Circuit was candid in describing the legal fiction 
being relied on: 
Attempts to incorporate protection for a product's overall design or appear-
ance into § 43(a) have come under a variety of guises. Some courts have 
found an unregistered trademark in the product's trade dress. . .. Others 
simply find that copying a product's overall trade dress or design is unfair 
competition. Still others have found such copying to be trade dress infringe-
ment without attempting to link it to trademark infringement or designating it 
a subcategory of uilfair competition. 
American Greetings, 807 F.2d at 1140 n.2. 
637. See generally Dratler, supra note 564, at 924-35 (taking a cautious view); supra notes 
562-65 and accompanying text. On this theory, nothing inherently subordinated the 
legitimate protection of trade dress in federal unfair competition law to the patent or 
copyright laws. But see Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F. 2d 971, 977-78 
(2d Cir. 1987) (warning that overly broad trademark protection could undermine the 
objectives of the patent law and conflict with &ars-Compco); w.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 
778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cu. 1985) (stressing danger of "a collision between section 
43(a) and patent law"); Brown. supra note 32. at 1360-61 & n.91 (arguing that the 
Supreme Court, in Sears-Compeo, had "pre-empted" product configurations from both 
federal and state unfair competition laws because they interfered with the patent and 
copyright laws and with free competition); see also Meyer. supra note 528. at lot 
(overly broad trademark protection fails to separate goods from alleged mark and 
encroaches on domain of copyright law). 
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Equally revealing was the notion that the federal judiciary should help 
to stimulate better industrial designs by scuttling the aesthetic functionality 
doctrine. 638 Because statutory encouragement of industrial design fell to 
the design patent law, the Second Circuit's willingness to stretch section 
43(a) to protect commercial designs as trade dress implicitly criticized the 
level of incentives that Congress had approved in 1976. By allowing section 
43(a) to provide incentives beyond those available as positive legal rights,' 
courts following the Second Circuit's lead cooperated in establishing a pro-
visional regime of design protection that tried to compensate for the flawed 
congressional outcome of 1976.639 
a. Functionality and the Multiplicity of Forms Revisited 
The Second Circuit confirmed the deeper implications of LeSportsac in 
subsequent decisions handed down between 1985 and the first half of 1990. 
These decisions expanded the kinds of subject matter now eligible as 
appearance trade dress to include the designs of a shelf unit, 640 of an orange 
juice squeezer,641 a raincoat,642 and the bicycle rack denied copyright pro-
tection in Brandir.643 Other federal appellate courts influenced by LeSpon-
sac soon extended the mantle of section 43(a) beyond borderline literary and 
artistic products, such as toy dolls,644 greeting cards,64s and magazine 
638. See supra notes 613-18, 629-30 and accompanying text. 
639. See, e.g., Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 1987) (con-
trasting public interest "in maintaining pleasing substitutes for known product brands" 
with producer's interest "in protecting its products' design from infringement"); Bruns-
wick, 832 F.2d at 518-19 (stressing emphasis of LeSportsac on "protecting a producer 
who takes the initiative to develop innovative or imaginative designs to identify his 
product" and avoidance of "disincentives to creative design"); infra notes 702-03 and 
accompanying text. 
640. Morex S.p.A. v. Design Inst. Am., Inc., 779 F.2d 799,801 (2d Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 
641. Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), 
affd without opinion, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986). 
642. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974-75 (2d Cir. 1987) (conceding 
that design of waterproof rain jacket was protectable trade dress unless barred by func-
tionality doctrine). 
643. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987) 
("As to whether the [noncopyrightable] configuration of Brandir's bicycle rack can be 
protected under . . . section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, ... we are reminded that the 
design of a product itself may function as its packaging or protectable trade dress." 
(citing LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75»; see supra text accompanying notes 451-75,515-16; 
see also PAF S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Jolly Good 
Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Artemide S.p.A. v. Gran-
dlite Design & Mfg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). But this expansion of sub-
ject matter was not totally unlimited. See, e.g., Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 F. 
Supp. 658 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding house designs to be. inherently functional). 
644. See, e.g., American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 
1986) (holding design of teddy bears protectable as trade dress against unprivileged 
imitation if further evidence satisfied functionality test). 
645. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that unique 
"feeling sensitive" line of greeting cards was protectable trade dress); Hartford House, 
Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that line of greet-
ing cards possessed combination of features protectable as trade dress). 
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covers,646 in order to protect commercial designs of an increasingly func-
tional or utilitarian nature. For example, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits, 
respectively, found the external designs of a video game and of a medical 
cart to be protectable trade dress within the purview of this provision. 647 
. Various panels of the Seventh Circuit found the configuration and overall 
designs of plastic stacking trays, folding picnic tables, insulated beverage 
servers, and exercise bicycles all eligible, in principle, for protection as 
unregistered trade dress,648 although there were second thoughts about the 
exercise bicycle in 1989.649 The Ninth Circuit extended trade dress protec-
tion from the interior decor of a restaurant650 to cantilevered industrial 
clamps that had been manufactured under a utility patent since the 1950s. 6S I 
The Tenth Circuit protected the design of a fishing reel in 1987.652 
As the list of eligible subject matter encompassed ever more utilitarian 
design features, only the nonfunctionality requirement kept the federal 
trademark and unfair competition laws from protecting the very utility 
models in disguise that have always posed such a challenge to the design pat-
ent law.653 Indeed, one panel of the Second Circuit, led by Judge Newman, 
and another panel of the Seventh Circuit, led by Judge Posner, expressly 
646. See Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 E2d 800 (D.C. Cir. (987) 
(holding that magazine cover was protected trade dress). 
647. See Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad Inc., 864 E2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding 
design of medical carts to be protectable trade dress that was not infringed); M. 
Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 E2d 421,447-50 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding design of 
the glass panel and console of video game to be protectable trade dress that was 
infringed). 
648. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. III. (988) (holding 
that design of exercise bicycle was protected trade dress and infringed), vacated and 
remanded, 870 E2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that issues of confusion and function-
ality required further findings); Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118 (7th 
Cir. (988) (holding that design of insulated beverage server was protectable trade dress 
and infringed); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 E2d 346 (7th Cir. (987) 
(finding design of folding picnic table was protectable trade dress and infringed); W.T. 
Rogers Co. v. Keene, 178 E 2d 334 (7th Cir. (985) (holding that configuration of plastic 
stacking trays was, in principle, eligible for protection, and reversing and remanding 
lower court's finding of functionality); see also Sun Prods. Group, Inc. v. B & E Sales 
Co., 700 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mich. (988) (finding overall design and appearance of 
foldable headrest, protected by utility patent, was nonfunctional trade dress "although 
it greatly aided the product's sales"). 
649. See Schwinn Bicycle, 678 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. 1JI. 1988), vacated and remanded, 870 
F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989); infra text accompanying notes 717-21. 
650. Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 E2d 837,841 (9th Cir. (987). 
651. Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that design of 
cantilevered "C" clamps was protectable, nonfunctional, and infringed, despite exis-
tence of expired utility patent). 
652. Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 E2d 513,516 (lOth Cir. (987) (holding that 
particular configuration of "closed face spin-cast fishing reel" was protected as unregis-
tered mark and infringed). 
653. See supra notes 196-210 and accompanying text; Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l 
Trade Comm'n, 753 E2d 1019, 1025 (Fed. Cir. (985) (stating that "the right to copy 
better working designs would, in due course, be stripped of all meaning if overall func-
tional designs were accorded trademark protection because they included a few arbi-
trary and nonfunctional features"). 
102 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 19 
urged their colleagues not to vitiate the exclusionary power of the nonfunc-
tionality doctrine at the expense of the patent law, which these jurists viewed 
as supreme within its proper sphere of influence.6s4 The LeSportsac mani-
festo thrust in the opposite direction, however, because it viewed utilitarian 
functionality as excluding only superior or optimal design features and 
because it emptied the aesthetic functionality doctrine of its former exclu-
sionary power. 65S It followed that once complainants demonstrated second-
ary meaning, the functionality doctrine as thus reformulated no longer 
disqualified the bulk of the highly functional des!fsns now eligible for long-
term protection in federal unfair competition law. S6 
The Second Circuit reached this very conclusion just after LeSpoTtsac, 
when it reversed a lower court's finding of functionality in regard to the 
design of a shelf unit,657 and again when it affirmed that a high-tech design 
of an orange juice squeezer was not dictated by function. 658 In 1987, the 
Second Circuit suggested that the 'same reasonin§ applied to the non-
copyrightable design of the bicycle rack in Brandir6 9 because competitors 
could market numerous other bicycle racks without copying that particular 
form. 660 Outside the Second Circuit, the functionality barrier crumbled 
after 1985 as other appellate courts influenced by LeSpoTtsac declined to 
bar the designs of such objects as video games, plastic slacking letter tr~s, 
folding picnic tables, insulated beverage servers, and industrial clamps. 1 
654. See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 976-78 (2d Cir. 1987) ("Even if 
Stormy Clime were to have a patent on the use of horizontal shingled vents in rain-
jackets, it is unlikely that it would have such monopoly power as an unregistered trade-
mark in the shingled look would provide."); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 
338-39 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that functionality defense avoids collision between 
§ 43(a) and patent law). 
655. See supra notes 624-33 and accompanying text. 
656. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1188-91 (7th Cir. 
1989) (recognizing and criticizing this result); see also Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 518 (not-
ing that both the Second and Ninth Circuits bad "redefined their interpretations of 
functionality" and bad rejected explicitly or implicitly the per se exclusion of a product 
feature that contributes to consumer appeal and marketability). 
657. Morex S.p.A. v. Design Inst. Am., Inc., 779 F.2d 799, 801 (2d Cir. 1985). 
658. See Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 273, 275-76 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985), aff d without opinion, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986). 
659. See supra text accompanying notes 515-16. 
660. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber, Inc., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d Cir. 1987). 
By the same token, the Southern District of New York found that certain high-tech 
designs of halogen desk lamps met the nonfunctionality requirement, even though their 
overall configurations combined functional with nonfunctional elements. See PAF 
S.r.l. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Artemide S.p.A. v. Gran-
dlite Design & Mfg. Co., 672 F. Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). In these cases, the presid-
ing judges understood the LeSportsac standard as excluding only design features that 
represented a superior enhancement of the use or purpose of the product, and they took 
the availability of alternate marketable forms largely for granted. Bur see the Second 
Circuit's recent decision in Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 
916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir., 1990) (finding that aesthetic functionality applied because alterna-
tive forms were not available). 
661. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(finding design of industrial clamp nonfunctional despite expired utility patent); Ser-
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Sometimes an appellate panel neglected to consider functionality at 
all, as if the issue no longer remained of much consequence.662 More often, 
courts went through the motions of applying the superior design test as 
refined by LeSportsac, only to presume that competitors had alternate forms 
at their disposal without copying a configuration said to have acquired sec-
ondary meaning. This presumption followed more or less automatically 
from evidence that the alleged infringer intended to imitate the originator's 
design and from his corresponding inability to circumstantiate any failed 
attempts to.market a different design. 663 
. Courts in this frame of mind seldom considered the economic disabili-
ties that might actually have prevented alleged infringers from trying to 
design around a protected configuration.664 For example, the LeSportsac 
doctrine had stressed that courts should evaluate an originator's design as a 
"total image" without disassembling it-into'its component parts for purposes 
of the functionality analysis.665 By manipulating this apparently innocuous 
premise, later decisions resisted arguments suggesting that single compo-
nents of a combination design might significantly enhance the utility of the 
products embodying them or that such components might attain the status of 
market standards owing to their popularity or efficiency or both.666 A uni-
vice Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 1118, 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding 
design of insulated beverage server not dictated by function); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit 
Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,519-20 (10th Cir. 1987) (finding unique design of fishing reel 
nonfunctional); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 
1987) (holding design of folding picnic table not functional because not "superior or 
optimal in terms of engineering, economy of manufacture, or accommodation of utili-
tarian function or performance"); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421. 
447-49 (4th Cir. 1986); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene. 778 F.2d 334.338-47 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(holding that design of plastic stacking letter tray was not functional unless further evi-
dence showed that its hexagonal shape had become intrinsic to the product and indis-t 
pensable to competition). . 
662. See, e.g., Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d 421. This methodology resembled that of the Second 
Circuit's first Warner Bros. decision in 1981. See supra notes 541-52 and accompanying 
text. 
663. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg., 870 F.2d at 516-17 (deeming commercially feasible alternatives 
to be available despite expired utility patent); Service Ideas, 846 F.2d at 1123-24 (sta-
ting that defendant could have adopted other functional features instead of copying a 
successful configuration); Brunswick. 832 F.2d at 520-21 & n.4 (finding that alternative 
shapes appeared to be available. despite evidence that commerciai success of plaintiff's 
design derived from utilitarian advantages); Vaughan Mfg., 814 F.2d at 350-51 (stress-
ing that defendant "copied a successful product lock, stock and barrel" and that "(nJo 
money was expended in determining which features were necessary to the function of 
the product"); Hartford House Ud. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 F.2d 1268. 1273-74 
(10th Cir. 1988) (stressing infinite availability of alternative designs without imitating 
"overall look" of protected designs). 
664. A notable exception, however, was Judge Posner's opinion in w.T. Rogers. 778 F.2d 334; 
see infra text accompanying notes 710-11. 
665. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76-77. LeSportsac was followed in numerous cases including 
CiLlmp Mfg., 870 F.2d 512; Hartford House, 846 F.2d 1268; Service Ideas., 846 F.2d 
1118; Brunswick, 832 F.2d 513; Vaughan Mfg., 814 F.2d 346. 
666. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg., 870 F.2d 512 (holding that although design of "single screwactu-
. ated pivoted clamp" was object of utility patent that had issued i~ 1955 and expired in 
1972, and despite emphasis on utility features in advertising, the overall design was 
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tarian approach similarly dissuaded courts from considering that certain 
appearance designs embodied ideas, methods, concepts, or marketing 
schemes that could constitute barriers to entry if monopolized along with the 
more fanciful or decorative features. 667 
. At the limit, some courts precluded even the possibility of disqualify-
ing product configurations on grounds of functionality unless the defend-
ants could establish that effective competition required them slavishly to 
imitate the designs in question. On this approach, "if the feature enables 
the second comer simply to market his product more effectively, it is entitled 
to protection.,,668 Even in more conservative jurisdictions, the notion that 
defendants had a multiplicity of noninfringing forms at their disposal para-
doxically constituted a more complete answer to the functionality defense in 
the trade dress environment than it did in the design patent environment as 
administered by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit .. 669 
nonfunctional because defendant copied the whole configuration); Service Ideas, 846 
F.2d at 1123 (design of insulated beverage server, unchanged for over thirty years, with 
sales of some 2.5 million units, was object of expired design patent; held nonfunctional 
trade dress when viewed as a combination of functional features constituting a protec-
table whole); Vaughan Mfg., 814 E2d 346. BUI see Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycle 
Co., 870 F.2d 1176, 1191 (7th Cir. 1989) (criticizing judicial emphasis on failure to 
research alternative designs or to conduct cost studies as flawed analysis because it 
overlooks "the required ultimate question 9f whether [defendant] ... would be able to 
'effectively' compete if it used an alternative design"), vacating and remanding 678 F. 
Supp. 1336 (N.D. III. 1988); see also w.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 345-48 (questioning 
whether design of plastic stacking letter tray had become market standard). 
667. See. e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 E2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that overall 
design of nonoccasion emotional greeting cards combined functional and nonfunc-
tional features into protect able whole that could not be emulated); Brunswick, 832 F.2d 
at 520-21 (holding that although plaintiff had developed concept of closed-face spin-
cast fishing reel and had dominated market with unique product since 1954, his design 
was nonfunctional when viewed as a whole, and it was "unnecessary for the district 
court to perform a feature-by-feature functionality analysis"); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. 
Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding interior decor of res-
taurant was nonfunctional trade dress when viewed as a whole, even though it included 
functional elements); Vaughan Mfg., 814 F.2d at 348, 350 (finding design of folding pic-
nic table was nonfunctional when viewed as a whole, despite plaintiffs dominant mar-
ket position and noting competitors selling significantly different tables "continue to 
comprise only a small portion of the market"). But cf. 17 U.S.C. § I02(b) (1988) 
(excluding copyright protection of ideas, methods, and the like). 
668. Brunswick, 832 E2d at 519 (fishing reel); see also Hartford House, 846 E2d at 1274 
(defendant could "compete effectively without having to slavishly copy or imitate the 
distinctive combination of features comprising plaintiff's line" of greeting cards); Ser-
vice Ideas, 846 E2d at 1123-24 (involving an insulated beverage server); Vaughan Mfg., 
814 F.2d at 350 (stating that "[ilt strains the imagination to assert that someone design-
ing such a table from scratch would ineluctably choose ... [the identical design fea-
tures] or that one seeking to buy a folding picnic table would necessarily prefer such a 
table over all others"). This approach followed in large part from a reading ofthe func-
tionality requirement that excluded only superior, optimal, or "the best possible" 
design solutions, in keeping with Morton-Norwich and LeSponsac. But see Schwinn 
Bicycle, 870 E2d at 1189 (criticizing this methodology). 
669. Compare authorities cited supra notes 663, 667-68 with authorities cited supra notes 
269-302 (multiplicity of forms in context of design patent law). A parodox arises 
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b. Secondary Considerations Without Nonobviousness 
Not all courts took the same approach, to be sure, nor was it axiomatic 
that every product configuration masquerading as trade dress would auto-
matically benefit from a kid-gloved application of the nonfunctionality 
requirement between 1985 and the first half of 1990. In fact, a number of 
panels in different federal appellate jurisdictions continued to use the non-
functionality test to deny or retard protection for sundry commercial 
designs seeking a refuge from competition under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act. 670 One should remember, however, that nonprotection of product 
configurations on grounds of functionality had been the norm, and not the 
exception, until Morton-Norwich and LeSportsac undertook to reshape the 
relevant legal methodology in the period 1982 to 1985.611 What strikes the 
investigator reviewing the post-LeSportsac decisions, therefore, is the rapid-
ity with which a protectionist line gained ascendancy notwithstanding the 
woolly doctrinal formulations it proclaimed672 and the solid pockets of 
because the novelty and nonobviousness standards of patent law already eliminate most 
candidate designs before the functionality test applies, whereas functionality and sec-
ondary meaning are the principal guardians against overprotection in regard to unreg-
istered marks. Any radical lowering of the functionality standard in the latter milieu, 
unless offset by a stiffening of the secondary meaning requirement, thus leads to a mis-
appropriation rationale at the expense of the Competitive ethos. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 702-05. 
670. See. e.g., Wallace Int'I Silversmiths. Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d 
Cir. 1990); Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1189-91, discussed in infra text accompanying 
notes 717-21; Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding 
that design of synthetic animal heads was functional because critical features conferred 
the actual benefit the consumer wanted to purchase as distinct from source identifying 
features); Inverness Corp. v. Whitehall Laboratories, 819 F.2d 48, 51 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(remanding to determine if design of roll-on hair remover was functional); First Brands 
Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1381-83 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that yellow-
coloured, F-shaped design of antifreeze container was functional); Stormy Clime Ltd. 
v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee 
Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1141-43 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding design of teddy bear with 
"tummy graphics" could be functional; only clear labelling may be required, and nei-
ther standard configuration nor maIiceting method should be removed from public 
domain); Standard Terry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(finding weave and pattern of imported towel were functional; both utilitarian and 
modified aesthetic functionality invoked); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. 
Co., 791 F.2d 423. 426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (deeming design of machine to make ice 
shaving desserts probably functional, in dicta, because optimal in engineering sense 
and changes would have economic or functional drawbacks); Prufrock Ltd. v. Lasater. 
781 F.2d 129, 133-35 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that interior design of restaurant was 
"core concept" excluded by functionality doctrine); see also w.r. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 
345-47, discussed in infra text accompanying notes 720-21, 754-63; Textron, Inc. v. 
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding 
that overall configuration of milling machine was functional, although curved design 
of the column and ram could be protected as mark if inherently distinctive or if it had 
acquired secondary meaning). 
671. See supra text accompanying notes 572-633. 
672. See. e.g .• Brunswick, 832 F.2d at 518 ("Despite their criticism of the 'important ingredi-
ent' formulation. neither court (i.e.. the Second and Ninth Circuitsl clearly stated a test 
to be used for functionality. "). 
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resistance it encountered. 673 Egged on by the fashionable commentaries, 
the federal judiciary's basic attitude concerning unregistered product 
configurations changed almost overnight from one that viewed imitation as 
the lifeblood of commerce to one that stigmatized "unprivileged imitation" 
as parasitical conduct leading to unhealthy market conditions.674 
In this protectionist atmosphere, the functionality test continued to 
raise the same issues as before, issues not dissimilar from those that had 
always vexed the design patent law. 675 Moreover, courts increasingly 
addressed these issues in the trade dress environment by recourse to a mul-
tiplicity of forms test not unlike that which the Federal Circuit had employed 
to revitalize the statutory design protection law. 676 As applied to design 
patents, however, the multiplicity of forms test bore solely on the threshold 
issue of functionality, in conjunction with the statutory requirement of orna-
mentation, while evidence of copying-as an important secondary factor-
bore solely on the issue of nonobviousness.677 In other words, evidence that 
alternate forms were available to produce comparable utilitarian yields and 
evidence of copying by second comers helped design patent owners to with-
stand two independent threshold challenges, either of which might suffice to 
invalidate the patent. Neither body of evidence necessarily determined the 
outcome of particular design patent cases at the infringement stage because 
highly functional designs still had to meet a stiffer standard of scrutiny, 
including the "point of novelty" test, to determine if the protect able matter 
had in fact been copied.678 
In the trade dress environment after 1985, in contrast, evidence of 
copying tended in and of itself to determine the outcome of the multiplicity 
of forms test, even though this test nominally controlled the level of the 
functionality barrier. 679 In other words, fewer and fewer panels that per-
673. See supra note 670 and accompanying text. 
674. Compare KeUogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. Ill, 122 (1938) (staling that 
"[s)haring in the goodwill of an article unprotected by patent or trademark is the exer-
cise of a right possessed by aU") with International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 
U.S. 215, 239-40 (stigmatizing wholesale appropriation of fruits of others' labors as 
"endeavoring to reap where ... [one) has not sown"). See generally Brown, supra note 
32, at 1341, 1386-95 ("Free Riders and Level Playing Fields"). For comparable ten-
sions in foreign and international law, see Reichman, GKI'T Connection, supra note 50, 
at 784-96. 
675. See supra text accompanying notes 191-233,269-302. 
676. See supra text accompanying notes 656-69. 
677. See supra text accompanying notes 269-302. 
678. See supra notes 303-18 and accompanying text; see also Winner Int'! Corp. v. Wolo 
Mfg. Corp., 905 E2d 375 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
679. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 516-17 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(given copying, commercially feasible alternatives were deemed available despite 
expired utility patent on clamp design); Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 
1118, 1123 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that while other forms were possible, "[a)U of the 
evidence ... indicate[s) an intent to duplicate the external design of the plaintiff's 
product"); Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 E2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(stressing the fact of copying while making no reference to the fact that a utility patent 
on the picnic table at issue had expired). But see .. e.g., Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. 
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ceived a taint of copying would actually apply the nonfunctionality require-
ment to narrow the protection afforded product configurations under section 
43 (a), no matter how much courts professed to recognize the dangers of 
overprotecting utilitarian features in the abstract. Moreover, evidence of 
copying would increasingly determine the outcome of the trade dress cases 
at the infringement stage, too, as courts swayed by the protectionist ethos of 
LeSportsac weakened the collateral prerequisites still to be met once plain-
tiffs had surmounted a functionality challenge. 680 
Evidence of commercial success or of large advertising expenditures, 
for example, readily established secondary meaning without more,681 while 
evidence of a failed negotiation sometimes played a similar role.682 In such 
cases, courts seldom required complainants to establish a nexus between 
these factors and consumer identification of the design with a particular 
manufacturing source. This left open the possibility that consumers simply 
bought the product because they liked its design. 683 
Moreover, evidence of copying frequently supported either a presump-
tion that plaintiff's design had acquired secondary meaning684 or a pre-
Meredith Corp., 904 E2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding features of magazine format 
and mailer to be functional and in common use in industry). 
680. See infra notes 681-701 and accompanying text; see also supra note 661 (citing cases). 
681. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg., 870 F.2d at 517; Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 
846 F.2d 1268, 1270, 1272 (lOth Cir. 1988); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 
421,448-49 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Reader's Digest v. Conservative Digest, Inc., 821 
F.2d 800, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("Courts uniformly have held that evidence of substan-
tial sales and promotion of a product tends to show that the trade dress of the product 
has acquired secondary meaning."). For a common source, see LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 
78. 
682. See, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,516 (10th Cir. 1987) (failed 
negotiations; issue of secondary meaning or distinctiveness not raised on appeal); 
Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2a974, 977, 985 (11th Cir. 1986); LeSportsac, 754 
F.2d at 78. 
683. See, e.g., Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Rowoco, Inc., 618 E Supp. 273, 276 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985), aff'd without opinion, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986), which stated as follows: "In 
LeSportsac, the Second Circuit found that a company's proof of 'phenomenal sales suc-
cess, substantial advertising expenditures, unsolicited media .coverage, requests for 
third parties to license the use of its design and [defendant's] deliberate attempt to imi-
tate its-trade dress' was sufficient evidence to support a preliminary injunction .... " 
Metro Kane, 618 F. Supp. at 276 (quoting LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 78). Some panels 
were more fastidious about such a nexus, however. See, e.g., Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia 
Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that sales 
success may show only that consumers wanted aesthetically pleasing: telephone, not 
secondary meaning); First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d·1378, 1383 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (insisting on nexus between advertising expenditure and "image advertis-
ing" that fosters source identification of trade dress); Textron, Inc. v. United States Int'l 
Trade Comm'n, 753 F.2d 1019: 1027 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that advertising of 
maChine tool did not focus attention on nonfunctional features of design as source iden-
tifiers). 
684. See generally Bryant, Trademark Infringement: TIu! Irrelevance of Evidence of Copying 
to Secondary Meaning, 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 473 (I 989} According to Bryant, evidence of 
copying may create either an irrebuttable presumption of secondary meaning or a 
rebuttable presumption, or it m~y serve only as one factor in the proof of.infringement. 
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sumption that the defendant's design would confuse the relevant consumer 
group, or at times both presumptions in concert. 685 These presumptions 
followed from the simplifying premise that defendants would not have cop-
ied the designs at issue unless they wanted to trade on the originators' good 
will,686 hence the copied designs must already have possessed secondary 
meaning. 687 But this reasoning ignores other possible justifications for 
copying appearance designs, including a second comer's need to satisfy 
market demand or merely to engage in competition with a preexisting prod-
uct. 688 It also masks a tautology if "secondary meaning is proven by the 
defendant's intent to confuse the public, and . . . the defendant's intent to 
confuse the public is proven by the secondary meaning found in the original 
mark."689 Such a tautology then inclines courts to base the very existence 
[d. at 487 (citing authorities). There is little consistency in applying these nuances, 
however, and panels smitten with the LeSpoTlsac virus will tend to rely on evidence of 
copying regardless of the strength of the formal presumption. See infra note 685 (cit-
ing cases). Moreover, the "evidentiary weight that courts give this inference corre-
sponds to the court's interpretation of the ethical importance of copying." Bryant, 
supra note 684, at 487. Hence, there are considerable inconsistencies even within sin-
gle circuits that formally apply the same presumption. Compare, e.g., Blau Plumbing, 
Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 610-11 (7th Cir. 1986) (declining to allow 
copying to establish secondary meaning) with Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 
814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that "proof of intentional copying was proba-
tive . . . of secondary meaning"). 
685. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. Co. v. Enco Mfg. Co., 870 F.2d 512, 513-14, 517-18 (9th Cir. 
1989) (copying tacitly reinforced inference of secondary meaning after the fact and 
expressly supported inference of likelihood of confusion); Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's 
B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1987) (stating that evidence of 
deliberate copying was relevant to a determination of secondary meaning, but declin-
ing to shift burden to defendant because of copying); Reader's Digest Ass'n v. Conserv-
ative Digest, Inc., 821 F.2d 800,804 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that secondary meaning 
was shown by copying); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 n.241 (4th 
Cir. 1986) (stating that proof of deliberate copying of video game design established 
prima facie case of secondary meaning and supported presumption of likelihood of 
confusion). But see Brown, supra note 32, at 1377 n.163 (criticizing this double infer-
ence); Bryant, supra note 684, at 495-511 (criticizing all use of copying to show sec-
ondary meaning). 
686. See, e.g., Reader's Digest, 821 F.2d at 804; M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d at 448-49; Jolly 
Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (stressing that a 
defendant was not to "piggy back on [plaintiff's] goods, reputation, or market share" 
by means of intentional copying). But see, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, 
Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1183-85 & n.16 (7th Cir. 1989) (criticizing these presumptions); 
Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 427-30 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(finding that defendant was not cashing in on plaintiff's goodwill because copying per-
mitted him to use interchangeable machine parts and to make repairs). 
687. See, e.g., Bryant, supra note 684, at 486,498 (,'The basis for this assumption is that no 
producer would be motivated to copy a mark that does not have secondary meaning. 
,This proposition is counterintuitive. "). 
688. See, e.g., Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1553 
(Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that attempt to capitalize on consumer demand for see-
through neon-lit telephone was licit absent strong evidence of secondary meaning). 
MoreOver, the conduct of a defendant is irrelevant absent secondary meaning because 
copying another's product is a right unless abrogated by positive law. See generally 
Bryant, supra note 684, at 487-511; infra text accompanying notes 712-24. 
689. Bryant, supra note 684, at 498-99. 
1989] Design Protection and the New technologies 109 
of source-identifying characteristics on a moral judgment about copying.690 
In some jurisdictions, courts were increasingly willing to dispense with 
proof of secondary meaning altogether and to protect product 
configurations deemed inherently distinctive. 691 While this practice could 
be rationalized so long as the term trade dress retained its historical refer-
ence to packaging and container designs,692 use of the distinctiveness doc-
trine in the product configuration cases merely served to perfect a mystical 
judicial transformation of one thing into its opposite. At step one, courts 
converted product configurations into trade dress because "appearance. . . 
may function as packaging.'>693 At step two, courts that accepted a distinc-
tiveness test applied the lowest and most subjective standard of eligibility to 
690. Id; see also P.J. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 12-13 (criticizing analogous moral evalu-
ations in foreign law). In the Second Circuit, the tautology discussed in the text is fur-
ther perfected by the notion that product designs may acquire instonl secondary mean-
ing, or "secondary meaning in the making," which an alleged infringer's act of copying 
had tortiously nipped in the bud. See, e.g., Metro Kane Imports, Ltd. v. Federated 
Dep't Stores, Inc., 625 F. Supp. 313,315-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affdwithout opinion, 800 
F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986); Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227, 230 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn MeAn Shoe Co., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (recognizing doctrine of secondary meaning in the making, though 
not expressly approved by Second Circuit, because "defendants should not be entitled 
to benefit from their speedy efforts to appropriate the goodwill plaintiff was in the pre-
cess of generating"). But see Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Thlecommunications Group, 900 
F.2d 1546, 1548-49 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (finding this doctrine inconsistent with Lanham 
Act § 43(a»; see also Pegram, supra note 532, at 351 (stating that trademark protection 
of most new product configurations is unsatisfactory because secondary meaning takes 
time to acquire and can be thwarted "without protection at the outset"). 
691. The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Federal Circuits all appear to have embraced 
the doctrine of "inherent distinctiveness" for these purposes, with varying degrees of 
enthusiasm. See, e.g., Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256-57 
(5th Cir. 1989); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,517 n.2 (10th Cir. 
1987); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974, 979 (lIth Cir. 1986), em. denied, 481 
U.S. 1041 (1987); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 449 n.26 (4th Cir. 
1986); Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604,608 (7th Cir. 1986) (sta-
ting that "[i]f any of these cases stands for the broader proposition that secondary 
meaning. must be shown even if the trade dress is a distinctive, identifying mark, then 
we think they are wrong"). Jurisdictions reportedly requiring that a product 
configuration or package have acquired secondary meaning for purposes of § 43(a) 
include the First, Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. See Brunswick, 
832 F.2d 513 (citing authorities); see also Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1550 & n.5 (limiting 
distinctiveness to trademarks but requiring secondary meaning for trade dress under 
§ 43(a». Moreover, the status of this issue in the Ninth Circuit remains uncertain. 
See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir. 
1987) (criticizing this doctrine but not resolving the issue). 
692. See supra note 558 (citing cases); Brown, supra note 32, at 1378-80. Because the pool 
of packaging and container designs is infinitely large, at least in theory, a wide range of 
options allows a producer to appropriate a distinctive identity without unduly hinder-
ing competition. On this theory, secondary meaning had to be proved only if the dress 
were not sufficiently distinctive. See, e.g., Blue Bell, 864 F.2d 1253; Blou Plumbing, 
781 F.2d 604; Chevron Chern. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing, Inc.; 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 
Unit A Oct. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982). But see Cicena, 900 F.2d 1546. 
693. Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. V. Eisemann Prods. Co., 791 F.2d 423, 426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) 
(citing Note, Trade Dress Infringement, supra note 528, at 79); see also supra notes 
621-23 and accompal"!yill8 text. 
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product configurations that were ,patently constrained by functional 
efficiency and market expectations.69 
Whether they settled for distinctiveness or required proof of secondary 
meaning, courts imbued with the spirit of LeSportsac seldom allowed imita-
tors to exculpate themselves by a demonstration that labelling or other mea-
sures could avoid a likelihood of confusion69s due to similarities of 
design.696 Most panels, indeed, regarded intent to imitate as the critical 
factor because it showed that a defendant meant to profit from the plaintiff's 
good will and reputation. 697 Once this critical factor came into play, courts 
694. See Brown, supra note 32, at 1380. Professor Brown wrote: 
To say that the overall design of a useful article is "inherently distinctive" of a 
particular source just by examining it ... substitutes an impression that the 
design is outstanding, or eccentric, or clever ... for the proofs of association 
with a source, gained in the marketplace, that add up to a showing of second-
ary meaning. Furthermore, such a short-cut subordinates the functionality 
inquiry . . . indispensible in appraising a design. 
Id. The fallacy was thus to apply the distinctiveness standard of eligibility reserved for 
true trade dress to three-dimensional industrial designs, as if the pool of configurations 
potentially available for any given product were as unlimited as the pool of packaging 
and container designs potentially available for that same product. 
695. Formally, a plaintiff had not made out a case for trade dress infringement until he had 
shown "some 'likelihood of confusion' on the part of consumers as to the source of the 
product" once he established that the trade dress was either inherently distinctive (in 
some circuits only) or that it had acquired secondary meaning to consumers. See, e.g., 
Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1I76, 1I83 n.14 (7th Cir. 1989). 
The likelihood of confusion test examines the behavior of "ordinary purchasers pur-
chasing in the ordinary manner." Id. at 1187 n.19. 
696. See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837,846 & n.13 (9th 
Cir. 1987); Ambrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974,984 (lith Cir. 1986) (use of dis-
tinguishing word marks did not preclude a finding of actionable design similarity), 
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 
448 n.24 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Hartford House, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 846 
F.2d 1268 (lOth Cir. 1988) (holding that strong brand of defendant did not suffice to 
offset confusingly similar line of nonoccasion greeting cards). On one view, indeed, 
the confusion standard applicable to trade dress cases ought to be more encompassing 
than that used for symbols protected as true trademarks, even though trade dress now 
included three-dimensional prodUct configurations. This followed because § 43(a) 
dealt with unfair competition, which was a body of law that reached "the total image of 
plaintiffs product, package, and advertising" and not "merely one facet of plaintiff's 
total selling image as in trademark law." I J.T. McCARl1fY, supra note 525, § 8:1, at 
282-83. 
697. See, e.g., Hartford House, 846 F.2d 1268; Service Ideas, Inc. v. Traex Corp., 846 F.2d 
1118 (7th Cir. 1988); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 
1987); Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d 837; Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'I,lnc., 814 F.2d 346 
(7th Cir. 1987); M. Kramer Mfg., 783 F.2d 421. However, a few courts, undeterred by 
this philosophy, did allow for labelling and looked into the nature of, and reasons for, 
specific acts of copying. See Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1184-88 & n.16 (refusing to 
presume likelihood of confusion without application of "digits of confusion" test; not-
ing that "labeling may be an important factual factor ... [in] a particular case and 
may not, as a matter of law, be deemphasized merely because the element of secondary 
meaning is established; and fearing the creation of a "product monopoly rather than the 
protection of trade dress," especially if the product had been the first of its type on the 
market). In some courts, labelling carried more weight if the design was viewed as a 
"weak mark" or if the underlying goods were purchased by discriminating buyers. 
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adjudicating actions for infringement of appearance trade dress would rou-
tinely issue temporary and permanent injunctions, much as copyright courts 
would do if artistic property rights had been violated.698 The federal appel-
late courts tended, in short, to eliminate all further possibility of confusing 
similarity by prohibiting imitation as such, rather than imposing reasonable 
measures to avoid the actual or probable confusion that was nominally the 
crux of the matter. 
In sum, evidence of commercial success, extensive advertising, copy-
ing, and failed negotiations often combined to truncate all further judicial 
deliberations once courts began routinely to validate product configurations 
as trade dress on grounds of nonfunctionality.699 Yet, these were the very 
secondary considerations most likely to cement a finding of nonobviousness 
for purposes of validating issued design patents.7OO While these factors in 
that legal subculture could yield a fourteen-year monopoly on very strict 
conditions, the same factors operating in the trade dress milieu produced an 
equally powerful monopoly, without any requirements of novelty or nonob-
viousness, that could last as long as the proprietor cared to defend it. 701 
c. Misappropriation and Its Countervailing Tendencies 
The patterns repeated in these cases demonstrate that most federal 
courts applying section 43(a) to unpatented, noncopyrightable industrial 
designs in the period 1985 to 1990 aimed to repress misappropriation as 
such, in the spirit of International News Service v. Associated Press,702 and 
See, e.g., Blue Bell Bie-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253 (5th Cir. 1989); First 
Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378, 1384-85 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1987); Sno-
Wizard, 791 F.2d at 428-29. 
698. See, e.g., Hartford House, 846 F.2d at 1270, 1274 (enjoining defendant from copying, 
imitating or marketing greeting cards that reproduced plaintiff's "specific artistic 
expression, in combination with other features to produce an overall ... look," and 
stating that such protection did not conflict with the policy of copyright law); Bruns-
wick, 832 F.2d at 524-25 (affirming injunction against imitating present or similar 
configuration of fishing reel design .despite defendant's alterations to avoid confusion 
and despite evidence that design enhanced function); Service Ideas, 846 F.2d at 1125; 
and Vaughan Mfg., 814 F.2d at 351 (holding designs of beverage server and of folding 
picnic table protected by trade-dress injunctions despite expired patents); see also 
supra notc 697. However, some courts worried that overly broad injunctions could pre-
vent a defendant from marketing functional as well as nonfunctional features of a given 
configuration or design. See, e.g., Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Corp., 904 
F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990) (magazine format not actionably similar despite evidence of 
actual confusion); Inverness Corp. v. Whitehall Laboratories, 819 F.2d 48,51 (2d Cir. 
1987); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1144 (3d 
Cir. 1986); Ambril, 805 F.2d at 990-92 (modifying overly broad injunction that 
restricted use of royal blue color on ice cream wrapper). 
699. See supra note 683 (quoting LeSponsac. 754 F.2d at 78). 
700. See supra notes 151-70, 177-90,259-68 and aceompanyin,g text. 
701. See supra notes 624,654 (quoting. Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 
976-78 (2d Cir. 1987); infra text accompanying notes 729-33. 
702. 248 U.S. 215 (1918); see supra notes 548-49 and accompanying text. 
Misappropriation is an ill-defined tort that provides relief when the intellectual 
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not merely to prevent confusion in the marketplace due to similar, source-
identifying features of trade dress. The net result, as one panel of the Sev-
enth Circuit recently admitted with chagrin, is that "most of the plaintiff's 
required proof for both trademark infringement and for preliminary injunc-
tion can be accomplished by simply filing suit and proving intentional copy-
ing. ,,703 As the decade drew to a close, moreover, the protectionist surge 
that followed LeSportsac in 1985 showed few outward signs of abating. 704 
Indeed, Professor Brown observed in 1987 that "li]f the flow of reported 
decisions is any guide to the pace of activity in the real world, unfair compe-
tition law appears to be overtaking both copyright and design patent as a 
source of protection for designs. ,,70S 
Countervailing tendencies were nonetheless at work throughout the 
period under review, both in the case law and the literature. Some courts 
recognized, for example, that application of a weak functionality standard to 
product configurations in keeping with the prevailing trend could end by 
protecting the actual benefits that consumers expected to obtain from cer-
tain products as distinct from their source-identifying features. 706 Others 
feared it had become too easy to remove ideas, themes, and core concepts 
efforts of an individual are used by another. In International News Service v. 
Associated Press the. . . Supreme Coon defined misappropriation as "endeav-
oring to reap where [one] has not sown." So defined. misappropriation swal-
lows all other intellectual property doctrines and creates property rights 
where none would otherwise exist. . . . The holding in INS is diametrically 
opposed to that in Sears and Compco. 
Meyer. supra note 528. at 88-89.92; see also Baird. supra note 549. at 412-15; Terry. 
Unfair Competition and tlu: Misappropriation of a Competitor's Trade Values. 51 Moll. 
L. REV. 296. 319-22 (1988). 
703. Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles. Inc .• 870 F.2d 1176. 1184 n.16 (7th Cir. 1989). 
This followed because evidence of a defendant's intent to imitate could give rise to a 
nearly conclusive presumption of source confusion. often preceded by an equally 
strong presumption of secondary meaning that was also premised on the fact of copy-
ing. See also supra notes 681-90 and accompanying text; Brown. supra note 32. at 
1377 n.163 ("The coup de grace is to combine these inferences .... "). Preliminary 
injunctions could then follow almost automatically because lack of an adequate remedy 
at law and irreparable harm were themselves standard inferences to be drawn from evi-
dence that a complainant would probably succeed in proving a likelihood of confusing 
similarity at trial. See Schwinn Bicycle. 870 F.2d at 1184 n.16 (noting and criticizing 
this phenomenon); supra notes 695-98 and accompanying text. Even the non-func-
tionality requirement was at times indirectly satisfied by a presumption drawn from 
evidence of copying. in the sense that a competitor's failure to seek alternate forms 
actually determined how some courts applied the multiplicity of forms test and inhib-
ited them from evaluating the larger public interest. See supra notes 697-98 and 
accompanying text. 
704. See. e.g .• 1. Gn.sON. supra note 538. § 2.13[1] (noting "a torrent of cases granting relief 
on this ground" and stating that § 43(a) as applied to trade dress "has eclipsed state law 
on the subject"). 
705. Brown, supra note 32, at 1357. For the view that this represents a positive rather than a 
negative development, see generally Dratler, supra note 564; Franzosi. Unfair Competi-
tion. supra note 522. 
706. See. e.g .• Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F. 2d at 1184 n. 16 (fearing creation of product monop-
oly); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir. 1987); American Greet-
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from the public domain. 707 Still others rejected any indeterminate limita-
tions on a competitor's fundamental right to imitate superior products 708 
and warned against undermining the patent law by indirectly pr~tecting 
utilitarian advantages that did not satisfy the novelty and nonobviousness 
standards. 709 
In 1987, moreover, Landes and Posner published an economic analysis 
of general trademark law that called into question the excesses of the prod-
uct configuration cases.710 Their findings confirmed and refined insights 
concerning the limits of trademark protection for appearance designs that 
Judge Posner had advanced in w.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene/II a 1985 decision 
of the Seventh Circuit that LeSportsac had temporarily eclipsed. An article 
by Professor Brown, also published in 1987, reminded the relevant legal 
community that decisions sounding in misappropriation rested on shaky 
legal and economic foundations in United States law.712 
These countervailing pressures gave rise, in 1989, to two judicial pro-
nouncements of capital importance for future developments in this field. In 
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,713 the United States Supreme 
Court invalidated state plugmold statutes on the grounds that they unduly 
interfered with the federal patent law. In so doing, the Supreme Court again 
rejected the misappropriation rationale of International News Service and 
appeared to invest a competitor's right to reverse engineer unpatented prod-
ings corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986); see also supra note 
670 and accompanying text. 
707. See, e.g., Woodsmith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Co., 904 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(finding method and style of doing business not protectable); Prufrack Ltd., Inc. v. 
Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 134 (8th Cir. 1986)(holding chosen theme or concept not protec-
table trade dress); see also First Brands Corp. v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 809 F.2d 1378 (9th 
Cir. 1987) (finding shape was industry standard); American Greetings, 807 F.2d at 1145 
(holding standard configurations and marketing methods not protectable). 
708. See, e.g., Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Thlecommunications Group, 900 F.2d 1546, 1551 & 
n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that § 43(a), at least prior to its amendment, does not 
protect skilled efforts as such); Thxtron, Inc. v. United States Infl1rade Comm'n, 753 
F.2d 1019~ 1024-25 (Fed. Cir. 1985); infra notes 717-21 and accompanying text. 
709. See, e.g., Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971,977-78, (2d Cir. 1987) 
(noting that trade dress protection of product design can bar entry to markets not fore-
closed by patents, and stressing monopoly power of unregistered trademark); Standard 
Thrry Mills, Inc. v. Shen Mfg. Co., 803 F.2d 778, 781, 7% (3d Cir. 1986) (stating that 
judicial disapprobation of copying must give way to public policy favoring competition 
in regard to unpatentable products); Sno-Wizard Mfg., Inc. v. Eisemann Prods. Co., 
791 F.2d 423,426 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986); supra note 670 and accompanying text. 
710. See Landes & Posner, 7rademarlc Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcoN. 265, 
297-306 (1987); see also Bryant, supra note 684; Denicola, Institutional Publicity 
Rights: An Analysis of the Mercluzndizing of Famous 7rade Symbols, 7S TRADEMARK 
RER 41, 44-61 (1985); Note, Promotional Goods and the FUllCtionality Doctrine: An 
Economic Model of Trademarlcs, 63 TEX. L. Rev. 639,656-69 (1984). 
711. 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985). 
712. See generally Brown, supra note 32; see also Meyer. supra note 528, at 88-92. 
713. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (holding state laws 
forbidding unauthorized reproduction of product configurations by direct molding pro-
cess unconstitutional under Sears-Compco). 
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ucts with constitutional underpinnings.714 Flatly declaring that the legiti-
mate concern of unfair competition law lay in "protecting consumers from 
confusion as to source. . . not [in] the protection of producers as an incen-
tive to product innovation,'o7JS the Court cited Professor Brown's 1987 arti-
cle and reaffirmed the antiprotectionist mandate of Sears-Compeo with par-
ticular reference to industrial designs. 716 
A few months later, in Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc.,717 the 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied economic analysis to the 
design of an exercise bicycle and backed away from the protectionist line 
identified with LeSportsac.718 In a ground-breaking opinion, the panel 
found that the "superior" or "optimal" design test derived from Morton-Nor-
wich and LeSponsac had induced courts to exclude only the best possible 
designs and to ignore real difficulties competitors might face in trying to 
engineer around successful product configurations at a reasonable cost. 719 
The Schwinn Bicycle panel, like its predecessor in W. T. Rogers, 720 advocated 
the retention of a modified aesthetic functionality test capable of excluding 
designs that became market standards or that were so much valued for their 
own sake that effective competition could not occur without product simula-
tion.721 . 
Although one cannot foresee the future impact of these decisions with 
any degree of certainty, they add to a growing reaffirmation of the funda-
mental principle that allows competitors to copy all products not qualifying 
as "inventions" or "literary and artistic works."722 Whether the raw com-
714. Id. at 159-64; see Wiley, supra note 537, at 301-02. 
715. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 157 (emphasis in original). 
716. Id. at 159-68. 
717. 870 R2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989). 
718. Id. (vacating preliminary injunction protecting design of exercise bicycle as trade dress 
because fact of copying did not support presumption of likelihood of confusion and 
modified aesthetic functionality test should have been applied); see also W.T. Rogers 
Co. v. Keene, 778 R2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985) (followed in Schwinn Bicycle, 870 R2d 1176); 
supra notes 710-11 and accompanying text. . 
719. See Schwinn Bicycle, 870 R2d at 1189-90; Bloomfield Indus. v. Stewart Sandwiches, 
Inc., 716 R Supp. 380 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (applying Schwinn Bicycle to exclude look-alike 
design of coffeemaker); see also Sno-Wizard Mfg., Co. v. Eisemann Prods., 791 R2d 
423 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating that evidence suggested that design of machine was the 
most effective, practical, and cost-effective, so that other designs would have economic 
or functional·draw-backs). 
720. 778 RZd 334 (7th Cir. 1985). 
721. See Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1191; WT. Rogers, 778 R2d at 346-47. For the most 
recent case, see Wallace Int'. Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 R2d 76 
(2d Cir. 1990); cf Estabilimento Miliardi-Zanova S.r.L. v. Cassina, at 453 (Court of 
App., florence, Italy, Feb. 4, 1989) (rejecting claim for unfair competition, holding that 
defendant's minor variations on the LeCorbusier chair designs were either sufficient to 
identify it as the source of manufacture or were tbe only variations it could have made 
without compromising the value of the unpatented models), discussed in supra note 
380 .. 
722. See Bonito BoalS, 489 U.S. at 163-68 (reaffirming the right of competitors to reproduce 
unpatented, noncopyrightable designs, and declaring that Congress had decided to 
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petitive mandate institutionalized in this historical dichotomy infallibly pro-
motes the public welfare under modern economic conditions remains open 
to doubt.723 Even so, Bonito Boats and Schwinn Bicycle may well prefigure 
yet another swing of the pendulum away from the misappropriation ratio-
nale of International News Service and LeSportsac back to the free-market 
ethos of Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co. and Sears-Compco.724 Scholars 
and practitioners seeking to ascertain the status of design protection law in 
the United States will therefore need to test the trade-dress waters at fre-
quent intervals in order to determine if the floodgates of protection thrown 
open in the 1980s are not abruptly to close before the 1990s get very far 
under way. 
3. Critical Evaluation of Current Law 
The fiction that product configurations are just another form of trade 
dress leads to the odd conclusion that every product comes equipped with at 
least two trade dresses for purposes of section 43(a). One comprises the 
exterior shell or three-dimensional form that houses whatever else the prod-
uct consists of, known today as "appearance trade dress." The other com-
prises the package or container placed around the product when sold or 
transported from one place to another, which is what trade dress signified in 
the past. 72S . . 
Some courts and commentators who favor this result fear that a tenuous 
distinction between "trade dress" and "trademarks" could allow different 
legal rights to flow fro~ mere differences in labels.726 While this concern 
is valid in a narrow, technical sense, it ignores that product configurations 
traditionally received only marginal protection in unfair competition law 
because positive intellectual property law ordained that unpatented, non-
leave industrial designs unprotected); Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1184 n.16 (criticiz-
ing presumptions rooted in copying that result in product monopoly); id. at 1189-90 
(rejecting optimal design test of utilitarian functionality and focusing on whether fea-
tures are costly to design around or to do without); id. at 1191-92 (affirming modified 
aesthetic functionality test based on existence of competitive alternatives and insisting 
that trade dress protection must never prevent effective competition); see also Wood-
smith Publishing Co. v. Meredith Co., 904 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir. 1990) (rejecting theory of 
trade dress in the making); Cicena Ltd. v. Columbia Telecommunications Group, 900 
F.2d 1546, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (disapproving theory of secondary meaning in the 
making, and stressing that § 43(a) as originally enacted does not protect skilled 
efforts). But see Cicena, 900 F.2d at 1550 n.7 (hinting in dicta that "the substantial 
amendments made to § 43(a) by the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 changed the 
scope of protection" to reach deliberate copying as such). 
723. See, e.g., Wiley, supra DOte 537, at 296-302; Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra 
note 23, at 648-62 ("New Directions in Legal Protection of Industrial Know-How"); 
infra text accompanying notes 866-972. 
724. See supra notes 527-29, 549 and accompanying text. 
725. See supra notes 556-63,635-36 and accompanying text. 
726. See, e.g., Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604,608 (7th Cir. 1986). 
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copyrightable "industrial designs" should compete on the open market. 727 
If substantive rights ought not to depend on mere labels, then calling prod-
uct configurations "appearance trade dress" will not make them any the less 
product configurations. Nor should it automatically entitle them to the gen-
erous modalities of protection afforded packaging and container designs in 
recent years.728 The question is not whether trade dress should be assimi-
lated to trademarks. It is how to protect product configurations-that is to 
say, three-dimensional designs of useful articles-within a federal intellec-
tual property system that has been artificially carved up into semi-au-
tonomous subcultures each at war with the others. 
In this connection, one hears too much loose talk about protecting the 
good wilJ129 associated with product configurations under section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act. 73o Although a manufacturer's advantageous relations 
with the public are to some extent symbolized by his mark, a property right 
in the mark protects good will only insofar as it excludes others from draw-
ing on the information it provides, but not from using the qualities or fea-
tures of the underlying product. 731 So long as both Congress and the 
Supreme Court continue to regard the broad misappropriation doctrine of 
International News Service as inconsistent with free-market principles,732 it 
727. See supra notes 28-37,713-16 and accompanying text; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,157-68 (1989). 
728. The turning point was apparently Chevron Chern. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, 
Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. Unit A Oct. 1981), which Professor McCarthy believes 
"brought trade dress cases into the mainstream of trademark law." I 1.T. McCAIrrHY, 
supra note 525, at 287. 
729. Broadly conceived, good will results from a manufacturer's investment of time, money 
and skill, and it encompasses most of the factors that fan consumer demand for given 
products or services. See, e.g., 3 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 1677-78, 1705-06 (stress-
ing that a competitor's improper conduct may disrupt advantageous business relations 
built on goodwill without direct harm to the consuming public); Dratler, supra note 
564, at 927 & n.212 (designating protection of goodwill as the least important purpose 
of trademark law). 
730. See, e.g., Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844,854 n.14 
(1982) (stating that "by applying a trademark to goods produced by one other than the 
trademark's owner, the infringer deprives the owner of the good will which he has spent 
energy, time, and money to obtain"); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 678 F. 
Supp. 1336, 1344 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (declaring that, even without a showing of secondary 
meaning, the competitor should not be allowed to "cash in" on the plaintiff's good will 
in the design of an exercise bicycle), vacated, 870 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989); see also 
Jolly Good Indus., Inc. v. Elegra Inc., 690 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (defendant not 
to "piggyback on [plaintiff's] goods, reputation, or market share"). 
731. See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 967-68; Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 
268-75. 
732. See supra notes 527-28, 546-49 and accompanying text; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder 
Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (reconfirming that patent system "embodied 
a careful balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that imi-
tation and refinement through imitation are . . . the very lifeblood of a competitive 
economy"); see also P.J. KAuFMANN, supra note 50, at 4-5 (criticizing a "quasi-patent" 
analysis that allows the goodwill in an imitated product to be protected as such). But 
see, e.g., R. CALLMAN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR CoMPETITION 33 (L. Altman 4th ed. 1981) 
("If the copyist rival is permitted to ride 'piggy-back' into the market on the shoulders 
1989] Design Protection and the New Technologies 117 
is not the province of trademark and unfair competition laws to protect 
investment as such, nor indirectly to protect design concepts, ideas, meth-
ods, principles, and marketing strategies. 733 
Trademarks serve to distinguish the go~ds or services of single firms 
from those of other firms. 734 By protecting the signs and symbols used to 
make these distinctions, trademark law reduces the search costs to consum-
ers,735 stimulates manufacturers to "maintain a consistent quality over time 
and across consumers, .. 736 and discourages conduct tending to deceive or 
confuse consumers. 737 That there are sound economic justifications for 
securing property rights in trademarks 738 does not mean that courts should 
use trademark law to stimulate innovation or to provide incentives for prod-
uct development that derogate from the norms of competition.739 The 
opposite is true, as Stephen Ladas pointed out,74O because trademark law 
lacks the limitations and safeguards that positive intellectual property law 
establishes in order to balance the long-term public interest against short-
term restraints on trade. 74 1 To the extent that trademark and unfair compe-
tition laws attempt to remedy the perceived inadequacies of other legal disci-
of one who has legitimately sown, the classical injunction against the reaping of anoth-
er's harvest is violated."); see also Reichman, GAlT Connection, supra note 50, at 
780-96 ("Imitation as a Paradox of International Economic Law"). 
733. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. Ill, 122 (1938). The Court stated: 
Kellogg Company is undoubtedly sharing in the goodwill of the article known 
as "Shredded Wheat," and thus is sharing in a market which was created by 
the skill and judgment of plaintiff's predecessor ... [as] extended by vast 
expenditures in advertising. . . . But that is not unfair. Sharing in the good-
will of an article unprotected by patent or trade-mark is the exercise of a right 
possessed by all-and in the free exercise of which the consuming public is 
deeply interested. . 
Id.; see Brown, supra note 32, at 1357-58 (stressing that product simulation is legal 
right absent tortious acts of confusion or deception); see also Wiley, supra note 537, at 
292-93 (reading Bonilo BoalS as inhibiting judicial use of trademark law to encourage 
innovation). 
734. See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 967; Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 268. 
735. Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 269-70,275. 
736. Id. at 269. 
737. See, e.g., B. PATIISHALL & D. HILUARD, UNFAIR CoMPETITION AND UNFAIR TRADE 
PR ArrtCES 5 (1985); 2 s. LADAS, supra note 1, at 967; Oddi, supra note 550, at 926-27. 
738. See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 268-84. According to Ladas, "com-
petition is not possible if the purchasing public cannot distinguish the competing goods 
and have a chance to choose among them." 2 S. LADAS, supra note 1, at 968. 
739. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 157 (1989) (recog-
nizing the creation of" 'quasi-property rights' in communicative symbols" as a vehicle 
for the protection of consumers but disavowing the use of unfair competition law "as an 
incentive to product innovation" for the protection of producers). 
740. See 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 967-68 (stating that although linked with patents for 
purposes of the relevant international conventions, "trademark protection has none of 
the elements of patent protection"). 
741. Id. "[N]or is there any theory of public property or public possession of trademarks as 
there is in the case of inventions. . . . On the contrary, the public interest is that every 
producer or trader should use different marks so that the public may be able to distin-
guish between them ... without being confused or deceived." Id. at 968. 
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plines,742 they set up a competing forum capable of furnishing longer and 
tougher forms of protection on softer conditions. 743 At the limit, unfair 
competition law provides a ritual formula for suspending the rules of compe-
tition in favor of perpetual monopolies 744 that are conferred on a hit-or-miss 
basis for reasons that vary with the outlook of single judges. 74S 
The recent erosion of the functionality standard applied to product 
configurations under section 43(a) illustrates this disruptive· capacity. 746 
Time and again case law and the literature postulate that arbitrary or fanci-
ful trademarks are always available and that competitors never lack substi-
tute symbols.747 In reality, product configurations are most efficient when 
they combine functional and aesthetic attributes into an indissoluble whole 
that self-advertises the manufacturer and the product. 748 Such forms are 
hardly limitless, however. When the utilitarian nonfunctionality standard 
is unduly weakened in order to defend source-identifying aspects of these 
configurations, second comers may have to engineer around either the 
design as a whole or some of its constituent features in order to obtain com-
parable technical yields or even to gain entry into the market. 749 
To avoid these anomalies, trademark and unfair competition laws must 
require highly utilitarian ~roduct designs to undergo stringent tests of eligi-
bility and infringement.7 If functional design features cannot realistically 
be separated from aesthetic or distinctive features without loss of technical 
efficiency or output, no amount of secondary meaning should oblige a sec-
742. See, e.g., Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 661-67. 
743. See, e.g., Meyer, supra note 528, at 111-12; Pegram, supra note 532,:at 349-51. But 
see Dratler, supra note 564, at 975 (contending that "trademark law can accommodate 
protection of industrial design with the congressional mandate for free and robust com-
petition"). 
744. See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 532, at 348-49; supra note 624. 
745. See, e.g., van Nieuwenhoven Helbach, supra note 522, at 7 (referring to Netherlands 
law). 
746. See supra notes 653-69 and accompanying text. 
747. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 274; supra notes 608-12 and accompany-
ing text. But see, e.g., Carter, The Trouble With Trademark, 99 YALE LJ. 759, 760, 
787-88 (1990) (criticizing barriers to entry sheltered by this doubtful premise). 
748. See, e.g., van der Put & Komarnicki, Cooperation Between the Industrial Designer and 
the Lawyer Within an Enterprise, in DEsIGN PRon:cnON, supra note 8, at 181-203; 
Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17, at 280-82. See generally 1. HESKETT, 
supra note 493, at 127-44 ("Corporate Design and Product Identity"). 
749. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1188-89 (1989) 
(stating that a "feature is functional if it is one that is costly to design around or do 
without, rather than one that is costly to have," and suggesting that a second comer 
might have tQ duplicate aspects of the appearance of an exercise bicycle in order to 
duplicate its utilitarian features); W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene. 778 F.2d 334, 339-40 (7th 
Cir. 1985); Landes & Posner. supra note 710. at 297; see also supra text accompanying 
notes 196-210, 269-302 (discussing nonprotection of utility models in United States 
intellectual property law). 
750. Utilitarian designs, for example, should never qualify as unregistered marks without 
evidence of strong secondary meaning, and a defendant's intent to copy is irrelevant to 
this determination. See, e.g., Bryant. supra note 684, at 510-11; Duft, supra note 550, 
at 184-93.201-03. 
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ond comer to engineer around the ensemble in order to compete effec-
tively. 75 I To reduce this risk, courts should demand correspondingly 
stronger evidence of secondary meaning and probable .confusion when eval-
uating very functional designs at the infringement stage. They should also 
insist that the elements said to foster confusion actually pertain to protec-
table components of the design and not to components that bear on func-
tional yields or standardized results.752 In principle, courts should prefer 
remedies that are the . least disruptive of normal market forces, especially 
that of corrective labelling, rather than injunctive relief. 753 
Even when the appearance design of a useful article meets stiff 
requirements of secondary meaning 754 and of utilitarian nonfunctionality, 
and there is a real likelihood of confusion, the design should not qualify as 
an unregistered mark if it becomes an intrinsic part of the product in the 
minds of the purchasing public; or if it attains the status of a market stan-
dard for goods of a particular class; or if its popularity as a product design 
significantly outweighs its source-identifying capability within the relevant 
consumer group.755 Over time, commercial success can render any source-
identifying appearance design quasi-generic because of its popular associa-
tion with a product rather than a producer.756 Such features become "aes-
751. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 164 (1989) 
("Where an item in general circulation is unprotected by patent, '[r]eproduction of a 
functional attribute is legitimate competitive activity.' " (quoting Inwood Laboratories, 
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 863 (1982) (White, J., concurring in 
result»; see also Pegram, supra note 532, at 350 (stating that Bonito Boats appears not 
to adopt the methodology of Morton-Norwich in this dicta). 
752. See, e.g., Bloomfield Indus., Div. of Specialty Equip. Cos. v. Stewart Sandwiches, Inc., 
716 F. Supp. 380, 388 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (applying Schwinn Bicycle to deny a presump-
tion of secondary meaning from direct copying because "all coffeemakers are similar 
in design"); cf. supra text accompanying notes 303-18 (discussing parallel approach to 
design patent$ in Federal Circuit). 
753. See. e.g., Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d 1176. 
754. See supra note 750. Even when appearance designs are not highly functional, courts 
must nonetheless ensure that true·secondary meaning has been acquired over. and above 
the popularity of the product, and they should ascertain that a nexus exists between 
advertising or commercial success and source identification. See, e.g., Duft, supra 
note 550, at 184-93, 201-03 (arguing for stiff standard of secondary meaning in regard 
to commercially successful ornamental designs). 
755. See. e.g .• Schwinn Bit:-ycle, 870 F.2d at 1190; W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 
338, 340-48 (7th Cir. 1985). See generally Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 
297-99. 
756. See. e.g., Wallace Int'l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (finding "no difference between a claim ... [to] basic elements of decora-
tive style on silverware and claims to generic names"); w.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 347-48 
(comparing loss of trademark because consumers like it for its own sake rather than for 
its informational content to loss of a brand name that becomes generic). Judge Posner 
observed that the manufacturer remains free to brand his product with identity symbols 
even if consumers can no longer look to the configuration for source identification. He 
added that what the manufacturer "may fear of course is not the loss of an identifying 
mark but the loss of a competitive advantage stemming from the exclusive possession 
of a popular design"; yet, for that he "must seek the aid of the design-patent law, with 
its stringent requirements and its 14-year limitation, and not the aid of the trademark 
laws." [d. at 348. 
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thetically functional" if second comers cannot compete effectively without 
designing around them, which costs money, or if access to the market 
becomes difficult unless copying is allowed, just as occurs in cases of utili-
tarian functionality.757 
The aesthetic functionality doctrine inherited from the first Restate-
ment of Torts, which excluded most commercially successful designs under 
the "important ingredient" test, was undoubtedly a crude method of subor-
dinating trademark and unfair competition laws to the sway of copyright 
and design patent laws. 758 To vitiate the aesthetic functionality doctrine 
without providing other means of restraining trademark law from disrupting 
its sister legal subcultures is an even cruder response. One can agree that a 
design need not be ugly to qualify as an unregistered mark759 without for-
getting that trademark law protects industrial designs only insofar as they 
provide information about the source of manufacture760 and do not become 
"so important to the value of the product to consumers that continued . . . 
protection would deprive them of competitive alternatives."761 A modified 
aesthetic functionality doctrine thus provides a useful tool for restraining 
the excesses of the trade dress approach,762 and it merits careful develop-
ment in the future. 763 
Neither a modified aesthetic functionality doctrine nor stringent appli-
cation of other substantive prerequisites, however, will suffice to eradicate 
757. See, e.g., id. at 347; Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 297-99 ("The concept of 'aes-
thetic' functionality gives recognition, highly appropriate from an economic 
standpoint, to the fact that utility in an economic sense includes anything that makes a 
good more valuable to consumers. . . . A problem arises only if the aesthetic feature 
becomes an attribute of the product ... in the minds of consumers."); see also 
RESTATEMENT (TmRO) OF UNFAIR CoMPImTION § 17 comment c (Tent. Draft No. 2, 
1990) (stating that aesthetic functionality generally applies "only when objective evi-
dence indicates a lack of adequate alternative designs"). 
758. See supra notes 550-51, 608-12 and accompanying text. 
759. See, e.g., w.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 347 ("[A] producer does not lose a design trademark 
just because the public finds it pleasing .... "); LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 
F.2d 71, 76-78 (2d Cir. 1985). 
760. See supra notes 733-41 and accompanying text; Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. fix-It, 
Inc., 781 F.2d 604,609 (7th Cir. 1986). 
761. w.r. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 347; see supra notes 755, 757; see also Meyer, supra note 528, 
at 101 (discussing cases in which "it is impossible to separate the goods from the 
alleged trademark" and "it is the 'trademark' that consumers want to purchase"). 
Meyer concludes that an "exclusive right to the mark then confers a monopoly ... 
[that) precludes others from offering the same product. In that sense plaintiffs right in 
. the valuable symbol is equivalent to a copyright." Id. 
762. See, e.g., Schwinn Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1190-91 (remanding to determine whether 
design of exercise bicycle had become "so attractive that trade dress protection 
deprives consumers of competitive alternatives"); w.T. Rogers, 778 F.2d at 340, 342-43 
(remanding to determine whether the hexagonal end panel was "common to the entire 
product as evolved," i.e., to the molded plastic office stacking tray, or whether the 
design was otherwise functional); see also Landes & Posner, supra note 710, at 299. 
763. It is not clear, for example. why such a doctrine should be viewed as imposing a "heavy 
burden" on a defendant, as the Schwinn Bicycle panel seemed to believe. See Schwinn 
Bicycle, 870 F.2d at 1190. . 
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the raw protectionist bias that threatens to transform section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Act into a law &rQhibiting the misappropriation of three-dimension-
al industrial designs. 7 The Supreme Court's Bonito Boats decision thus 
provides a timely reminder that it cannot be unfair, in principle, to make 
free use of that which Congress has wisely or unwisely chosen to leave 
unprotected. 765 Some observers expect this latter-day reaffirmation of 
Sears-Compco to induce the federal judiciary to moderate protectionist sen-
timents rampant in the 1980s.766 . 
Yet, no evocation of liberal economic principles will make the design 
problem go away or provide a solution worthy of the name. The risk, 
indeed, is that unless Bonito Boats were followed by suitable legislative 
action, it could merely replace a period of mounting overprotection with a 
period of chronic underprotection in the name of nineteenth century eco-
nomic principles that yield increasin~r unsatisfactory results when applied 
to twentieth century technologies. 6 The nature of these oscillations 
between states of over- and underprotection is more fully explored in the 
final part of this Article. 768 For present purposes, one should recall that the 
United States intellectual property authorities urged Congress to provide the 
design industries with a sui generis legal regime built on modified copyright 
principles, a scheme that was very nearly enacted in 1976.769 The logical 
and most expedient solution is to pass a similar law now, at a time when the 
Supreme Court's Bonito Boats decision may have jeopardized recently 
acquired rights. Unfortunately, this solution has been compromised by spe-
cial interests seeking to transform the carefully worked out provisions of the 
preexisting ornamental desi~n bill770 into a law that would protect func-
tional designs of every kind 71 without requiring any appreciable creative. 
764. See supra notes 702-05 and accompanying text. 
765. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 ("At the heart of Sears and Compeo is the conclusion that 
the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free 
trade in publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions."). 
766. See, e.g., Pegram, supra note 532, at 345-48; see also Wiley, supra note 537, at 289-94. 
767. See, e.g., Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 652-67. 
768. See infra text accompanying notes 811-972. 
769. See supra notes 13-27 and accompanying text. See generally Reichman, Designs 
Befnre 1976, supra note 17, at 1186-1200 ("Toward an American Regime of Sui 
Generis Protection"). 
770. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1176 & n.169. 
771. See H.R. 3499, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (Moorhead Dill), reprinted in 38 Pat. 
Trademark & Copyright J. (DNA) 684-89 (Oct. 26, 1989) (proposing in § I(a) to pro-
tect "an original design of a useful article which makes the article attractive or distinct 
in appearance to the purchasing or using public" and excluding in § 2 designs that are 
not·original, that are staple or commonplace or that are "dictated solely by a utilitarian 
function," and apparel designs) (emphasis supplied); H.R. 3017, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1989) (Gephart Dill), reprinted in 38 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (DNA) 348-54 
(Aug. 3, 1989) (essentially the same as to coverage except that typeface designs are 
included while some provision is made to limit the eligibility of automotive spare parts 
in § 1002(4»; H.R. 902, IOlst Cong.,. 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in Pat. Trademark & 
Copyright J. (DNA) 359-68 (Feb. 16, 1989) (essentially the same but proposing to 
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contribution. 772 
As will be seen below, the legal status of functional designs cannot 
rationally be severed from the drive to protect applied scientific know-how 
in general,773 and no law purporting to regulate the one without addressing 
the other deserves serious consideration.774 In the long run, a satisfactory 
solution to the puzzle of applied scientific know-how should determine the 
nature of the protection afforded both functional and ornamental designs 
within the framework of far-reaching adjustments to the world's intellectual 
property system. 775 In the short run, however, tinkering with established 
modalities of intellectual property law for the purpose of protecting func-
tional designs that are neither aesthetically nor technically innovative con-
stitutes an unprecedented assault on free-market principles,776 a solution 
exclude typeface designs). The precise coverage obtained by allowing protection for 
"two-dimensional or three-dimensional features of shape and surface" that make a use-
ful article "attractive or distinct in appearance" is open to question, as is the thrust of 
the common exclusion for functionality, which kicks in only when a candidate design is 
"dictated solely by a utilitarian function." See, e.g., H.R. 3017, IOlst Cong., 1st Sess. 
§§ lool(a), 1002-03 (1989). It is clear, nevertheless, that by changing the nature of the 
subject matter of protection from "ornamental designs" to "industrial designs," leading 
supporters of these bills want them to protect nonpatentable functional designs, includ-
ing automobile and tractor replacement parts. See, e.g., House Panel Looks at Impact 
of Proposed Design Protection on Autoparts Market, 40 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. 
(BNA) 207 (June 28, 1990) (summarizing testimony before House Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice, June 20, 1990); infra 
note 776; see also Brown, supra note 32, at 1399-1403 (analyzing and criticizing an 
earlier version of these bills); Hearing on H.R. 1179, Protection of 1ndustrial Designs of 
Useful Articles Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil liberties & the Admin. of Justice of 
the House Comm. of the Judiciary, looth Cong., 2d Sess. 153-64 (1988) [hereinafter 
Design Protection Hearings 1988) (statement of Professor Ralph S. Brown, Yale Univer-
sity); id. at 57-65 (statement of Ralph Oman, Register of Copyrights). 
772. See, e.g., H.R. 3017, Wist Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1001 (a), 1002-03 (1989) (requiring 
originality in the sense of independent creation, excluding staple or commonplace 
designs and designs dictated solely by function, and allowing substantial revisions of 
commonplace or staple designs). The other bills, H.R. 3499 and H.R. 902 are the 
same in this respect. Contrast the zero creativity standard of these bills with the rela-
tively stiff standards of inventive height traditionally required of functional designs 
under foreign utility model laws. See supra note 198 and accompanying text; see also 
infra text accompanying notes 899-972. Another defect of the proposed design bills is 
that their line of demarcation with trademarks is also murky and can be read to pre-
serve the broad protection currently available under § 43(a). See, e.g., Brown, supra 
note 32, at 1399-1400. 
773. See infra text accompanying notes 866-900. See generally Reichman, Programs as 
Know-How, supra note 23, at 661-67, 714-17. 
774. The recently enacted unregistered design law in the United Kingdom, supra note 202, 
only confirms the proposition sustained in the text. According to Fellner, this law was 
really an effort to cut back on the exorbitant copyright protection of functional designs 
that English couns developed in recent years. See Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 
46; see also infra notes 846, 947-63 and accompanying text. 
775. See infra text accompanying notes 866-972. 
776. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1399. Professor Brown observed: "The most vigor-
ous support for it [i.e., the pending bill] came from original parts manufacturers .... 
[T)hey expect to ... register purely utilitarian objects on the strength of design gim-
micks that make the article 'distinct in appearance' even if it will never be seen once it 
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certain to be challenged in international trade forums 777 and likely to be 
repealed once the country returned to its competitive senses. 
A protectionist venture of this kind778 would only lengthen the list of 
unsolved problems attributable to this unruly legal hybrid and discredit the 
cause of design protection generally. What the present situation calls for, 
instead, is prompt enactment of a law like the refined sui generis design 
bill-meant to be "a model for the whole world,,779- that was so inogpor-
tunely deleted from the General Revision of Copyright Law in 1976.78 
III. PREMISES FOR INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF A 
DISRUPTIVE LEGAL HYBRID 
A. Cyclical Nature o/the Design Phenomenon in all Legal Environments 
The recurring bouts of over- and underprotection depicted in the pre-
ceding pages recapitulate the chequered history of design protection law 
abroad despite the long period in which American intellectual property law 
was relatively isolated from continental influences. 78 1 On both sides of the 
Atlantic, one discerns a cyclical pattern in the behavioral response of indus-
trial design to different regulatory approaches. This pattern illuminates the 
true nature of the design problem, and it suggests that no lasting interna-
tional solution will emerge from parochial essays that ignore the lessons of 
the past. 
I. Pendular Swings in Domestic Law 
The cyclical nature of the United States experience can best be illus-
is installed. . . . Now a fuel injector nozzle would get ten years' proteclion from copy-
ing just because it was distinct from other nozzles." Id.; see also Hearings on H.R. 
3017 (Industrial Design Anti-Piracy Act of /989) and H.R. 3499 (The Design Protection 
Act of 1989) Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of 
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (testimony 
and statement of Professor 1.H. Reichman on Sept. 27, 1990). 
777. Article XX(d) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) exempts specific 
forms of intellectual property from the normal disciplines imposed by the GAIT. 
However, the terms of this exception are not infinitely expandable at the whim of partic-
ular countries, nor can the notion of "intellectual property" as a whole be defined with-
out reference to some objective historical understanding of this institution. Otherwise, 
intellectual property would become the label for an exception that swallowed the GATT 
whole. See generally Reichman, GAIT Connection, supra note 50, at 831-36. 
Moreover, the mandate for the Uruguay Round specifically calls on the negotiators "to 
ensure that measures . . . to enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves 
become barriers to legitimate trade." See id. at 751 n.2. 
·778. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 1399 (calling the pending design bills "a bald piece 
of protectionism, aimed . . . at the Japanese and other competitors in the replacement 
parts market"). 
779. Fisher Address, supra note 16, at 211. 
780. See supra notes 17-22 and accompanying text; infra notes 918-34 and accompanying 
text. 
781. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. 
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trated by reference to certain lamp designs that marked turning points in the 
relevant legal history.782 It was, for example, a set of lamps in the shape of 
dancing figures that dramatically opened the domestic copyright law to 
works of applied art in 1954,783 at a time when judicial hostility to desi~n 
patents had rendered the statutory design law operationally ineffective. 84 
But the Register's adoption of restrictive legal definitions of applied art-
notably the criterion of scindibilta or sefarability78S-soon closed the copy-
right door to modem industrial art,78 and lamp designs not representing 
traditional forms of sculpture were consequently left without any effective 
protection under federal intellectual property law after 1958.787 
In this legislative vacuum, lamp manufacturers, like other design 
industries, looked to state unfair competition laws for relief against free rid-
ers who appropriated innovative product configurations.788 In fact, the 
Sears-Compeo cases, which reached the Supreme Court in 1964, dealt with 
nonrepresentational lamp designs that had obtained protection afainst copy-
ing under state laws rooted in the misappropriation rationale. 78 But when 
the Supreme Court barred the states from treating slavish imitation as a dis-
crete business tort,790 the pendulum thus swung brusquely away from incip-
ient overprotection in state unfair competition law towards chronic under-
protection in federal intellectual property law once again.791 
While the intellectual property authorities sought legislative enactment 
of a sui generis design law built on modified copyright principles,792 the 
legal community responded to Sears-Compeo by pressing federal courts to 
open copyright law to commercial designs notwithstanding administrative 
782. The tendency of lamp designs to figure prominently in foreign jurisprudence adds to 
the significance of these illustrations. 
783. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954). 
784. See supra notes 29-30, 68-77 and accompanying text. 
785. See supra notes 332-48 and accompanying text. 
786. See supra notes 339-42 and accompanying text. 
787. See supra notes 28-32, 72-77, 339-42 and accompanying text. At that time, the notion 
of a federal common law of unfair competition was still constrained by constitutional 
limitations on the jurisdiction of federal courts generally. See, e.g., 3 S. LADAS, supra 
note I, at 1701-02 (discussing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938». The federal 
appellate courts had not yet dared to move § 43(a) of the Lanham Act in this direction. 
See generally Germain, supra note 534. 
788. See Brown, Eligibility for CopyrighJ Protection: A Search for Principled Standards, 70 
MINN. L. REV. 579,603-06 (1985) (hereinafter Brown, Eligibility). 
789. See id. at 603-05; supra notes 527-29 and accompanying text. The Sears case dealt 
with pole lamps and Compco concerned certain fluorescent lighting fixtures. Both 
designs had been the subject of issued design patents that were judicially invalidated in 
the course of infringement proceedings. . 
790. See supra notes 31-32, 528, 538 and accompanying text. Had state unfair competition 
law been allowed to continue on its previous path, it would have instituted a highly pro-
tectionist era. This prospect alarmed the copyright authorities. See, e.g., Ringer, The 
Case for Design Protection and the O'Mahoney Bill, 7 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 25, 
29-30 (1959). 
791. See supra notes 332-48 and accompanying text. 
792. See supra text accompanying notes 72-75. 
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regulations to the contrarfg.793 Beginning in the 1970s, some courts 
acceded to these pressures, 94 a trend that culminated early in 1976 when a 
federal district judge held that the streamlined shape of an outdoor parking 
lamp qualified as a copyrightable work of applied art. 795 The low threshold 
of originality characteristic of United States copyright law and the principle 
of nondiscrimination that is deeply rooted in the domestic tradition thus 
combined to produce full copyright protection for a growing number of 
commercial designs of everyday objects, including this "high-tech" lamp 
design, some twelve years after Sears-Compeo had ended the protection of 
comparable designs in state unfair competition laws.796 . 
Congress repudiated this and similar decisions a few months later by 
codifying the separability test for works of applied art'97 without, however, 
enacting the proposed sui generis design law. 798 On the strength of this 
codified criterion, a federal appellate court retroactively ejected the outdoor 
parking lamp from copyright law in 1978,799 and the prospects for chronic 
overprotection of industrial designs as copyrightable works of applied art 
subsided once again. Given the past ineffectiveness of the design patent 
law, indeed, the pendulum appeared to swing towards another period of 
chronic underprotection in federal intellectual property law. 800 
In reality, as the empirical evidence surveyed earlier in this Article has 
shown, countervailing judicial strategies in the 1980s first checked and then 
reversed the seemingly vulnerable legal status of industrial designs. One 
influential appellate court tried to expand the availability of copyright pro-
tection by devising a more elastic interpretation of the separability criterion 
itself, an experiment that now seems to have failed. 801 The new appellate 
tribunal specializing in patent appeals has significantly increased the availa-
bility and effectiveness of design patent protection.802 Above all,· the fed-
eral appellate courts generally have expanded the protection of product 
configurations as "appearance trade dress" under section 43(a) of the Lan-
ham Act, with the result that its anticompetitive thrust may actually exceed 
that of state unfair competition laws prior to the Sears-Compeo decisions of 
1964.803 
793. See generally Reichman. Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1223-49. 
794. See id. nt 1238-49; supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
795. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer. 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev 'd. 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 
1978); see also Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198. 200-01 (E. D. Va. 1976) 
(typeface design was artistic work). affd on other grounds. 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978) 
(denying copyright). 
796. See supra notes 19-20, 31-32 and accompanying text; Comment, Copyright Protection, 
supra note 6; Reichman, Designs After 1976, supra note 17. at 298-303 ("Excesses of 
the Copyright Approach"). 
797. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. 
798. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
799. See Esquire, 591 F.2d 796; supra notes 369-73 and accompanying text. 
800. See supra text accompanying notes 339-48. 
801. See supra text accompanying notes 385-91. 
802. See supra text accompanying notes 319-31. 
803. See supra text accompanying notes 634-705. 
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The full irony of this latest swing of the pendulum appears from two 
decisions concerning modern designs of halogen desk lamps, imported from 
Italy, that were handed down in 1987 and 1989, respectively.804 Under the 
legislation currently in force, neither the ''Tizio'' nor the "Dove" lamps 
qualified for hard protection on hard conditions for a period of fourteen 
years in design patent law,805 nor could they have obtained soft protection on 
soft conditions for a period of seventy-five to one hundred years in literary 
and artistic property law.806 A federal district court nonetheless protected 
both high-tech designs against copying for an indefinite period of time as 
nonfunctional appearance trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. 807 By 1989, in short, lamp designs like that denied copyright protec-
tion in 1978808 routinely obtained more than copyright law had to offer 
under federal unfair competition law, even though Congress had refused to 
grant similar designs even ten years of protection on modified copyright 
principles in 1976!809 
Whether industrial designs will continue to receive exorbitant protec-
tion in unfair competition law after the Supreme Court's Bonito Boats deci-
sion in 1989 remains an open question. 810 Either way, barring appropriate 
legislative action, the prospects favor continued swings of the pendulum like 
those that have characterized the treatment of industrial designs in domestic 
law for the past forty years. 
2. Under- and Overprotection in Foreign Law 
Taken together, virtually all the industrialized countries have experi-
enced the pattern depicted above in one form or another during the two hun-
804. Artemide S.p.A. v. Grandlite Design & Mfg. Co., 672 E Supp. 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) 
(holding "Tizio" design of halogen desk lamp entitled to preliminary injunction 
because commercial success, advertising, unsolicited media coverage and evidence of 
deliberate copying established "sufficiently serious question of secondary meaning of 
lamp's trade dress"); PAF S.r.I. v. Lisa Lighting Co., 712 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(holding "Dove" design of halogen desk lamp protected against copying as appearance 
trade dress that had acquired secondary meaning and was not functional). 
805. The "Tizio" lamp had been sold throughout the world and, since 1972, in the United 
States, where it was the subject of a United States utility patent. The defendant had 
apparently managed to design around the utility patent even though his product still 
resembled the Tizio lamp in appearance. Artemide, 672 F. Supp. at 698. Had the man-
ufacturer obtained an enforceable design patent in 1972 (there is no evidence that he 
tried), it would have expired in 1986 at the latest. See 17 U.S.c. § 173 (1988). As· 
regards the "Dove" lamp. it is not clear whether a design patent would have been 
granted if sought, given the Tizio design as prior art, although the "Dove" design was 
good enough to win numerous international awards. The defendant candidly testified 
that "because no design patent had issued for the Dove, he thought he could sell the 
Swan [i.e., his copy] freely." PAF, 712 F. Supp. at 399. 
806. See supra text accompanying notes 412-75. But see supra text accompanying notes 
360-68,385-91. 
807. See supra note 804. 
808. See supra notes 369-73 and accompanying text (discussing Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 
F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and other relevant decisions). 
809. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
810. See supra notes 713-24 and accompanying text. 
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dred year period in which the design problem has plagued world intellectual 
property law. 811 Although the cyclical movement from underprotection to 
overprotection and back to underprotection once again tends to occur at dif-
ferent velocities in different legal environments, comparative analysis shows 
it to be a recurrinf behavioral characteristic of most developed intellectual 
property systems. 12 
a. Excesses of the Copyright Approach 
-
Initially, the condition of underprotection stemmed from the assimila-
tion of industrial designs to the full patent paradigm under the aegis of the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.813 Few appear-
ance designs satisfied the test of inventive height characteristic of this para-
digm814 because most designers strive to produce recognizable variations on 
known models or style trends and seldom take major steps beyond the prior 
art. 815 Moreover, few commercial designers able to surmount this hurdle 
could also satisfy the patent law's rigid novelty requirements, which usually 
oblige inventors to file before testing the market on pain of forfeiture. 8 16 
The strict substantive prerequisites and cumbersome procedures of patent 
law thus made industrial designs the "foor relation" of both domestic and 
international industrial property law. 81 
The rigidity of the patent paradigm led the design industries in many 
countries to seek copyright protection by emphasizing the artistic skills that 
are but one ingredient of most successful product configurations. 818 Parti-
sans of this approach premise the right to copyright protection on the claim 
that industrial art is art while stressing that the copyright paradigm forbids 
discrimination between various art forms on the basis of merit.819 Because 
811. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. 
812. See generally Reichman, Designs After 1976. supra note 17, at 366-82 (summarizing 
findings of the author's earlier comparative studies). The cyclical movement in France 
occurred before that country converted to the unity of art position late in the 19th cen-
tury. Since then, the situation has proved remarkably stable despite complaints about 
chronic overprotection in copyright law. See supra note 500. The significance of this 
relative stability is examined below. See infra text accompanying notes 900-69. 
813. See G. BoDEN HAUSEN, supra note 109, at 86 (discussing current version of Paris Con-
vention, supra note I, art. 5 quinquies); 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 827-40 (discussing 
evolution of this provision). 
814. See supra notes 97-109, 319-20 and accompanying text. 
815. See. e.g., Oratler, supra note 564, at 892 (citing and quoting authorities); Crouwel, A 
Designer's View of Plagiarism, in DEsIGN PROTECTION, supra note 8, at 155, 161-62 
(stating that, to the designer, "[e]xamples exist to be further developed and copied"). 
816. See. e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 832. 
817. Id. at 828; see also Benussi, supra note 8, at 61 (stating that "the widespread view that 
designs are the 'poor relations' of the industrial property family, and of only limited 
interest from a legal point of view, corresponds to an ever smaller degree with reality"). 
818. See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 833-36 ("An industrial designer, who must recon-
cile ... competing considerations, is ... part artist, part artisan, and more than a lit-
tle engineer."); see also Dratler, supra note 564, at 891. 
819. See, e.g., 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 831-32; Bougeard, Les origines equivoques de Ia 
Loi de 1909: Des dessins et mode/es au dessin ou mode/es, in LES DEsSINS ET MOD~LES 
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copyright laws everywhere accept low standards of originality and creativ-
ity (although seldom as low as those traditionally applied in the United 
States),820 the bulk of all appearance designs become potentially eligible for 
long-term protection on soft conditions once the door swings open In 
response to such pressures. 821 
The . mature copyright paradigm then perversely invests successful 
designers with market opportunities that are denied to other creators of liter-
ary and artistic works. The powerful reproduction rights, strong remedies 
and long duration of copyright law normally presuppose the existence of an 
infinite range of variables through which acts of independent creation give 
expression to the human personality in original works of authorship.822 In 
regard to ornamental designs of useful articles, however, the range of vari-
ables actually available to would-be innovators is narrowed by an array of 
external constraints. 
For example, the designers' subjective inputs are conditioned by objec-
tive functional requirements and by the need to work within the style trend 
prevailing for any given class of goods.823 Other constraints include: stan-
dardization; the current emphasis on nonpersonalized, corporate design 
solutions for mass-produced goods; a need to fulfill consumer expectations 
concerning marketable designs of particular products;824 and the growing 
reliance on human factors engineering, which uses psychological and socio-
logical data to increase the sales appeal of certain products by rendering 
them more "user friendly" to the relevant class of consumers.825 These con-
EN QuESTION, supra note 8, at 9, 24-32; Cohen Jehoram, Specific Design Protection and 
Copyright in Benelux and Dutch Law, in DEsIGN PRoTecnoN, supra note 8, at 21, 26 
[hereinafter Cohen Jehoram, Specific Protection] (stating that for judges to evaluate the 
aesthetic character of candidate designs is "an anathema to copyright"). 
820. See, e.g., Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 683-88; Ljungman, The 
Scandanavian Approach in Design Protection-Aims and Outcome-in Comparison 
with the New Benelux Legislation, in DEsIGN PROTECJ1ON, supra note 8, at 117, 123. 
821. See, e.g., Finniss, The Theory of "Unity of Art" and the Protection of Designs and 
Models in French Law, 46 1. PAl: OFF. SOC'y 615, 618-19 (1964). See generally Perot-
Morel, Specific Protection of Designs and Its Relation to Protection by Copyright in 
French Law, in DEsiGN PRmccrION, supra note 8, at 45-46,56-65 [hereinafter Perot-
Morel, Specific Protection] (criticizing the extension of French copyright law to the 
head of a grease gun, a light socket, an armchair devised to increase relaxation, and the 
design of an umbrella, when no aesthetic effect was intended). 
822. See, e.g., 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 26-31, 116-20. 
823. See, e.g., id. at 76; van der Put & Komamicki, supra note 748; Crouwel, supra note 
815. See generally J. HESKETT, supra note 493, at 127-44 ("Corporate Design and 
Product Identity"). . 
824. See, e.g., E. MANZINI, THE MATERIAL OF INVENTION 53-54 (1989) (stressing abstrac-
tion, immateriality, a multiplicity of parameters, and "the mass of knowledge ... that 
[makes] design ... increasingly ... a collective activity"); see also Strunkmann-
Meister, Leistungsschutz und industrieform, 66 UFITA 63, 64-67 (1973); Strunkmann-
Meister, Systematische Betrachtungen zum Neuheitsbegriff und Geschmac/csmuste"echt, 
58 UFITA 14, 14-16,20-23,36 (1970). 
825. See, e.g., D. UGHANWA & M. BAKER, supra note 263, at 291; McCoy, Forward, in 
DEsIGNS IN THE INRlRMATlON ENVIRONMENT 1, 5 (P. Whitney ed. 1985) (stating that 
designers "must position themselves as the experts at humanizing the machine for their 
users. . .. [T]he concept of human factors must be expanded [beyond the physical 
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straints increase the likelihood that different designers will independently 
arrive at similar results, and they determine the number of design solutions 
that second comers must use in order to compete effectively on the relevant 
market segments. 826 
Given the incremental nature of most design innovation, the lack of any 
obligation to specify copyrightable claims at the time protection arises, and 
the restricted range of variations available to competitors who need to stay 
within parameters set by the market, the classical defenses of copyright law 
lose much of their bite. The first to introduce a commercially successful 
design onto the market will try to stigmatize the competitors' posterior 
designs as infringing copies merely because they partake of a general style 
trend or of a common idea or of other fublic-domain matter, and these 
harassing lawsuits are costly to defend.8 7 Wary competitors sometimes 
prefer to work around unprotectable design features rather than face the 
threat of litigation. 828 Once litigation occurs, even the most laissez-faire 
courts may incautiously erect barriers to entry around miniscule design var-
iations that second comers should be able to avoid with equally miniscule 
variations of their own. 829 The more industrial designers succeed in inte-
grating form and function, moreover, the more likely it becomes that copy-
right owners can impose variations ostensibly pertaining to form that actu-
ally affect the capacity of third parties to imitate noncopyrightable func-
tional components in a cost effective manner. 830 
All the risks of overprotection that inhere in equating ornamental 
interface) to include the psychological, cognitive. and perceptual interface with the 
user."); see also Moody. The Role of Industrial Design in the Development of New Sci-
ence-Based Products, in DEsiGN POLICY. DEsIGN AND INDUSTRY 70, 73 (R. Langdon ed. 
1984) (hereinafter DEsiGN POLICY); Curtis, Engineering Computer "Look and Feel": 
User Interface Technology and Human Factors Engineering, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 51, 
63-75 (1989). 
826. See, e.g., Ljungman, supra note 820, at 123; Curtis, supra note 825, at 74-78 (stressing 
limited number of ways to perform simple tasks, designer's aim to achieve most 
effective method, and users' demand for consistency of design in computer software 
packages); see also Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Appli-
calion Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1053-58, 1066-71 (1989). 
827. See, e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905,910-11 (2dCir. 1980) (sta-
ting that "to extend copyrightability to miniscule variations would simply put a weapon 
for harassment in the hands of mischievous copicrs"); L. Batlin & SOil, Inc. v. Snyder, 
536 F.2d 486, 488, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) (involving lawsuit sought to restrain 
competitor from using public-domain matter, not just plaintiff's contribution), cerr. 
denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); see also 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 66-71 (criticiz-
ing judicial tendency to protect nonoriginal subject matter, including "fundamental 
design elements" lacking originality or expressive content, in fabric design cases); id. 
at 78-80 (noting same tendency in regard to three-dimensional toys and dolls). 
828. See, e.g., Drader, supra note 564, at 913-.16. 
829. See generally Comment, Copyright Protection, supra note 6; cf Reichman, Programs as 
Know-How, supra note 23, at 684-85; supra note 827. Most commercial designs will 
lack the stamp of the creator's personality, which remains a key prerequisite of eligibil-
ity in foreign copyright laws. See, e.g., Ljungman. supra note 820. at 123. 
830. See, e.g., P~rot-Morel, Specific Protection, supra note 821. at 56-60; cf Curtis, supra 
note 825, at 76-78 (stressing subservience of aesthetic values to functional efficiency in 
modem industrial design influenced by human factors engineering). 
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designs of useful articles with original works of authorship are then com-
pounded by the copyright owner's ability to restrict competition on the gen-
eral products market and not just oJi the market for artistic objects. 831 This 
phenomenon confronts the international intellectual property system with a 
major theoretical anomaly, and it can easily disrupt the overall balance 
between incentives to innovate and free competition that system aims to 
mediate. 
b. The Two-Market Conundrum 
The mature copyright paradigm of the Berne Union countries, with its 
low threshold of eligibility and its long duration, tends to reward authors and 
artists more generously than would be the case if the goal of artistic prop-
erty law were solely to stimulate a sufficient level of investment in the pro-
duction and dissemination of creative works. 832 This generosity, which 
exposes copyright law to the criticism of conservative economists,833 
appears in turn to rest on two negative assumptions that tacitly underlie the 
copyright and patent paradigms, respectively.834 The first assumption is 
that the soft modalities of the domestic copyright laws will apply only to the 
market for literary and artistic works as such and will not, for this reason, 
disrupt the regulation of industrial property by the patent paradigm. 835 
The second negative assumption is that all forms of industrial property that 
fail to satisfy the strict prerequisites of domestic patent laws (or allied disci-
plines) should submit to free competition. 836 
831. See, e.g., B. KAPL\N, supra note 6, at 55. 
832. Foyer, Rapport de synthese. in OsJECTIF 1992. supra note 46. at 133-34 (stating that 
copyright law. as applied to true literary and artistic works. is more concerned with the 
recognition of creators' rights than with the protection of the investment in given types 
of production); cf 1 P. GOLDSTEIN. supra note 28. at 6-8 (conceding that copyright law 
gives more protection than incentive theory alone can justify). 
833. See, e.g .• Breyer. The Uneasy Case/or Copyright: A Study o/Copyright in Books, Photo-
copies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARY. L. REV. 281 (1970); see also R. BENKO, PRO-
TECl1NG INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS-IssuES AND CoNTROVERSIES 19-25 (1987); 
Landes & Posner, An Economic Analysis 0/ Copyright Law. 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 
(1989) [hereinafter Landes & Posner. Copyright Law). 
834. For the role of the negative assumptions discussed in the text in establishing a theoreti-
cal foundation for the protection of new technologies generally, see J.H. Reichman. 
Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms (Nov. 30, 1989) (paper 
presented to the Forum on Intellectual Property Issues in Software. Computer Science 
and Technology Board. National Research Council. National Academy of Sciences. 
Washington. D.C.) [hereinafter Reichman. Legal Hybrids). 
835. See, e.g .• Baker v. Seiden, 101 U.S. 99. 103 (1879); Fisher Address, supra note 16, at 
209 (stating that the copyright law. "with its long term and a whole series of different 
formalities," was developed for totally different purposes from those of industrial pro-
duction and should not be misapplied to the broad scope of American industry). 
836. See Bonito Boats. Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156, 164 (I 989)(sta-
ting that the novelty and nonobviousness requirements of the federal patent law "pro-
vide the baseline of free competition upon which the patent system's incentive to crea-
tive effort depends"; adding that "Sears and CompeD protect more than the right of the 
public to contemplate the abstract beauty of an otherwise unprotected intellectual crea-
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Treating designs of useful articles as copyrightable works of art sub-
verts both of these negative economic premises. For example, adherents of 
the unity of art thesis disregard the likelihood that the exclusive rights con-
ferred on commercial designs as works of art will enable manufacturers to 
control exploitation of the material sup~orts in which these designs subse-
quently become embodied as products. 37 Because products of routine in-
novation normally escape price competition only on the hard conditions of 
patent law, the availability of copyright protection for industrial art under-
mines the proper operation of the patent system. 838 It is "precisely the 
capacity·of ... applied art to compete in both the market for artistic works 
and in the general products market that aggravates the design problem; no 
facile invocation of general principles of copyright law will make this two.:. 
market conundrum disappear. ,,839 
The propensity of industrial designs to violate cardinal economic 
premises underlying both the patent and copyright paradigms explains the 
resistance to the unity of art doctrine and the destabilizing impact that doc-
trine continues to exert on the world's intellectual property system. A "two-
market conundrum" also explains the supposed paradox that results from 
treating ornamental designs of useful articles less favorably than banal com-
mercial paintings sold as home furnishings. 840 The falsity of the paradox 
resides in the fact that sales of commercially successful paintings do not 
affect the markets for the material supports in which they are embodied, 
namely, the markets for canvas, petroleum, and wood products. In con-
trast, ornamental designs of useful articles, which typically begin life as 
two-dimensional graphic works like any other commercial paintings, end by 
tion-they assure its efficient reduction to practice and sale in the marketplace"). 
Trade secret, however, remains a valid option. Id. at 154-56; see also Brown, Eligibil-
ity. supra note 788, at 604-05. 
837. See. e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 13 ("Industrial aesthetics, born under the sign of 
the most ferocious competition, is devoted to purely commercial objectives.") (trans.); 
Gaubiac, supra note 7, at 40-41 (stating that "the theory of the unity of art entails an 
undermining of the [Copyright) Law ... and an alignment with the law of industrial 
property" and noting that "industrial and commercial exploitation, the chief character-
istic of designs and models, makes the [Copyright) Law ... hard to apply") (trans.). 
838. See. e.g .. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 156 (stating that "efficient operation of the federal 
patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented 
design and utilitarian conceptions"); Note, Protection/or the Artistic Aspects 0/ Articles 
0/ Utility, 72 HARY. L. REV. 1520, 1526-27 (1959) (stressing evils of long-term protec-
tion for noninventive designs). 
839. Reichman, Designs Be/ore 1976. supra note 17, at 1197. To say that a copyrighted 
work of art is normally protected when transformed into a different artistic medium is 
not a sufficient answer to questions concerning the desirability of encumbering trade on 
the general products market simply because a given product also makes use of a copy-
righted work. See also Foyer, supra note 832, at 138-42; Gaubiac, supra note 837. 
840. See. e.g., Truijen, Industrial Design and the Design Law, in DEsiGN PROTECfION, supra 
note 8, at 169-70. Because such paintings also serve a utilitarian purpose without for-
feiting copyright protection, it can be argued that to exclude industrial designs from 
copyright law violates the principle of nondiscrimination. 
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driving the markets for, say, automobiles, refrigerators, and dental equip-
ment. 841 
Given this two-market conundrum, the economically undesirable 
repercussions that ensue from treating commercial designs as copyrightable 
works of applied art will vary with the extent to which domestic intellectual 
property systems succumb to the claim to recognition as art. 842 As copy-
right protection for designs of useful articles expands, the disruptive effects 
on the general products market induce countervailingg£ressures to restrict 
the scope of protection acquired in the name of art. 3 As protection in 
copyright law correspondingly contracts, pressures for recognition of indus-
trial art as a legally,srotectable form of industrial property normally 
increase once again. 8 Herein lies the perennial fascination with sui 
generis design protection laws, which virtually all industrialized countries 
(except the United States) have adopted and which many European Commu-
nity countries have attempted to reform in recent years. 845 The trouble with 
these laws, however, is that-with the possible exception of the United 
Kingdom's new, unregistered design right846-they uniformly subject 
industrial art to a modified patent-law paradigm. 847 
841. See. e.g .• Fisher Address. supra note 16. at 286 (stating that the "appearance of the con-
tainer may turn out to be the single most important factor in the marketing, sale, and 
distribution of the commodity"); see also Comment, Copyright Protection, supra note 
6. 
842. Contrast, e.g., the broad protection of ornamental designs under Belgian copyright law 
from 1935 to 1975 with the limited protection afforded similar designs under Nether-
lands copyright law during the same period, notwithstanding the fact that neither coun-
try possessed a special design law at the time. See. e.g., Reichman, Designs After 
1976. supra note 17, at 283-97 ("The Benelux Experience"). 
843. [d. The case of Belgium from 1935 to 1975 was a prime example. See. e.g .• Braun, 
supra note 46, at 99-101. 
844. For example, after the movement to bring commercial designs into international copy-
right law failed at the Brussels Conference to Revise the Berne Convention in 1948, the 
sui generis design laws were assigned a new role. and reform legislation became wide-
spread. The adoption of article 5 quinquies at the Lisbon Conference to Revise the 
Paris Convention in 1958 confirmed this orientation. See Paris Convention, supra note 
I, art. 5 quinquies; Reichman, Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1164-67 (citing 
authorities). 
845. See 2 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 837-40; supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
846. Copyright, Designs and Patent Act of 1988 [United Kingdom], supra note 202, Part 
III, §§ 213-64. "Unregistered design right, or 'design right' as it is referred to by the 
CDPA 1988, is a new hybrid concept which draws upon elements subsisting in copy-
right, registered designs and patents. Its purpose is to provide residual protection for 
purely functional designs which do not appeal to the eye and thus do not qualify for 
artistic copyright or for registration under the RDA (Registered Designs Act of 1949)." 
R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 360. See also infra notes 948-63 and accompanying text. 
847. See supra notes 8, 82-87 and accompanying text. Although the design law of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany was designated a Design Copyright Law, it evolved the typi-
cal patent-like standards of eligibility while retaining a relatively soft form of protec-
tion. See supra notes 82, 87, 824 and accompanying text; Katzenberger, supra note 
505, at 94-96 (stressing requirements of objective-relative novelty and of qualitative 
originality that "must exceed the average skill of a designer in the field in question"). 
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c. Failings of the Modified Patent Approach 
The typical sui generis design law streamlines some of the procedural 
inconveniences of the full patent approach while softening its exclusionary 
tests of eligibility and retaining the strict registration requirements charac-
teristic of industrial property systems.848 These tests of eligibility, usually 
cast in terms of novelty and qualitative originality,849 disfavor small- and 
medium-sized entrepreneurs who contribute the bulk of today's design inno-
vation. 
Unlike the largest firms, which develop a few product lines from 
scratch,850 the smaller manufacturers launch myriad designs onto the mar-
ket each year without knowing in advance which, if any, will capture the 
public's fancy. In order to maximize protection while fulfilling the novelty 
requirements of the special design laws, these producers would have to file 
applications on their entire output. This in turn would oblige them to 
absorb the costs of preparinS elaborate claims as well as substantial publi-cation and registration fees. 8 I But when small- and medium-sized produc-
ers try to reduce transaction costs by selecting those creations that might 
better justify such expenditures, they find that they cannot test market their 
designs without a loss of novelty under the typical sui generis regime. 852 
Once designers spend the sums needed to comply with the sui generis 
laws, moreover, they often obtain a disappointingly low level of protection. 
If the novelty test does not strike the design down owing to a premature dis-
closure or sale prior to filing, then stiff qualitative originality and nonfunc-
tionality requirements ·as judicially interpreted in most countries will retro-
activelr exclude a large part of the registered designs as unworthy of protec-
tion.85 Proprietors who survive these formal and substantive challenges 
848. See supra notes 8, 78-88, 847 and accompanying text. For recent liberalization of the 
design law in the Federal Republic of Germany, see supra note 82 and accompanying 
text. For atypical features of the French design law, which does not penalize disclosure 
prior to registration, see supra note 81. 
849. See supra'notes 87, 847 and accompanying text. 
850. See infra note 857 and accompanying text. 
851. See, e.g., Wibbens, supra note 84, at 258 (stating that "the formal registration require-
ments-to put it mildly-are intricate and cumbersome," and the "costs involved ... 
are often excessively high for a self-employed designer [under the Uniform Benelux 
Designs Law of 1975»"; see also Levin, Recent Developments, supra note 87, at 276 
(discussing the Nordic Countries). 
852. See, e.g., supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text. Japan, however, was an exception, 
see supra note 82, as was France, see supra note 81. Other exceptions stem ming from 
very recent legislation include the Federal Republic of Germany, see supra note 82, and 
the United Kingdom, see supra note 846. The standard eligibility requirements con-
vert most special design laws into legal instruments of primary interest to big firms. 
See infra note 857. 
853. See supra notes 87, 847 (citing and quoting authorities). For the surprisingly strict eli-
gibility requirements in the Nordic Countries and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
see, e.g., Levin, Recent Developments, supra note 87, at 276; Kruger, supra note 393, at 
171-76; Katzenberger, supra note 505, at 94-96. But see Kunz-Hallstein, supra note 
393, at 71-72 (suggesting that German courts have begun to relax the qualitative origi-
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then discover that courts everywhere seem psychologically unprepared to 
protect design concepts against more than slavish imitation. 854 
At their worst, the sui generis design laws operating on modified patent 
principles either exclude the bulk of the designs they are nominally set in 
place to protect or provide ineffective and costly protection against misap-
propriation8S5 of a kind that some countries make available-to varying 
degrees and at various periods-in their laws of unfair competition at a 
much lower cost. 856 At their best, the special design laws are of primary 
interest to big firms prepared to spend large amounts on research and devel-
opment, advertisinf' and the legal fees necessary to secure systematic 
design protection. 8 7 In either case, the exclusion of commercial designs 
from copyright law on a theory that the creators' needs are met by sui 
generis design laws all too often turns out to be chimerical because existing 
laws do not actually cover the bulk of today's design innovation for one rea-
son or another. 
The twice excluded designs are thus headed for the public domain, 
with no certain refuge against free-riding imitations, unless their originators 
nality standard that was judicially stiffened in 1968 and citing a recent decision allow-
ing protection for the design of an automobile fender (1987 BGH GRUR 518 
(Kortftugel)). While Italian law has consistently been more receptive, see supra note 
87, the Benelux reform of 1975 sought to obviate the problems identified in the text by 
holding to an objective novelty standard without demanding qualitative originality. 
See, e.g., Uniform Benelux Designs Law, supra note 4, art. 4; A. BRAUN & J.J. EVRARD, 
DRoiT DEs DEsSINS ET MODELES Au BENEUJX 22 (1975). However, the level of objec-
tive novelty readily drifts upward towards nonobviousness when it is the sole criterion 
applied, as experience in the Federal Republic of Germany strikingly illustrated at an 
earlier period. See, e.g., E. ULMER, supra note 393, at 149-50; Englert, The Law of 
Industrial Designs in Germany-Actual State and Reform Proposals, 12 I.I.C. 773, 
778-79 (1981). This was not, it seems, the intention of the Benelux drafters. See, e.g., 
Braun, Droit Benelux, in i>RarEGER LA FoRME 168, 169 (INPI ed. 1981). Nevertheless, 
this "novelty prerequisite is strictly interpreted" in practice. Wibbens, supra note 84, 
at 255, 258. For the uncertain eligibility standards in the United Kingdom under 
either the registered or the unregistered design laws after 1988, see infra note 948 and 
accompanying text. 
854. See, e.g., Katzenberger, supra note 50S, at 94 (noting that design law of Federal Repub-
lic of Germany protects "only against copying and does not grant an exclusive right 
against any use of the creation, such as that granted by industrial property rights"); 
Levin, Recent Developments. supra note 87, at 276-77 (discussing the Nordic Coun-
tries). See generally M.A. P£R01'-MOREL, LES PRINCIP£S, supra note 8, at 19. 
855. The more functional the design, the more courts seem prone to exonerate copying. 
See. e.g., Ljungman, supra note 820, at 124 (discussing Nordic law). If the nonfunc-
tionality requirement is lowered to counteract this tendency, as occurred in Nordic law, 
see id., courts seem likely to elevate the other substantive prerequisites. See, e.g., 
Levin. Recent Developments. supra note 87, at 276. 
856. See Loi federale contre la concurrence deloyale du 19 decembre 1986 [Switzerland), 
art. 5, effective Mar. I, 1988 (Federal Law on Unfair Competition of December 1986), 
reprinted in 27 INDUS. PROP. (Laws & Treaties Supp. Sept. 1988); see also Probst, supra 
note 524, at 108 (discussing this law). 
857. See. e.g., Wibbens, supra note 84, at 258 (discussing Benelux countries). This 
oligopolization of the design law appeared very pronounced in the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the 1 970s, to judge from at least one public survey. See generally B. 
ENGLERT, supra note 82. For a detailed description of how one large firm operates in 
this connection, see van der Put & Komarnicki. supra note 748. 
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supplicate at the portals of unfair comrsetition law or attempt to re-enter 
copyright law through the back door.8 8 To the extent that some courts 
respond to these supplications by stretching unfair competition law, they 
undermine the policies behind the sui generis design laws and trigger new 
forms of overprotection that are still more anticompetitive than the exclu-
sive rights of copyright law. 859 Meanwhile, other courts may sooner or later 
allow copyright law to rescue a few exceptional designs from the flood of 
refugees, esr:cially if judges perceive their creators to be victims of unjust 
enrichment. 60 The latest and most clamorous incident of this kind was the 
decision of the ,Netherlands Supreme Court to allow copyright protection 
under domestic law for a design that did not qualify for protection under the 
Uniform Benelux Designs Law, notwithstanding the express anticumulation 
clause inserted in the design law to avoid this very result. 861 
Once a copyright tribunal agrees to admit some particularly creative 
design, however, it becomes difficult for succeeding courts to justify treat-
ing one set of designs more sympathetically than the rest without byzantine 
rationalizations that become increasingly arbitrary and protectionist over 
time. 862 The zig-zag line of decisions certain to result from trying to distin-
guish copyrightable "works of applied art" from noncopyrightable "indus-
trial designs" under the traditional criteria, and the subtle controversies this 
breeds, then elicit demands for yet another experiment in full copyright pro-
tection of all commercial designs under the "unity of art" banner.863 When 
this occurs, the cycle is ready to recommence, with no prospects of break-
ing out of the historical pattern on the horizon , 864 as the recent experience of 
the Benelux countries so dramatically reconfirms. 865 
858. See Reichman, Designs After 1976. supra note 17, at 371-72. 
859. See. e.g., van Nieuwenhoven Helbach, supra note 522, at 6-8, 12-18 (referring to Neth-
erlands law); supra text accompanying notes 734-45. 
860. Compare. e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (fearing a result that "enables the commercial pirates of the marketplace to 
appropriate for their own profit, without any cost to themselves, the work of talented 
designers who enrich our lives with their intuition and skill") with id. at 999 (Wein-· 
stein, I, dissenting) (seeing copying as a purely licit act of competition because "Con-
gress and the Supreme Court had answered in favor of commerce and the masses rather 
than the artists, designers, and the well-to-do"). 
861. See Braun, .~upra note 46, at 98-106 (discussing the ScreenoprinlS decision of May 22, 
1987; model of sunscreen for automobiles, denied protection in design law tor lack of 
novelty, was allowed protection in Netherlands copyright law, notwithstanding article 
21 of the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, which limits copyright protection under 
domestic laws to designs. having a "marked artistic character"). 
862. See, e.g., M.A. ~Ror-MoREL, LES PRINCIPES, supra note 8, at 42-45; Desbois, supra 
note 7, at 74. 
863. See Desbois, supra note 7, at 74; Braun, supra note 46, at 98-99; supra notes 502-05 
and accompanying text. 
864. Nevertheless, the "unity of art" regime in France has remained remaritably stable over 
time despite its excessive level of protection. See supra note 812; Fran~on & Perot-
Morel, Conclusion, in LES OESSINS ET MODELES EN QuESTION, supra note 8. For the 
significance of this stability in determining a valid future solution, see infra text 
accompanying notes 899-972. . 
865. See supra note 861; BraUD, supra note 46, at 105-06 (concluding that, notwithstanding 
article 21 of the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, supra note 4, the way is open for abu-
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B. From Industrial Design to the New Technologies 
Most commentators still view design protection law as a marginal case 
that does not challeng: the general soundness of the world's intellectual 
property framework. 8 In retrospect, however, it appears more accurate to 
view industrial design as a precursor of the many legal hybrids that world 
intellectual property law would strive to accommodate in the last quarter of 
the twentieth century.867 While a thorough analysis of this topic lies beyond 
the scope of the present Article,868 it is instructive to identify the ways in 
which neither industrial designs nOf the products of new technologies 
behave in a manner consistent with the standard assumptions underlying the 
international patent and copyright systems. 
1. Incremental Innovation Bearing Know-How on Its Face 
The bulk of today's most valuable innovations flow from incremental 
improvements in applied scientific know-how. 869 Traditionally, unpatent-
able industrial know-how87o remained exempt from free competition only so 
sive protection of designs and models in the Benelux copyright laws, which may once 
again cover such objects as signboards. notepads. the head of a grease gun. and a 
stool). For similar excesses in French law. see supra note 821. 
866. See supra notes 813-17 and accompanying text. Compare. e.g., Braun & Evrard. supra 
note 520 (discounting objections to modified patent protection of industrial art) with 
Cohen Jehoram, Cumulative Protection. supra note 367 (discounting objections to full 
copyright protection of industrial art); see also H. HUBMANN. URHEBER- UND 
VERLAGSRECHT 35-40, 84-95 (4th ed. 1978) (assimilating the protection of industrial 
designs to the protection of skilled efforts in general). 
867. See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23. at 655, 661-67. 
868. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids. supra note 834. 
869. See generally Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23. at 641-42,648-67, 
714-18; see also Kingston, The "Thesis" Chapters (hereinafter Kingston. Thesis], in 
DIRECT PROTECTION OF INNOVATION 1-123 (w. Kingston ed. 1987); F. MAGNIN, KNOW-
How ET PRoPRIETE INDUSTRIELLE 14-22, 93-94, 38\-88 (1974) (emphasizing the dis-
tinctive phenomenology of know-how as a basis for its positive recogrution in interna-
tional industrial property law); Kronz, Patent Protection for Innovations: A Model (pt. 
1),7 E.I.P.R. 178 (1983). 
870. See Reichman, Programs as Know-How. supra note 23, at 656, stating: 
Broadly conceived, know-how encompasses the "totality of unpatented knowl-
edge utilized in industry." It is not concerned with major principles or inven-
tive ideas, but rather with "detailed innovation in industrial techniques" of a 
practical nature that is often the "fruit of ... experience and trial and error." 
The value of know-how is thus measured in terms of commercial superiority 
and marketing advantages. It typically accrues from incremental improve-
ments on some aspect of the existing state of an art and not from creative 
activity that raises the level of an art as a whole. Because know-how includes 
"techniques that are still at an experimental stage." ... it links the kinds of 
basic and applied research normally carried out in academic and other nonin-
dustrial institutions with industrial research and development. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see. e.g., 3 S. LAUo\S. supra note I. at 1617; F. DEssEMONTET. 
THE LEGAL PRoTEcrION OF KNow-How IN THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERICA II. 16 (2d 
ed. 1976); F. MACiNIN, supra note 869, at 14-22.93-94.381-88; Troller. The Legal Pro-
tection of Know-How: General Report, in THE PRarEcrION OF KNow-How IN 13 CouN. 
TRIES 149, 150, 152 (H. Cohen lehoram ed. 1971). 
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long as it was neither voluntarily disclosed. nor reverse engineered. 871 
Because the task of reverse engineering took time and cost money, it 
endowed innovators with a period of natural lead time in which to secure a 
foothold in the market. 872 
In contrast, much of today's most advanced technology enjoys a less 
favorable competitive position than that of conventional machinery because 
the unpatentable, intangible know-how responsible for its commercial value 
becomes embodied in products that are distributed on the open market. A 
product of the new technologies, such as a computer program or an inte-
grated circuit design, or even a biogenetically altered organism may thus 
bear its know-how on its face, a condition that renders it as vulnerable to 
rapid appropriation by second comers as any published literary or artistic 
work. 813 
From this perspective, a major problem with the kinds of innovative 
know-how underlying important new technologies is that they do not lend 
themselves to secrecy even when they represent the fruit of enormous invest-
ment in research and development. 874 Because third parties can rapidly 
duplicate the embodied information and offer virtually the same products at 
lower prices than those of the originators, there is no secure interval of lead 
time in which to recuperate the originators' initial investment or their losses 
from unsuccessful essays, not to mention the goal of turning a profit. 875 
When innovators turn to the world's intellectual property system for 
relief, however, they find that its dominant paradigms are structured to pro-
871. See, e.g., 3 S. LADAS, supra note I, at 161 7, 1621. In this sense, know-how bears 
affinities to trade secrets. F. DEsSEMONTET, supra note 870, at II, 18-20,33-48. But 
see F. MAGNIN, supra note 869, at 113-16 (stressing the importance of differentiating 
know-how from trade secrets). The line of demarcation between inventions and know-
how is correspondingly uncertain. See Troller, supra note 870, at 151-53, 156-57, 
160-64. 
872. In simpler days, a conventional manufacturer could "transfer the possession of a new 
machine without transferring the know-how involved in manufacturing the machine," 
which would have to be reverse engineered. Galbi, Proposal for New Legislation to 
Protect Computer Programming, 17 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 280, 281 (1969). The 
protection of traditional forms of industrial know-how is thus entrusted to contracts 
and trade secret laws, which make acquisition of the pertinent knowledge unlawful only 
when obtained by means that violate private agreements or that are generally forbidden 
by law or are against public policy. See, e.g., Troller, supra note 870, at 156 (basing 
work on comparative surveys of 13 countries, including the United States); see also 
Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 
688-93,699-701,711-23 (1980). 
873. See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 656-60 (citing authorities); 
Galbi, supra note 872, at 280-81; see also W. KINGSTON, INNOVATION, CREATIVITY AND 
LAw 122-23 (1989). 
874. Owing to its intangible and intellectual nature, know-how remains potentially ubiqui-
tous, like artistic works, despite its embodiment in a tangible medium. See, e.g., F. 
MAGNIN, supra note 869, at 115-16; "Iroller, supra note 870, at 151. 
875. See generally Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 658-60. While the 
know-how embodied in commercial products may still have to be reverse engineered 
after duplication, the second comer who obtains the physical support can more rapidly 
accomplish this result than when the desired information remained under lock and key 
at the factory. 
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teet "art" and "inventions." Present-day innovation fits imperfectly.within 
either category. Viewed as industrial inventions, advances in the new tech-
nologies often appear too incremental and too small in scale to qualify as 
major breakthroughs under the "nonobviousness" or "inventive step" 
requirements of patent law. 876 At the same time, these technologies serve 
impersonal, functional goals that make them alien ·to the spirit of laws 
devised to protect literary and artistic works.877 Today's most economically 
significant technologies are thus likely to be intermediate technologies878 
that fall between the patent and copyright paradigms. 879 
2. Industrial Design as the Oldest Marginal Case 
Those familiar with the legal history of industrial design will observe 
that the conditions facing innovators working in the new technoiogies880 do 
not represent such a novel constellation in the intellectual property universe 
as is fashionable to pretend. On the contrary, industrial design and the 
more recent technologies, such as computer software design, integrated cir-
cuit design, and, to some extent, even the products of genetic engineering 
share a common behavior pattern that deviates from the standard assump-
tions underlying the dominant paradigms of the world's intellectual.prop-
erty system. This pattern may be characterized as "a proclivity to yield 
extravagant financial rewards from incremental improvements in know-how 
that require considerable capital and effort to develop" coupled with "a vul-
nerability to rapid duplication by competitors who bear no part of the devel-
opment expenditure.,,881 
The problems of providing adequate legal protection for the new tech-
nologies thus resemble those that have plagued the design industries for a 
876. See, e.g., Kingston, Thesis, supra note 869, at 31. For a remarkable study of the dif-
ficulties of applying patent law to computer programs, see Samuelson, Benson Revis-
ited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other Computer Program-
Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025 (1990). 
877. See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 660-61 . 
878. These technologies are not "intermediate" in the sense this term is also used to connote 
traditional technologies requiring moderate levels of skill that are appropriate for devel-
oping countries to absorb in an integrating world economy. The author regrets this 
ambiguity but has not found an acceptable alternative for the term "intermediate tech-
nologies" as used in this Article. 
879. See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 662 stating: 
The fear is that these intermediate technologies, if left to fend for themselves 
in this nether world between the dominant paradigms, will attract insufficient 
investment owing to the great risk of loss. . . in the innovative enterprise and 
to the likelihood that imitators rather than innovators will reap the rewards of 
success in the end. Consequently, world intellectual property law has come 
under intense pressure to alleviate this perceived risk aversion by providing 
modem innovators with artificial lead time through one legal device or 
another. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
880. See supra. text accompanying notes 868-79. 
881. Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 655 (citing authorities). 
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century or more. The designer's know-how consists in giving rhysical 
expression to technical, organizational, and marketing demands88 and in 
harmonizing these demands with aesthetic features883 in products that yield 
the desired volume of sales within parameters set by the world market. 884 
Increasingly, this know-how includes the use of laser holograms, computer-
generated displays, and other new techniques,88s as well as the psychologi-
cal and sociological inputs of human factors engineering. 886 
Modern industrial design thus concerns intangible products of skilled 
efforts that are embodied in physical supports887 and distributed on the 
open market888 with little or no possibility of invoking the trade secret laws 
that otherwise protect nonpatentable innovation.889 In this respect, the 
design industries resemble publishers of literary and artistic works who lack 
autonomous means of preventing free-riders from appropriating the rewards 
of high-risk investments in creations that obtain commercial success.890 By 
882. See. e.g., E. MANZINI, supra note 824, at 54 (stressing the "growing number of actors" 
and the "mass of knowledge" which makes the individual design contribution largely 
dependent "on an exchange of information, a capacity to establish contact with thase 
wha know how to perform certain other processes") (emphasis supplied); C. LoRENZ, 
supra note 263, at 10-27, 145-49 (stating that in many companies "the industrial 
designer remains the only person directly in touch with both technology and the con-
sumer"); see also Gray, The Role of Design in Strategic Business Development: Method-
ology and Case Histories, in DEsIGN POLICY, supra note 825, at 32-39. 
883. See, e.g., Roy, Product Design'and Innovation in a Mature Consumer Industry, in DESIGN 
POLICY, supra note 825, at 91-97;'Dratler, supra note 564, at 890,892; Truijen, supra 
note 840, at 170-71. Truijen states: "Now how must we view artistry in industrial 
design? The structure, composition, functioning and expression of an ,industrial utility 
product we call its appearance ... [nJow the designer harmonizes these ... divergent 
elements. Practicing design and even applied science in this creative manner is what I 
call artistry of the highest rank." Id. (emphasis supplied); see also J. HESKElT, supra 
note 493, at 145-56. 
884. See, e.g., C. LoRENZ, supra note' 263, at 145 (stressing globalization of products and 
markets as "an extra stimulus to the emergence of industrial design"). See generally D. 
UGHANWA & M. BAKER, supra note 263. For legal perspectives on the role of market 
factors, see, e.g., Benussi, supra note 8, at 61-62; Fabiani, LA Protezione dell'arte 
applicata, supra note 18, at 414', 416-17. ' 
885. See, e.g., J. MORRIS & B. QuEST, supra note 3, at 184-89; D. UGHAN~ & M. BAKER, 
supra note 263, at 277-95 ("The Impact of Computers on Design"). 
886. See supra note 825 and;accompanying text; see also Doblin, Information and Design: 
The Essential Reliltion, in DEsIGN IN THE INR:>RMATION ENVIRONMENT 18-30 (P. Whiting 
ed. 1985); Curtis, supra note 825, at 76 (stating that the design of a modern user inter-
face for a computer program may require the joint efforts of computer scientists, elec-
trical engineers, computational linguists, graphic designers and human factors experts, 
among others). 
887. See supra note 873 and accompanying text. 
888. See supra text accompanying notes 832-47 ("Two-Market Conundrum"). 
889. Cf. supra notes 874-75 and accompanying text. 
890. See supra note 873 and accompanying text. Both works of art and innovative design 
solutions must capture the public's fancy in order to yield significant economic returns 
on their respective markets segments, even though designs must also embody func-
tional efficiencies that meet industry standards. The diffic;ulties of predicting the pub-
lic's fancy are thus a source of high risk aversion to investors in art or design. See infra 
text accompanying notes 908-10. 
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the same token, the deepest affinities between industrial design and works 
of art derive less from their common origins in the arts and crafts tradi-
tion891 than from a shared behavioral response to market forces that disrupt 
the standard legal mechanisms balancing private and public interests in 
free-market economies.892 
Viewed from this angle, a parallel exists between the failure of certain 
new technologies to obtain adequate protection under the dominant para-
digms of world intellectual property law and the much older and better doc-
umented difficulties facing industrial design in that same universe of dis-
course. In the one case, the patent paradigm will exclude the bulk of today's 
costly innovations in applied scientific know-how because they a~pear to 
represent slight or merely incremental advances over the prior art. 8 3 In the 
other case, design innovation normally reflects only small variations on 
established themes rather than major advances in a designer's chosen field of 
endeavor, and these variations look "obvious" in the patent sense even when 
novel and attractive to consumers. 894 In either case, applying the generous 
modalities of copyright law to protect tangible embodiments of know-how 
turns out to disrupt the balance between competition and monopoly on the 
general products market, which is otherwise a function of the strict patent 
paradigm. 895 
The foregoing analysis suggests that any long-term solution to the 
unsolved puzzle of design protection law is linked with the need for interna-
tional regulation of the important new technologies falling between the pat-
ent and copyright paradigms.896 The drive for a new intellectual property 
891. See, e.g., C. LoRENZ, supra note 263, at II; Dratler, supra note 564, at 890-91 (deem-
phasizing aesthetic component while emphasizing other important goals including 
safety, ease of use, cost of manufacture, ease of repair, and extent to which product is 
also "fun . . . to use"); see also Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 
Goo. L.J. 287, 343 (1988) (stressing external constraints that limit the expression of 
personality in particular forms of inteIlectual property). 
892. When free riders who share none of the risks and burdens of the creative enterprise 
capture the innovator's market by selling copies at prices lower than the latter's own 
marginal costs, consumers benefit in the short-run by paying less for any particular 
design solution. The long-run effects become counterproductive if the aggregate 
investment in product design falls chronically short of the aggregate risk capital needed 
to sustain healthy levels of international competition based on an innovative mix of aes-
thetic and technological skills. See generally Brown, supra note 32, at 1386-95; cf C. 
LoRENZ, supra note 263, at 25 (stressing the proper "marketing mix"). For the ways in 
which intellectual property law serves to organize markets for the efficient exploitation 
of intellectual goods, see Lehmann, supra note 263; Ullrich, supra note 263; Kitch, 
The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & EcoN. 265 (1977). 
893. See, e.g., F. MAGNIN, supra note 869, at 15-16, 121-26; Kingston, Thesis, supra note 
869, at 31; Galbi, supra note 872, at 281 (stating that "[tlhe patent system can ade-
quately protect inventive concepts; however, the patent law does not have any means of 
protecting the investment which goes into developing noninventive innovations"). 
894. See, e.g., Dratler, supra note 564, at 892; Crouwel, supra note 815, at 161-64, 167. 
895. See supra notes 832-47 and accompanying text. 
896. See supra note 879. 
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regime to protect applied scientific know-how has barely got under way, 897 
however, and it will take time to form a consensus concerning the real 
nature of the problem let alone the difficulties of negotiating internationally 
acceptable legal machinery to deal with it. 898 Meanwhile, as the oldest and 
most unruly marginal case in the history of intellectual property law, indus-
trial design has left a long record of failed solutions that are eminently 
worthy of study, and new design protection laws constitute a kind of living 
laboratory in which to test solutions that may later acquire much broader 
applicability. 
3. Logic of a Modified Copyright Approach 
It follows that reformers could address the regulatory problems posed 
by the newest legal hybrids with greater confidence if progress were made 
in curtailing the disruptive effects of the one legal hybrid that has been 
around for the longest period of time. Assuming that a drive to harmonize 
the intellectual property laws of the industrialized countries within a GATT 
Code of Conduct could provide sufficient impetus to make this effort,899 a 
logical point of departure is to reexamine the peculiar attraction that the 
copyright paradigm has continually exerted upon the design hybrid notwith-
standing its formal collocation within the Paris Convention for the Protec-
tion of Industrial Property. 900 
a. Why Know-How Seeks the Copyright Modality 
The persistence with which certain industries exploiting new technolo-
gies parrot demands for copyright protection long voiced by sectors of the 
design industries and their supporters suggests that more is at stake than the 
mere avoidance of free competition. 90 1 A plausible explanation is that cer-
897. See generally OIRECr PROTECTION OF INNOVATION (w. Kingston ed. 1987); Reichman, 
Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 660-62, 714-18. 
898. Not all observers are equally pessimistic, however. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, New Informa-
tion Products: A Challenge to Intellectual Property Theory, 20 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 
897 (1988); Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 50, at 884-85 (contending that the 
Uruguay Round of GAlT trade negotiations could feasibly produce a pact concerning 
slavish duplication of new technologies). . 
899. See generally Reichman, GATT Connection, supra note 50, at 857 (discussing designs); 
id. at 854-61 (discussing general problems of harmonization). For the difficulties of 
harmonizing the copyright laws of the European Community countries, see generally 
Schricker, Harmonization of Copyright in the European Community, 20 I.I.C. 466, 
483-84 (1989); Dietz, The Harmonization o/Copyright in the European Community, 16 
I.I.C. 379 (1985). . 
900. See supra notes 1-2,43-46 and accompanying text. 
901. For analogies between industrial designs and artistic works and the criticism they 
elicit, compare, e.g., E. POUILLET, supra note 502, at 49-54 and Cohen Jehoram, Cumu-
lative Protection, supra note 367 with F. PERRET, supra note 8, at 246 ("By evoking 
scholastic examples of Benvenuto Cellini's saltcellar or candelabra by Raphael, one has 
supposedly justified drawing into the orbit of copyright law a body of intellectual prod-
ucts that bear only an apparent resemblance to the creations covered by this regime.") 
(trans.). Similar analogies between computer programs and literary works stress the 
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tain regulatory features of the mature copyright paradigm inherently pro-
vide a unique response to the needs of these same industries notwithstand-
ing the industrial character of the subject matters at issue.902 
With this hypothesis in mind, one may postulate that the mature copy-
right paradigm has largely evolved its present physiognomy because it deals 
with intellectual goods not protectable as trade secrets that require no 
reverse engineering to appropriate. 903 The dissemination of literary and 
artistic works to the public in tangible mediums of expression automatically 
exposes them to refined technologies of copying904 apt to nullify their crea-
tors' natural lead time. 90S The copyright system responds by supplying 
artificial lead time to all independent creations without regard to merit906 
and without requiring originators to preselect works thought to be worth the 
costs of formal registration.907 Wary of unreliable value judgments about 
creative, quasi-artistic content of program design and downplay both functional con-
straints and industrial exploitation. Compare, e.g., Clapes, Lynch & Steinberg, Silicon 
Epics and Binary Bards: Determining the Proper Scope of Copyright Protection for 
Computer Programs, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1493 (1987) with Karjala, Copyright, Computer 
Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMIITRIC;:S J. 33, 33-36 (1987) and 
Samuelson, supra note 25, at 663, 705-53. Even the case for protecting integrated cir-
cuit designs was based on false analogies to works of art. See, e.g., Kastenmeier & 
Remington, supra note 205, at 417,444. These aberrations have lately given rise to 
claims that biogenetic innovation should also qualify for copyright protection. See, 
e.g., Kay ton, Copyright in Living Genetically Engineered Works, 50 GED. WASH. L. REV. 
191 (1982). 
902. Although these analogies tend to advance self-serving protectionist claims that weaken 
the conceptual underpinnings of the world's intellectual property system as a whole, 
one should not assume that the protective modalities of the copyright paradigm are 
entirely unsuited to any of these controversial subject matters. See, e.g., Ladd, To Cope 
With the World Upheaval in Copyright Law, 19 COPYRIGHT 289,293 (1983) (arguing that 
international organizations should develop "new kinds of copyright-like protection out-
side copyright itself" rather than extending traditional copyright law to "technology-
containing works"); see also Dietz, Mutation du droit d'auteur-":'changement de 
paradigme en matiere de droit d'auteur, 138 R.I.D.A. 22-32,4246,60-62 (1988). 
903. See supra notes 870-75 and accompanying text. 
904. See, e.g., Gaubiac, Les nouveaux moyens techniques de reproduction et Ie droit d'auteur, 
123 R.I.D.A. 22,26 (1986). 
905. See, e.g., R. BENKO, supra note 833, at 21: "The currently predominant economic 
rationale for copyright protection is that ... knowledge goods ... create problems of 
market failure, externalities, and appropriability." See also Landes & Posner, Copy-
right Law, supra note 833. When the creator is affiliated with smaller- or medium-
sized firms and the copier is an oligopolist with distributive power, the latter's copying 
can reduce the former's natural lead time to minus zero by enabling the copier to arrive 
on distant markets ahead of the innovator. Cf International News Servo v. Associated 
Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
906. See, e.g., S. RICKETSON, supra note I, at 231-32; WIPO GUIDE, supra note 368, at 17 
("(M]any national laws ... provide that ... works must be original in the sense that 
they possess creativity. But originality must never be confused with novelty. . .. "). 
The copyright paradigm thus formulates no doctrinal criteria for distinguishing literary 
and artistic works worthy of protection from those of lesser merit, in order to avoid 
unacceptable risks of censorship and judicial bias. See, e.g., A. DIETZ, COPYRIGHT LAw 
IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF NATIONAL Copy. 
RIGHT LEGISLATION 30-31 (1978). 
907. See, e.g., Berne Convention, supra note I, art. 5(2) ("The enjoyment and the exercise of 
these rights shall not be subject to any formality."); A. DIETZ, supra note 906, at 23. 
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art908 and incapable of predicting which of even the most successful authors' . 
future works will capture or recapture the public's fancy, the mature copy-
right paradigm embraces all literary and artistic works simply by virtue of 
their being creations909 and leaves the assessment of merit entirely to the 
market. 
In practice, the exclusive rights of copyright law provide a pecuniary 
reward onlfc JO those authors and artists who successfully explore the pub-
lic's taste.9/ By securing a winner-take-all return for those relatively few 
creators able to capture the public's fancy, the copyright incentive over-
comes high risk aversion otherwise apt to discourage investment in the dis-
semination of cultural goodS.911 Unlike the patent paradigm, however, the 
copyright paradigm never prevents third parties from independently creat-
ing works of authorship similar to those already on the market. 912 Nor does 
copyright law invest authors with any generally recognized right to control 
the end use of protected works as SUCh.913 On the contrary, by encouraging 
third parties to make free and abundant use of nonprotectable matter under-
lying the protected expression, copyright laws foster a built-in process of 
908. See supra note 906; Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 US. 239 (1903). As 
regards core literary and artistic works, Bleistein postulates that the act of independent 
creation manifests the unique personality whose imprint is stamped upon the creative 
outpUt. However, this postulate often breaks down when applied to borderline utilitar-
ian matter, such as industrial designs and computer programs, for the reason that no 
personal imprint may be feasible or desirable. See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 891, at 
343. 
909. See supra note 906 and accompanying text; see also I S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 269-75 (1938) (explaining why 
imposition of a legally attributive registration system would cause unacceptable techni-
cal forfeitures to artists too poor or too distracted to comply with its procedural intrica-
cies). 
910. Apart from direct pecuniary rewards, the exclusive rights of copyright law enable 
authors to control the environments in which they will allow physical embodiments of 
their personal expression to circulate. See, e.g., 17 US.C. § 106(2)-(3) (1988). The 
Berne Convention further requires member states to protect moral rights. See Berne 
Convention, supra note I, art. 6 bis. 
911. Cf R. BENKO, supra note 833, at 21; supra note 905 (quoting Benko). Arguably, copy-
right law thus protects the economic fruits of a quasi depletable resource in much the 
same way that mining claims protect any mineral deposits the prospector is lucky 
enough to find. Cf Kitch, supra note 892 (stressing role of prospecting function in 
patent system). Functionally, this means that legal protection of literary and artistic 
works often produces a sweepstakes effect. Until commercial success is achieved, the 
exclusive rights of reproduction, adaptation and public performance enable authors to 
secure the proceeds arising from unknown but statistically predictable winning entries 
without requiring them to select particular winning entries in advance. 17 US.c. 
§ 106(1)-(2), (4) (1988). Later, these same rights prevent second comers from prema-
turely siphoning off the fruits of any lucky strike that happens to result and thus permit 
creators to defray the costs of past failures. 
912. See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984); 2 P. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 
19-21. See generally WIPO GUIDE, supra note 368, at 17-18; S. RICKETSON, supra 
note I, at 231-32. 
913. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 US. 99 (1879); Reichman, Programs as Know-How, 
supra note 23, at 693 n.288 (discussing droit de destination in context of Baker and cit-
ing authorities); see also Brown, Eligibility, supra note 788, at 590: 
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"reverse engineering" that enables many copyrightable works to cluster 
around common themes or ideas.914 
To the extent that the soft modalities of the copyright paradigm consti-
tute an economic response to the behavior of literary and artistic works 
under free-market conditions, one may logically postulate that similar 
modalities of protection would suit technological know-how that behaves in 
the marketplace like works of art and literature notwithstanding its indus-
trial character.915 From a behavioral standpoint, investors in applied scien-
tific know-how find the copyright paradigm attractive because of its inherent 
disposition to supply artificial lead time to all comers without regard to 
innovative merit and without requiring originators to preselect the products 
that are most worthy of protection. The peculiar modalities of this para-
digm then protect the market-determined values of eligible innovation on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, against copying only, for a lengthy period of time. 
These same modalities, however, exculpate fair followers who independ-
ently fashion their own creations by exploiting the unprotectable ideas 
revealed in the process of public distribution, a strategy likely to improve 
the technology available to the public at large. 
If these insights proved accurate, it would not follow that either indus-
trial design or the new technologies should obtain all the benefits of the 
mature copyright paradigm. The opposite is true. Developed with differ-
ent social purposes in mind, the full copyright paradigm provides too many 
creations with too much protection for much too long a time to satisfactorily 
promote technological progress.916 The foregoing analysis does suggest 
that the legal protection of intermediate technologies as a class could benefit 
from a judicious adaptation of the copyright modality that did not unduly 
disrupt the workings of a competitive market for industrial products. The 
task, in short, is to bring that much of the copyright paradigm to bear on . 
intermediate technologies as will perform needed protective services, while 
discarding such technical features (and all of the mystique) as are inconsist-
ent with the industrial nature of these same technologies. 
b. Measured Exploitation of a Possibly Fatal Attraction 
It follows that a copyright approach to intermediate technologies fall-
ing between the patent and copyright paradigms could yield unexpected 
social benefits, even though application of the full copyright paradigm to 
these same technologies tends to hinder innovation and produce intolerable 
914. See. e.g., WlPO GUIDE, supra note 368, at 12-13; 2 P. GoLDSTEIN, supra note 28, at 
26-28; see also Litman, The Public Domain, 39 Emory L.J. 965 (1990). 
915. See supra notes 873-79 and accompanying text. When the length of protection exceeds 
that needed to induce the appropriate level of investment, consumers are unduly pre-
vented from purchasing lower priced copies of the protected contribution. When the 
scope of protection is similarly excessive, it unduly inhibits second comers from build-
ing on the earlier contribution. 
916. See, e.g., Reichman, Programs as Know-How,supra note 23, at 696-98. 
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burdens on trade.917 By the same token, the most promising solution to the 
historical quest for a workable design protection law, when viewed in the 
context of a larger drive to protect advanced technological know-how, con-
sists of a sui generis regime built around modified copyright principles. 
(1) Thnets of a Tailor-Made Regime 
Ideally, the general provisions of a law or treaty devised for the protec-
tion of know-how as such would be supplemented by more specialized legal 
nuances that took account of the different physical supports in which know-
how became embodied and of the market factors pertinent to each class of 
supports.918 Within this framework, the distinction between aesthetic and 
functional designs would lose conceptual vitality as the protective bounda-
ries of a new paradigm congealed over time. Because such a solution 
remains a long way off, however, any present-day reform of design protec-
tion law must necessarily retain its autonomous character without the 
immediate advantages of integration into a larger legal matrix. A transi-
tional reform of this nature should disrupt competition no more than is nec-
essary to augment investment in improving the appearance of products des-
tined for a discriminating global market. 
Consistent with this goal, a model design law would make short-term 
protection of quantitatively creative appearance designs919 easy and cheap 
to acquire without demanding either absolute novelty or qualitative original-
ity in the patent sense. 920 It would thus leave a broad area of routine or 
generic designs free for the public to use while recognizing an intermediate 
range of protectable design innovation921 whose value was determined by 
917. See supra notes 832-47 and accompanying text. 
918. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 834. 
919. Cj. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 E2d 905,909-11 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying 
nontrivial variations doctrine of L. Batlin to designs derived from works still in copy-
right); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 E2d 486, 490-92 (2d Cir. 1976) (en banc) 
(requiring substantial variations for copyrightable reproductions of commercial 
designs already in the public domain and denying eligibility to products of "physical 
skills"); see also John Muller & Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer 'Jearn, Inc., 802 E2d 
989 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding logo not copyrightable for lack of creative contribution). 
920. See. e.g., S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (O'Mahoney-Wiley-Hart Bill), refining 
H.R. 8873, 85th Cong., Ist Sess. (1957) (Willis Bill). S. 2075 had been put together by 
a high-level committee of experts that included Register Arthur Fisher, Barbara Ringer, 
and Judge Giles Rich. The drafters were determined that a design law should "rest 
generally on the concept of originality, which in a broad sense can be called the princi-
ple of copyright," duly adjusted to reflect a quantitative creativity standard. See 
Ringer. supra note 790. at 25. 30-31. To qualify for protection. only a minimum 
degree of creative content was required, but standard, commonplace, or staple designs 
were expressly excluded. The term of protection was short (five or ten years), registra-
tion was allowed within six months from the time the design was "made known." and 
designs dictated by function or by the purpose of the article embodying it were 
excluded. See generally Reichman, Designs Before 1976, supra note 17, at 1186-1200 
("Toward an American Regime of Sui Generis Protection"). 
921. Cj. Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited to New Technology, 47 U. Prn: L. REV. 1229, 
1249-50 (1986). 
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the market and not by artificial legal standards or by the subjective evalua-
tion of a patent examiner.922 Within these limits, an autonomous regime 
should protect eligible combinations of line, shape, color, and texture 
against copying only but not against independent creation, a result conso-
nant with actual practice under existing design laws despite their patent-like 
character. 923 This regime would exclude functionally determined design 
features as such,924 although it would recognize that the overall image or 
configuration of most useful articles necessarily combines external visual 
features with highly utilitarian components. 925 
A modern design law should also permit test-marketing and other 
forms of disclosure prior to registration under a grace period of suitable 
length,926 an approach that can be used to exempt candidate designs from 
registration altogether for a specified period of time.927 It would make pro-
vision for (but not mandate) a marketable certificate of title to a discrete 
body of innovative matter that could be sold and policed as needed, without 
necessarily provoking technical forfeiture for a failure to comply with 
streamlined procedural formalities. 928 At the infringement stage, such a 
law could recognize an "experimental" or "analytical use" defense that 
would allow designers to study available models in order to find elbow room 
on crowded market segments.929 Defendants that otherwise established 
independent creation should also avoid liability for copying design features 
that had become market standards or that were essential to a competitor's 
ability to enter and stay on particular market segments. 930 
In keeping with a modified copyright approach, the proposed regime 
would not provide moral rights nor would it afford non salaried designers the 
922. See supra notes 906-14 and accompanying text. 
923. See supra notes 853-55 and accompanying text. 
924. See, e.g., S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(c) (1959); supra notes 208-10 and accom-
panying text. 
925. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13, 279-302. 
926. See, e.g., S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 4, 9(a) (1959); supra notes 82-88, 850-52 
and accompanying text. 
927. Compare the American design bills of the 1950s, see supra note 920 (providing a six-
month novelty grace period and allowing alternative protection under design patent 
law) with Draft European Design Law, arts. 10-11, published April 3, 1990 by the Max 
Planck Institute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law, 
Munich FRG (allowing a choice between formal protection of up to 25 years by regis-
tration or informal protection against slavish imitation for a two-year period). The cur-
rent design bills pending in the United States would permit a one year grace period 
between the time a design is made public and the final date of a mandatory application 
for registration. See, e.g., H~R. 3017, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); supra note 771. 
928. See supra note 927 and accompanying text; cf Stern, supra note 921, at 1247-49. The 
bundle of remedies can be varied to reward registration and disclosure without neces-
sarily diluting the bundle of exclusive rights as such. 
929. Cf. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, 17 U.S.C. § 906(a) (1988); R. STERN, 
supra note 205, § 5.5 ("Reverse Engineering"); see also Eisenberg, Palents and lhe 
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 
(1989). 
930. See supra notes 746-57 and accompanying text. 
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advantages that copyright law confers on commissioned authors and art-
ists.93t Above all, the low standard of eligibility would combine with high 
anticumulative barriers that foreclosed the possibility of long-term, concur-
rent protection under the full copyright paradigm.932 Nevertheless, such a 
regime could exist side by side with the stricter requirements of a more tra-
ditional patent system, in order to accommodate industries that deemed this 
a valuable option. 933 
A sui generis law along these lines would, in effect, constitute a "Iead-
time" law that substituted a very short period of artificial lead time for the 
lack of natural lead time that occurs under modem marketing conditions. 934 
It would provide a limited form of protection against the appropriation of 
specific design know-how by technical means of duplication, without pre-
tending to inhibit independent creation and without succumbing to the logic 
of either "art" or "inventions." 
(2) Empirical Models in Search of a Consensus 
Models for such a regime are not lacking, even though one looks in 
vain for any single exemplar on the statute books of the industrialized coun-
tries at the present time. For example, the ingenious design protection bill 
fashioned in the United States during the late 1950s was largely conceived 
along these very lines. 935 Had that law been enacted in 1976, even in the 
slightly shopworn version it acquired after protracted negotiations with spe-
cial interests, the design problem in this country would appear far more 
manageable than it does tOday.936 World intellectual property law might 
also have obtained valuable empirical data bearing on the regulation of the 
new technologies that have proliferated since the 1960s. In this connection, 
it is worth noting that the Draft Proposal for a European Community Design 
931. See 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1988) (definition of works made for hire); id. § 201(b); Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. CI. 2166 (1989). 
932. See Reichman, Designs Before 1976. supra note 17, at 1167-72, 1192-95. If an inter-
national consensus were formed around a short-term copyright-like modality, the line 
of demarcation with other regimes need not remain as intractable as in the past. Given 
such a consensus, the reduction of technical forfeitures should make courts more likely 
to respect the chosen line of demarcation in order not to undermine transnationa' policy 
goals embodied in the special regime as a whole. However, cumulation in trademark 
and unfair competition law could remain a problem. See. e.g., Brown, supra note 32, at 
1400-01; van Nieuweuhoven Helbach, supra note 522, at 12-15. 
933. See supra notes 926-27 and accompanying text; S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). 
934. See supra text accompanying notes 903-07. The tendency to establish a fifteen-year 
period in some of the design laws enacted during the 1970s results from an interna-
tional compromise with no compelling legallogi~ behind it. See. e.g., Cohen lehoram, 
Specific Protection, supra note 819, at 25 (criticizing the compromise figure as too 
short). The Italian design law, supra note 4, provided only four years of protection 
when enacted in 1940, i.e., it was a true lead-time law. Although the period was 
extended to fifteen years in 1977, the initial very short term of duration may explain 
why invalidation for lack of qualitative originality was rare. 
935. See S. 2075, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); supra note 920. 
936. See supra notes 22, 72-77 and accompanying text. 
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Law, launched by the Max Planck Institute in 1990, independently arrived 
at some of the same innovative solutions set out in the American bills of the 
1950s.937 
At least three further experiments with a modified copyright approach 
to advanced technological know-how have found expression in positive law 
since that lost opportunity in 1976.938 One was the Semiconductor Chip 
Protection Act of 1984,939 which other industrialized countries have emu-
lated under pressure from the United States.940 A second was the French 
decision to protect computer programs under a modified copyright 
approach,941 in defiance of the "unity of literature" gospel preached by the 
United States. 942 A third was the recent enactment of an unregistered 
design right as part of the United Kingdom's Copyright, Designs, and Pat-
ents Act of 1988.943 
In the short run, the French law concerning computer programs seems 
the most important of these experiments. To be sure, the cryptic measures 
. hurried into law in 1985 lacked the elegance of the design protection bill 
that the United States Congress debated between 1957 and 1976. The 
French law on computer programs suffers particularly from inattention to 
the scope of protection issues that have recently become so prominent in this 
country.944 But the French law of 1985 takes a critical step forward by rec-
ognizing the inherent linkage between "industrial art" and "industrial liter-
ature. ,,945 In so doing, it concedes by implication that the full copyright 
paradigm still governing ornamental designs under that country's regime of 
total cumulation amounts to overkill. 946 
In contrast, the decision to protect integrated circuit designs under the 
United States Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984947 and, more 
recently, the decision to protect both functional and aesthetic designs under 
937. See supra notes 927-28 and accompanying text. 
938. See supra text accompanying note 22. 
939. See supra note 203. 
940. See R. STERN, supra note 205, at 377-444; S.M. STEWART, supra note 201, at 333-42; 
see also McManis, supra note 205. 
941. Law No. 85-660 [France], arts. 45-51 (Des Logiciels), July 3, 1985, Journal Officiel, 
July 4, 1985, p.7495, tit. II, reprinted in RECEUIL DALLOZ SIREY 357,361 (1985); see, 
e.g., R. PLAISANT, PRoPRIETE LITTERAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 14-15, 22-23 (Supp. Mise a 
Jour No. I, Aug. I, 1985); Gaud rat , La protection des logiciels par/e droit d'auteur, 138 
R.I.D.A. 76 (1988). 
942. See supra notes 19-27 and accompanying text. A close parallel thus exists between the 
United States extension of copyright protection to computer programs and the aberra-
tions that occurred when France pressed the Berne Union Countries to absorb indus-
trial designs into their domestic copyright laws under the "unity of art" rationale. Cf 
Foyer, supra note 832, at 138-42 (noting contradictions between treatment of industrial 
designs and computer programs in French law). 
943. See supra note 846. 
944. For searching recent criticism on this score, see generally Gaudrat, supra note 941. 
945. See supra notes 941-42. 
946. See supra notes 43,942 and accompanying text. 
947. See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text. 
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the United Kingdom's Unregistered Design Right of 1988,948 are mixed· 
blessings at best. On the positive side, these measures constitute tentative 
steps in the direction of a regulatory system, based on a modified copyright 
approach, that actually deals with embodiments of technological know-how 
in tangible mediums of expression. These laws accordingly serve to break 
the stranglehold of the dominant inteIlectual property paradigms, they pro-
vide new models for the elaboration of future solutions, and they will enrich 
tlte pool of empirical data concerning the operational feasibility of nontradi-
tional regimes in general. 949 
948. See supra notes 202, 846; W.R. CoRNISH, supra note 202, at 190-91 (stressing 
influence of United States Semiconductor Chip Act on United Kingdom Unregistered 
Design Act). Prior to 1989, the United Kingdom protected aesthetic designs under 
either the Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, which operates on the patent 
model, or automatically under a terminable copyright, lasting fifteen years, if derived 
from drawings, sculpture or the like. See Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46, at 371. 
Functional designs not protectable under the Registered Designs Act of 1949 [RDA 
I 949J, supra note 3, became increasingly protectable under the copyright law if 
derived from engineering drawings or blueprints, at least until the British Leyland deci-
sion of 1986 removed automobile spare parts from copyright law. See Fellner, New 
U.K. Law, supra note 46, at 372-75; see also R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 361. In con-
trast, the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 48, entitled both aesthetic 
and functional designs to the unregistered design right, in addition to any registered 
design rights they mayor may not retain. Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46, at 
376-77. This right arises automatically on fixation, but the level of "originality" to be 
required by the courts was reportedly unclear in the text of the law and remains to be 
determined at the time of writing. Id. at 377-78, 380. The exclusive right is subject to 
unique exceptions ("must fit," "must match"), id. at 378-79, which are meant to 
"remove all protection from functional spare parts." R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 362. 
Duration is 10 to 15 years from fixation or first sale. Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 
46, at 383. The new law appears to abolish the possibility of cumulation between 
copyright law and the design rights, but in some cases there may be cumulation 
between the registered and unregistered design rights. Id. at 386-87, 389-91. The 
Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, has also been amended, with some pos-
sible softening of the eligibility requirements and a lengthening of duration to a mini-
mum of 25 years. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, Part IV, §§ 265-73; 
R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 308-36. The precise level of "novelty" to be required 
under the RDA 1949 as amended remains unclear, since the prior requirement of "orig-
inality," which meant qualitative originality akin to nonobviousness, was deleted, per-
haps without any intention to lower the preexisting standard. See id. at 317-18. 
The net result of these dispositions cannot be gauged at the time of writing, although 
there is a clear, if clumsy, attempt to reduce the scope for "unmeritorious," heavily 
functional designs under the RDA 1949, see id. at 318, and to eliminate full copyright 
protection of purely functional designs altogether. Id. at 361. Ms. Fellner regards the 
new provisions as a move towards the more restrictive regimes of Italy and Germany. 
See Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46, at 392. However, neither of these regimes 
operates on modified copyright principles, and they protect functional designs only as 
utility models subject to relatively stiff formal and substantive requirements. 
See supra notes 8, 82-87,196-99 and accompanying text. 
949. See R. MERKIN, supra note 3, at 297, stating: 
The [U.K.] government ... rejected the 1983 registration proposals ... [asJ 
unduly bureaucratic and expensive. It further rejected the introduction of an 
unfair copying law. . .. Consequently, the government opted for what it 
described as a "modified copyright approach," which in essence meant the cre-
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On the negative side, these legislative r~sponses to sectoral protection-
ist demands are crafted with the tinkerer's tools and without any unifying 
goal or concept in mind. They add to the clutter of ad hoc legal initiatives 
currently being thrown at applied scientific know-how without addressing 
the hard questions that need to be answered in order to achieve a universally 
valid approach. 95o Despite the formal accouterments of intellectual prop-
erty laws, such measures look like thinly disguised trade barriers that 
benefit some industries but not others for reasons that defy scientific investi-
gation.95 I Cumulatively, these laws may undermine free-markcrt principles 
more than a simple unfair competition law charged with protecting invest-
ment in new technologies from misappropriation for a short period of 
time,952 such as the law Switzerland enacted in 1986.953 
In the long run, an international intellectual property regime seriously 
concerned about advanced technological know-how would have to accom-
modate both aesthetic and functional designs within a common universe of 
discourse.954 That the United Kingdom's new design law already covers 
both types of designs955 undoubtedly gives it a futuristic dimension of con-
siderable experimental interest.956 This experiment results, nevertheless, 
from a concatenation of purely local events and conditions dating back to a 
legislative miscue in 1968957 and to a traditionally restrictive view of unfair 
ation of a new right, the unregistered design right, to operate alongside copy-
right and the RDA [Registered Designs Act of) 1949. 
Id.; see supra notes 846; 848, 948. 
950. See Reichman, Programs as Know-How, supra note 23, at 662-67. For example, both 
the chip laws and the unregistered design law fail to clarify what the appropriate stan-
dard of eligibility for purely functional designs should be in a universe of discourse in 
which comparable designs are traditionally protected as utility models. See supra 
notes 196-202 and accompanying text; cf Higashima & Ushiku, A New Means of Inter-
national Protection 0/ Computer:. Programs Through the Paris Convention-A New Con-
cept 0/ Utility Models, 7 COMPlITER L.J. I, 15-22 (1986). 
951. See generally Kastenmeier & Remington, supra note 205; Cornish, supra note 226, at 
300-09 (critically viewing developments in the United Kingdom). 
952. See generally Reichman, GAIT Connection. supra note 50, at 875-78; see also 
Dreyfuss, supra note 898. 
953. See supra note 524 and accompanying text. 
954. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 834. 
955. The new right is defined as .. 'a property right which subsists ... in an original 
design' .. and "no distinction is drawn or intended between aesthetic and functional 
designs; both are intended to be covered." Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46, at 
377. 
956. See supra notes 846,848,948-49. 
957. A hurried amendment to the Copyright Act of 1956, known as the Design Copyright 
Act of 1968, installed a regime of partial cumulation for fifteen years between the 
copyright law and the Registered Designs Act of 1949, supra note 3, without expressly 
excluding functionally dictated designs. To very literal minded courts, this opened the 
door to copyright protection of functional designs depicted in two-dimensional draw-
ings. See, e.g., Stevenson, Protection/or Industrial Designs Under the British Copyright 
Act 0/1956,8 A.P.L.A. Q.J. 369 (1980); Wallace, Protection/or Designs in the United 
Kingdom, 22 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'y 437, 437-39 (1975). The current round of 
design legislation and its vagaries is largely conditioned by recent judicial decisions 
limiting copyright protection of industrial designs in response to the notion that reverse 
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competition law.958 It thus lacks a theoretical foundation capable of justify-
ing the grant of privileged monopolies, and it is doubly suspect because its 
privileges are not exchanged for any specified levels of creative activity.959 
Successful implementations of this law may well depend on the willing-
ness of British courts to devise differentiated standards of eligibility accord-
ing to the degree of functionality embodied in the particular designs under 
litigation.960 Even if courts mustered the technical sophistication needed 
for this task, however, to attempt such a synthesis in an ad hoc domestic 
design law having no well-defined subject matter boundaries, no settled 
standard of eligibility, and no underlying theory of protection seems a for-
mula for mischie(J61 that could raise GATT problems962 and that should not 
be emulated by the United States. 963 
engineering constitutes infringement; by a government decision to curb prior restrairits 
on trade; and by the resistance of vested interests. See, e.g., R. MERKIN, supra note 3, 
at 283-98, 360-62; supra note 948; see also Cornish, supra note 226, at 299-306. In 
contrast, the United States Copyright Office forestalled a similar situation by codifying 
aspects of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), in § 113(b) of the 1976 Act. See 17 
U.S.c. § 113(b) (1988); supra notes 356-59 and accompanying text. Unfortunately, the 
authorities declined to extend the principles underlying § II3(b) to industrial literature 
(i.e., computer programs) in the 1976 Act, which leaves the courts to puzzle it out from 
Baker. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text. 
958. See, e.g., Cornish, supra note 226, at 306-07 (stressing that copyright law in the United 
'Kingdom had "become one vehicle for preventing specific kinds of misappropriation 
through copying, and this approach has in part made up for any broad concept of unfair 
competition"). 
959. See supra notes 846, 848,948; W.R. CORNISH, supra note 202, at 384 (predicting that 
the operative standard will be independent creation). But see Fellner, New U.K. lAw. 
supra note 46 (predicting that courts will read "original" to mean more than independ-
ent creation as regards functional designs under the unregistered design law). 
960. See supra note 959. But it remains to be seen how judges in the United Kingdom will 
cope with such a complicated and unorthodox intellectual property regime when they 
are prevented by tradition from interpreting it in the light of the pertinent legislative 
history. See Fellner, New U.K. Law, supra note 46. The British courts' approach to eli-
gibility under the unregistered designs law, difficult under the best of circumstances, 
will be further complicated by the uncertainty surrounding the eligibility standard 
under the Registered Designs Act of 1949 as amended in 1988. See supra note 948; R .. 
MERKIN. supra note 3, at 316-18. 
961. See, e.g., Cornish. supra note 226, a(300-09; cf Fran~on & P~rot-Morel, supra note 
864, at 420-26. 
962. See Reichman, GAIT Connection, supra note 50, at 888, stating: 
This law necessarily styles itself an intellectual property law for purposes of 
avoiding the basic GATT discipline under the exceptions of Article XX(d). 
Yet, it can be construed as protecting purely functional designs under a stan-
dard of zero creativity that rewards no innovative activity familiar from the 
history of intellectual property laws. while proclaiming itself exempt from the 
national treatment provision that governs all industrial property under the 
Paris Convention. . . . Protectionist legislation of this ilk arguably uses intel-
lectual property laws to create disguised barriers to trade, contrary to article 
XX(d) of the GATT and to the express mandate of the Uruguay Round. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also W.R. CORNISH, supra note 202, at 385-86 (questioning 
requirement of reciprocity at the expense of national treatment). 
963. See supra text accompanying notes 769-80. 
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Reformers should, instead, concentrate their efforts on devising a more 
workable sui generis framework for appearance designs without attempting 
to integrate functional designs into an overall solution until such time as 
industry itself welcomes disinterested investigation of the rationale underly-
ing a broadened protective regime.964 Absent a more enlightened consen-
sus concerning the real basis of protection,96S those countries seeking to 
harmonize their intellectual property systems within a GATT framework966 
should resolutely exclude functional designs-including structural designs 
of computer programs-from full copyright protection in all domestic legal 
systems.967 
The most logical step would then be to align a sui generis law protect-
ing industrial art on modified copyright principles with a similarly con-
structed law to protect industrial literature. The successful alignment of 
appearance designs and computer programs along a single; coherent axis 
could in turn trigger long-term international decisions to accommodate 
these and other borderline subject matters within a new, paradigmatic frame 
of reference supported by an appropriate international convention. Short of 
this goal, a generic international arrangement to limit technological free-
riding could be added to article 10 his of the Paris Convention as part of a 
GATT accommodation,968 and an anti-misappropriation norm of this kind 
could retain its validity independent of future projects to harmonize design 
laws or event to regulate the protection of applied scientific know-how as 
such. 
Meanwhile, the need to harmonize copyright laws within the European 
Community creates a unique opportunity to persuade these countries to 
adopt a modified copyright approach to their common design problem. 
964. The distinction between aesthetic and functional designs is solidly but not uniformly 
established in present-day domestic legal systems, apart from the United Kingdom's 
unregistered design right of 1988. See supra notes 846, 948, 959 and accompanying 
text. At the extreme, French copyright law remains capable of protecting purely func-
tional designs, unless barred by criteria that guard the line of demarcation with patent 
law. See, e.g., Franc;;on & Perot-Morel, supra note 864, at 424-26. See generally Perot-
Morel, Specific Protection, supra note 821. Recently, however, French couns have 
reacted to these excesses by elevating the functionality barrier to the point where many 
or most utilitarian designs are liable to invalidation under either the Copyright Law of 
1985 or the Design Law of 1909, owing to judicial subordination of these laws to the 
patent law. See Perot-Morel, Le systemefran~aise de La double protection des dessins el 
modeles industriels, in DJSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E PRarEzIONE EUROPEA 40; 44-48, 52-54 
(1989). The design laws of the Nordic countries tolerate a high incidence of functional 
content while formally protecting only the exterior aspect of an object; but this is offset 
by exigent novelty requirements. See Levin, Design Protection in the Nordic Coun-
tries-Basic Provisions and Recent Developments, in DtSEGNO INDUSTRIALE E 
PRorEzIONE EUROPEA 139, 141-43 (1989). 
965. See supra notes 869-900 and accompanying text. 
966. See supra note 899 and accompanying text. . 
967. For evidence that critical authority in most industrililized countries increasingly disfa-
vors full copyright protection of computer programs, see Reichman, Programs as 
Know-How, supra note 23, at 714 n.388. 
968. See Reichman, GAIT Connection, supra note 50, at 876-78,884-85. 
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Such an approach would enable leading Berne Union members to break the 
historical impasse that continues to block serious reform efforts at the inter-
national level. It would provide both the European Community and eventu-
ally the United States with most of the advantages that France has obtained 
under the "unity of art" approach, but at a much cheaper cost and without 
the trade restraints inherent in a regime that systematically overprotects 
industrial designs. Once implemented, moreover, a sui generis design law 
along these lines could shed much needed empirical light on the problems of 
regulating incremental innovation generally, and it could become a model 
for later, more ambitious efforts to manage the many legal hybrids falling 
between the patent and copyright paradigms. 969 
969. See supra notes 866-79 and accompanying text; see also Reichman, Legal Hybrids, 
supra note 834. . 
